State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 25 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 107425,ED 107425 |
| Citation | 596 S.W.3d 168 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Vincent L. JONES, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT, James C. Egan, 1000 West Nifong Blvd., Building 7, Suite 100, Columbia, MO 65203.
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT, Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General, Daniel N. McPherson, Asst. Attorney General, P. O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.
Vincent Jones ("Defendant") appeals from the judgment entered on his convictions after a jury trial for abuse of a child resulting in death and second-degree felony-murder predicated on the child abuse. We affirm.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not in dispute. Defendant lived with his girlfriend ("Mom") and her four young children. On the morning of July 27, 2017, Mom left for work at approximately 7:20 a.m. When she left, her 21-month old son "Buddy" was sitting up in the bed where he had slept the night before with her and Defendant. He was whining and crying as he commonly did when Mom left. At 8:37 a.m., Defendant called 911 to report that Buddy was unresponsive and barely breathing. Buddy was taken to the emergency room, but died shortly thereafter at 11:00 a.m. The autopsy showed significant bruising over much of Buddy’s 30-pound body: he had eight bruises above his right ear and three above his left ear; there were multiple bruises across his forehead; the back of his head was bruised, as was the inside and outside of his mouth; there were bruises covering both thighs, on his sternum, abdomen and back. Buddy’s abdomen was full of a large quantity of blood, much of which came from his torn liver and lacerated intestines. There was significant other internal damage as well, including to his pancreas, adrenal glands and diaphragm. He had massive bleeding around his testicles, in and around his brain and the spinal cord.
These injuries were caused by multiple instances of blunt force trauma, which was determined to be the cause of Buddy’s death. The injuries all happened at the same time and could not have been inflicted more than two hours before Buddy died. He would have remained conscious for twenty or thirty minutes after being so severely beaten, during which time he would have been experiencing pain and crying. These injuries could not have been inflicted by Buddy’s young siblings, nor caused by a fall or spanking; they were consistent with an adult punching this child with a fist or kicking him. In other words, the beating happened at the hands of an adult that morning. The only adult with Buddy after Mom left for work was Defendant. Defendant denied doing anything to hurt Buddy and claimed he did not know who beat him.
Buddy’s brother, D.W., was interviewed at the Children’s Advocacy Center the afternoon of Buddy’s death. D.W. was five and half years old at the time. During the interview, while listing who he lived with, D.W. volunteered that Buddy was in the hospital because he was not breathing. When asked what happened to him, D.W. said he did not know. D.W. said that after Mom went to work he could hear Buddy crying in the other room "and [Defendant] keep on hitting him." Upon additional questions, D.W. explained that he did not see Defendant hitting Buddy, but did hear Defendant "thump" Buddy. D.W. said he heard Defendant tell Buddy to be quiet, but Buddy cried and cried "100 times." After a pre-trial hearing pursuant to Section 491.075, the trial court determined that D.W.’s statements contained sufficient indicia of reliability such that the videotape of the interview could be admitted at trial.
At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed on abuse of child, second-degree felony-murder and involuntary manslaughter. The child abuse verdict-director instructed that if the jury found Defendant had knowingly caused injury to Buddy by beating him and Buddy died as a result of that injury, then it must find him guilty of child abuse. On the second-degree felony-murder count, the jury was instructed that if it found Defendant guilty of child abuse and Buddy was killed as a result of that child abuse, then it must find him guilty of murder in the second degree. The jury was also instructed that if it did not find Defendant guilty of second-degree murder, it must consider involuntary manslaughter. The jury found Defendant guilty of child abuse and second-degree murder. The court sentenced him as a prior and persistent offender to twenty years in prison on the child abuse causing death count and life imprisonment on the second-degree felony-murder count, to be served consecutively. This appeal follows.
In his first point on appeal, Defendant alleges the court erred by admitting the videotaped interview of five-year-old D.W., arguing that the statements made therein did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability and were not admissible under Section 491.075. We review a trial court’s decision to admit a child’s statements under Section 491.075 for abuse of discretion. State v. Ragland , 494 S.W.3d 613, 622–23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). We find no abuse of discretion here.
The out-of-court statements of a child are admissible in a criminal trial under Section 491.075.1 as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if, among other things, the court finds after a hearing that "the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability." Section 491.075.1(1). The reliability of a child’s statement is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances as set out in the evidence presented at the 491 hearing. Id. at 623. Several non-exclusive factors aid the analysis: (1) whether the statements were made spontaneously and consistently repeated; (2) the mental state of the child; (3) whether the child had a motive to fabricate; (4) whether the child’s knowledge of the subject matter is unexpected at that age; (5) the amount of time between when the acts occurred and when the statements are made; and (6) the technique employed by the interviewer. Id. All of these factors are designed to assess whether the child "was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made." Id. Defendant argues D.W.’s statements were not sufficiently reliable based primarily on the first and second factors: D.W.’s mental state and inconsistencies during his interview.
As to D.W.’s mental state, the interviewer testified at the 491 hearing that D.W. seemed to understand her questions and his responses to her indicated his receptive language was developmentally normal for his age. She said D.W. was responsive to most of her questions, was polite and friendly and "very contained" for a five-year-old. The interviewer testified that D.W. stayed in his seat most of the time and kept on task for the almost 45-minute interview; when he occasionally deviated to play with the toys in the room, she said it was easy to bring him back on topic. Defendant asserts that the videotape belies this testimony and shows D.W. was focused more on playing with the toys in the interview room than on the questions. But, as the interviewer explained, young children need something to engage them during an interview because they are not able to just sit at a table and have a conversation like an adult might. The mere fact that D.W. was playing with toys while answering questions does not demonstrate a lack of attention or understanding. Defendant also cites several examples of supposedly non-responsive answers from D.W., but young children do not always speak in the same linear and direct way as an adult might when answering questions. The mere fact that D.W. interspersed some of his answers with comments that were not directly responsive—either about the toys he was playing with or about a related but slightly different matter than the question addressed—does not indicate that he did not understand the question or was not paying sufficient attention. Even if he misunderstood or missed a few questions, overall D.W. was generally attentive and gave appropriately responsive answers. Defendant has not established that D.W.’s mental state shows that he was less likely to be telling the truth when he made these statements.
As to the spontaneity and consistency factor, Defendant concedes that D.W.’s statements about Defendant hitting Buddy were made spontaneously and does not claim that D.W. was ever inconsistent about this most salient fact. But he asserts that D.W. was "very inconsistent" about other matters, which he claims renders the entirety of the interview unreliable. Defendant points out that early in the interview when asked where Buddy was sleeping and where Buddy was when he was crying, D.W. said in Mom’s room and that, at later points in the interview, when asked where Buddy was eating his breakfast or where he was sleeping or where he was crying, D.W. said Buddy was in D.W.’s room. But, as the interviewer explained at the 491 hearing, these statements are not necessarily inconsistent:
In fact, D.W. expressly stated at one point in the interview that Buddy left one of the bedrooms and went into the other...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Andrews
...is not at liberty to engage in that legislative function and we must apply the statute as written. See generally State v. Jones, 596 S.W.3d 168, 176-77 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). As written, the specific statutes under which Defendant was charged are silent on the matter of cumulative punishment......
- Scroggins v. State
-
At the Edge of Objectivity: The Missouri Court of Appeals' Deference to a Seemingly Subjective Assessment of Prejudice Under Strickland.
...by the record which, if true, would warrant relief. Patterson v. State, 576 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). (86.) Scroggins, 596 S.W.3d at 168. (87.) (88.) Id. at 163. (89.) Id. at 165; see also Patterson, 576 S.W.3d at 243. (90.) See Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)......