State v. Jones
Decision Date | 09 October 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 1D13–1964.,1D13–1964. |
Citation | 122 So.3d 517 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Ray JONES, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Ann Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
The state appeals the trial court's decision to impose a downward departure sentence after appellee entered an unconditional nolo contendere plea to child abuse and possession of a controlled substance. We agree with the state that the trial court's reason for departure was not supported by competent substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
The trial court imposed a downward departure sentence pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2012), upon finding the offenses were committed in an unsophisticated manner and were isolated incidents for which appellee had shown remorse. Under the plain language of section 921.0026(2)(j), all three elements—lack of sophistication, isolated incident, and remorse—must be established to permit a departure sentence. State v. Geoghagan, 27 So.3d 111, 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); State v. Jerry, 19 So.3d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The state argued below that a downward departure was not warranted because appellee's offenses were not isolated and appellee had not shown sufficient remorse. We agree there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellee's current offenses were isolated incidents.
Appellee's criminal history included a prior felony conviction for manslaughter, for which appellee was returned to prison after violating his probation; a prior felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance; and two prior misdemeanor convictions, one of which was for resisting an officer without violence. In light of this prior record, appellee failed to show that his current offenses of child abuse and possession of a controlled substance (the latter committed while appellee was on pretrial release for the former) were isolated incidents. See State v. Leverett, 44 So.3d 634, 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Centeno
...a tool from a store. With this record, we cannot conclude that Centeno's current offenses are isolated incidents. See State v. Jones, 122 So.3d 517, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (explaining that prior record consisting of two felonies and two misdemeanors precluded Appellant from showing current......
-
State v. Milici, Case No. 5D16–2353
...factors, before the trial court will depart." Wallace v. State , 197 So.3d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing State v. Jones , 122 So.3d 517, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ). We first address the trial court's departure under section 921.0026(2)(j). This subsection permits downward departure ......
-
Wallace v. State
...(2012). The defendant must prove these elements, or other mitigating factors, before the trial court will depart. State v. Jones, 122 So.3d 517, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Mr. Wallace argues that the trial court should depart because his second failure to register “was committed in an unsophi......
-
State v. Burt
...insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Burt's current offenses were isolated incidents. See State v. Jones, 122 So.3d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Although the State did not dispute that Burt committed the offenses in an unsophisticated manner and was remorseful, we agr......