State v. Jones
Decision Date | 17 August 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 2015–KA–1232.,2015–KA–1232. |
Citation | 200 So.3d 950 |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Ladareus J. JONES. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Edward McAuliffe, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee/State of Louisiana.
Michelle H. Hesni, Ehle & Hesni, Inc., Gretna, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
(Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge MADELEINE LANDRIEU, Judge JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge SANDRA C. JENKINS ).
DANIEL L. DYSART
, Judge.
Financial Casualty & Surety Company (“FCS”), appeals the trial court judgment denying its motion to set aside a judgment of bond forfeiture. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to the record before us, after a bill of information was filed against Mr. Jones, charging him with possession of controlled dangerous substances (cocaine and marijuana), bond was set by the magistrate judge at $22,500. FCS posted two surety bonds on Mr. Jones' behalf that day, one in the amount of $15,000 and the other in the amount of $7,500. The court set the arraignment for April 26, 2013.
Mr. Jones failed to appear for the scheduled arraignment on April 26, 2013, at which time the State sought the forfeiture of the bonds. The trial court granted the State's motion and, on April 26, 2013, executed a judgment in favor of the State of Louisiana and against Mr. Jones, and FCS as commercial surety, in the amount of $22,500. The trial court also issued an alias capias for Mr. Jones at that time, without bond.1 The matter was then continued without date. Notice of the bond forfeiture was mailed to FCS and Mr. Jones on May 30, 2013.
On October 23, 2013, FCS filed a Motion to Set Aside Bond Forfeiture and Petition for Nullity of Judgment. After a hearing held on November 5, 2013, the trial court took the matter under advisement and on November 12, 2013, denied FCS's motions. Counsel for FCS objected to the ruling, indicating an intent to seek a writ of supervisory review. The Docket Master then reflects that, over the next few months, FCS filed various motions for extensions of time. Ultimately, an appeal was lodged with this Court on November 12, 2014; however, because the record did not contain a signed judgment on FCS's motions, the appeal was dismissed as premature and the matter remanded to the trial court. See State v. Jones, 14–1259 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/27/15), 171 So.3d 1020
.
The record does not indicate what occurred regarding the bonds after the matter was remanded, but only pertains to Mr. Jones, himself.2 However, the record now contains a written judgment, dated June 18, 2015, by which the trial court denied FCS's motions. This appeal timely followed with FCS's Motion for Suspensive Appeal filed and granted on July 15, 2015.3
DISCUSSION
We note, at the outset, that “[b]ond forfeitures are not favored in Louisiana” and therefore, “the State must strictly comply with statutory provisions to obtain a judgment of bond forfeiture.” State v. Nellon, 12–1429, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/4/13), 124 So.3d 1115, 1118
. In this appeal, FCS does not suggest that the bond forfeiture was invalid or that the State did not comply with the statutory requirements necessary for a judgment of bond forfeiture. Rather, FCS maintains that the trial court erred in denying its motion to set aside bond forfeiture on the basis that Mr. Jones was incarcerated at the Orleans Parish Prison on July 9, 2013, some two and a half months after the alias capias was issued without bond.4 FCS argues that, under La.C.Cr.P. art. 345, it was relieved of its obligations on the bond based on Mr. Jones' incarceration within the time delays for setting aside a judgment of bond forfeiture. We disagree.
As this matter presents an issue of law, we review it de novo to determine whether the trial court's decision is legally correct. See, French Quarter Realty v. Gambel, 05–0933, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/28/05), 921 So.2d 1025, 1027
.
State v. Matteson, 36,628, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1199, 1203 (). When a defendant fails to be present in court at a subsequent scheduled appearance, the State may obtain a forfeiture of the surety bond. Importantly, “the surety may surrender the defendant or the defendant may surrender himself, in open court or to the officer charged with his detention, at any time prior to forfeiture or within the time allowed by law for setting aside a judgment of forfeiture of the bail bond.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 345
A. To effect a surrender, the surety “may [even] arrest him.” Id.
There is no question in this case that Mr. Jones was not “surrendered” to the court by FCS, nor did he self-surrender at any time. The issue in this case relates to Mr. Jones' subsequent brief incarceration and whether that incarceration absolves FCS of liability under the bond. At the heart of this matter is the interpretation of La.C.Cr.P. art. 345
B, which provides as follows:
B. If the defendant is incarcerated by the officer originally charged with his detention at any time prior to forfeiture or within the time allowed by law for setting aside a judgment for forfeiture of the bail bond, the surety may apply for and receive from any officer in charge of any facility in the state of Louisiana or a foreign jurisdiction charged with the detention of the defendant a letter verifying that the defendant is incarcerated, but only after the surety verifies to the satisfaction of the officer charged with the detention of the defendant as to the identity of the defendant. After compliance with the provisions of Paragraph F5 of this Article, the surety shall be fully and finally discharged and relieved, as provided for in Paragraphs C and D of this Article, of all obligations under the bond.
B. (Emphasis added).
The time period for setting aside a judgment of bond forfeiture, as referenced in Article 345
B, is set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 349.5. When a surety seeks to ify a forfeiture for those grounds set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 2001 ( ), it may do so by use of summary proceedings “within sixty days after the date of mailing the notice of the signing of the judgment of bond forfeiture.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 349.5 A. Otherwise, when the grounds for setting aside a bond forfeiture arise out of La.C.Cr.P. arts. 345 or 349.9, a surety may seek to set aside the forfeiture “within one hundred eighty days after the date of mailing the notice of the signing of the judgment of bond forfeiture.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 349.5 B.6 Thereafter, “[w]hen the defendant has been surrendered in conformity with this Article or a letter of verification of incarceration has been issued to the surety as provided for in this Article, the court shall, upon presentation of the certificate of surrender or the letter of verification of incarceration, order that the surety be exonerated from liability on his bail undertaking and shall order any judgment of forfeiture set aside.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 345 F.
In this matter, FCS sought to set aside the bond forfeiture based on the provisions of Article 345
; accordingly, it had one hundred eighty days from April 26, 2013, within which to file its motion. It met this deadline by filing its motion to set aside bond forfeiture three days before the one hundred eighty days elapsed, on October 23, 2013.
In support of its motion, FCS attached a “Letter of Verification of Incarceration,” from the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office, dated August 14, 2013, which states that Mr. Jones “was incarcerated from July 9, 2013 through July 9, 2013.” Under FCS's interpretation of the statute, because Mr. Jones was incarcerated “by the officer originally charged with his detention” for this one day, albeit “within the time allowed by law for setting aside a judgment for forfeiture,” it was entitled to be fully discharged from its obligations under the bond within the meaning of Article 345
B.
Because Article 345
B provides that “the surety shall be fully and finally discharged and relieved, as provided for in Paragraphs C and D of this Article, of all obligations under the bond,” a surety must meet the provisions of paragraphs C and D in order to be relieved of its obligations. Paragraph C pertains to fees that must be paid “to the officer charged with the defendant's detention for recalling the capias” and for the issuance of “a letter of verification of incarceration” when the surety receives “either a certificate of surrender” as per paragraph A or “a letter of verification as provided for in Paragraph B.” Paragraph D states that “[i]f during the period allowed for the surrender of the defendant, the defendant is found to be incarcerated in another parish of the state of...
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