State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 17 September 1888
• Citation: 7 S.E. 296,29 S.C. 201
• Parties: STATE v. JONES.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

7 S.E. 296

29 S.C. 201

STATE v. JONES.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 17, 1888

Appeal from general sessions circuit court of Edgefield county; J J. NORTON, Judge.

This was an indictment of R. T. Jones for the murder of Edward Pressley, Sr. There was a judgment of conviction, and defendant appeals. The court below gave the following charge to the jury:

"You have been appealed to by the state's counsel and by the counsel for the defense in regard to the discharge of your duty. Perhaps the views of the counsel were conflicting to you, and may have put you in some error on the question, so I will say something to you about that. You and I sit here for the trial of this cause. You are the triers of the fact, which you get from the evidence, as applicable to the law, as I give it to you. The proper division of these duties is important to the ends of justice. You are impartial men of sense, chosen from the vicinity. You know the witnesses. I am presumed to know the law, which is considered stable and applicable to a similar state of facts wherever found, and, if I mistake it, I may be corrected. If, coming to a right conclusion upon the facts you should mistake the law, your erroneous judgment could not be corrected. We are impartial. Attorneys for either side are not supposed to be so, and we are to take their statements, both on the law and the facts, guardedly. We are to investigate, respectively, the law and the facts for ourselves. Bear in mind the evidence which has been excluded, and give it no weight in coming to your conclusion. If counsel has inadvertently stated such to you, you will give it no weight. Counsel has very properly said that it is your memory of the facts, not mine, nor his, nor the state's attorney, which is to govern you. You are not to take the law from counsel, nor his books. Books are sometimes misleading, and the whole of the case is not brought to your attention, and you are not presumed to be able to have sufficient knowledge of the law to bring up the cases which are not read before you. One side claims that the same case means one thing, the other side claims that it means another thing; hence the necessity of an impartial interpreter, who has made the law a study. You are appealed to as an angel of mercy to save the defendant. You are appealed to resent the persecution of the defendant; but none of these things ought to move you. You are not a mob, to be influenced by passion. You are not to do anything but to find the facts, from the evidence fairly, impartially, and without prejudice, let the result be what it may. You must speak truly, according to the evidence, and according to the classical derivation of the technical name of the formal announcement of that finding and without regard to yourselves. I should feel insulted if I were asked to find the law out of sympathy; but, because insulted, I would, nevertheless, find the law in favor of the party who insulted me, if it were truly in his favor. So, no matter whether you like what has been said to you by the one side or the other, you will find the facts as they come from the evidence, fairly, impartially, and without prejudice. It is an unpleasant duty to sit upon a jury in any case, at any time, and pass upon the rights of parties where there is a contention. It is much more unpleasant where much is at stake, especially when one of the parties litigant suspects the jury of such bias that it cannot fairly try the case; and doubtless one of the jurors in this action feels greatly embarrassed by the position he occupies, without fault on his part, and I therefore desire to say, for his comfort, that the surest way to enjoy a clear conscience and the 'well done' of his fellows is to discharge his duty fearlessly and impartially, as he professed his ability to do, and has by a solemn oath sworn to do. That duty is to find the facts from the evidence adduced on the stand. The prisoner, by selecting him as a juror, has waived the benefit of anything to which the juror might have been able to testify, no matter how essential to the making out of his defense. The juror can neither consider any fact which comes within his personal knowledge, nor can he communicate it to the other jurors without being in contempt of the court, and violating his solemn oath; and the other jurors could not innocently listen to such statements. They would be unsworn to and unworthy of belief. Murder is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another, without malice, express or implied. Homicide, in self-defense, is where one who hath no other possible means of preserving him from death or great bodily harm by one who combats with him, on a sudden quarrel, kills the person who reduces him to such inevitable necessity. These general definitions will be borne in mind as you shall consider them more in detail in connection with the evidence. Much time has been consumed, and much expense incurred, in establishing the relative status of the rights of defendant to the possession of the land where the homicide is said to have occurred. If you believe from the testimony that the defendant and Charles Pressley purchased the land jointly from the sinking-fund commission; that, after certain payments were made, Charles Pressley, in the presence and with the assent of defendant, rescinded the bargain of purchase, and rented the land, (defendant is estopped from denying his presence and assent to such arrangement, if he witnessed the paper, which Capt. Brooks testified that he did, and at the time of such witnessing knew what was being done,) then the law applicable to such facts is that defendant had lost all rights under said purchase. Defendant testifies that, in consideration that he had paid $200 towards the before-mentioned purchase of the land, Charles Pressley agreed to rent the whole of the land included in said purchase, and to give to defendant a certain portion thereof, including the field of blood, rent free, so long as he (Charles Pressley) could hold it; that, under this agreement, he, the defendant, had been in possession of the land for over two years; that on Monday, before the killing took place, he first heard that Charles Pressley intended to revoke the parol tenancy. If you believe this statement, then the agreement constituted a tenancy at will, and under the decision in Godard v. Railroad Co., 2 Rich. Law, 346, that, more than two years having elapsed since its creation, it became a tenancy from year to year, and that defendant was entitled to three months' notice to quit, unless Charles Pressley, by reason of having no title, except as he procured it annually, was unable to create any title except what he had at the time of the contract of letting to defendant; and even then I should say that defendant had the right to retain possession under the agreement, at least until he had reasonable notice to quit, which ought to be longer than from Monday to Wednesday. I charge you, therefore, if you adopt that statement of facts, that the Pressleys were trespassers on the possession of defendant. If they were trespassers, how did they commit the trespass? Peaceably and quietly, or violently and riotously? How far off were defendant and his employes? How far his wife? How far Charles Brooks and Dan Mitchell? How far John B. Pressley? What were they doing? Were they armed? All these are pertinent inquiries to aid you in passing upon the further facts in the case. As against trespassers, two methods of redress are frequently presented to the injured party,--the one by invoking the aid of the officers of the law, the other by the owner's becoming judge and executioner of the law in his own behalf. When one adopts the latter course, the law requires of him the exercise of great care lest he in turn become an offender. Were Edward Pressley, Jr., Charles Pressley, and Edward Pressley, Sr., killed in this county on the 18th of November, 1885? You have heard a number of witnesses testify to the fact, among them the defendant. Do you believe it? If so, who killed them? You have heard the testimony of Charles Brooks and the defendant on that subject. Do you believe them, or either of them, so far as to say that defendant did it? If so, then it only remains to look into the circumstances of the killing to find the motive,--intent; whether with malice; on sudden heat and passion, without malice; or without fault on his part to preserve his own life or his body from serious harm. As this is decided, so will be the crime,--murder, manslaughter, or self-defense. Malice is called 'malice aforethought,' and this is true. It must be formed prior to the killing, but it is sufficient if it be but a second before, so that it be willfully done.

"Now, let us go back to inquire into the relation of defendant to the Pressleys. Was it kindly? If so, when and where? Had defendant done anything particularly showing kindness on his part to them? If so, when? Was there a family relation between them? If so, how close, and how long since it was formed? Did these kindnesses and family relations, if such existed, influence defendant to go in with Charles Pressley in the purchase of the Jennings land? Did they go into such purchase? If so, did defendant spend nearly all the money he had in such purchase? Were all the Pressleys recognized by defendant as interested in such purchase, and Charles' name alone used merely for the sake of convenience? Did Charles agree that defendant could have about fifty acres of that land free of rent as long as he could keep it? If so, did Charles attempt to repudiate that agreement? And did that intent become known to defendant, for the first time, on Monday before the killing, and

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