State v. Jones, ED 103677
| Decision Date | 14 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 103677,ED 103677 |
| Citation | 519 S.W.3d 818 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ralph Baby JONES, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Ralph Baby JONES, Appellant.
No. ED 103677
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR.
FILED: March 14, 2017
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied April 27, 2017
Application for Transfer Denied June 27, 2017
Maleaner Harvey, 1010 Market St., Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for appellant.
Joshua D. Hawley, Richard A. Starnes, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.
KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge
Introduction
Ralph Jones ("Jones") appeals from the judgment of the trial court entered after a jury trial. Jones was charged with attempting to cause physical injury with a dangerous instrument (his vehicle) and then leaving the scene of the resulting accident. The jury convicted Jones on one felony count of second-degree assault and one felony count leaving the scene of a motor-vehicle accident. On appeal, Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both counts. Jones also argues that the trial court plainly erred in submitting Instruction No. 5, the verdict director for second-degree assault, without defining the term "dangerous instrument."
Because the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions, we deny Jones's first two points. Further, because Jones did not seriously dispute that his vehicle constituted a "dangerous instrument," failing to define the term in the verdict director for second-degree assault did not warrant reversal under plain-error review. Accordingly, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
Jones skipped bail. In February 2014, he was at large. Randall Davis ("Davis"), a licensed bail bondsman, sought a $5,000 bounty for Jones's capture. Davis had received Jones's information—including a photo—from another bondsman. Davis found a woman who knew Jones and, for $100, the woman agreed to text Davis if she saw Jones.
The woman texted Davis, who then drove to the woman's residence in a Chevy Tahoe with two associates. While looking for a parking spot, Davis testified that a grey SUV "zoomed" directly towards him, swerved into his lane, and struck the front-right of his Tahoe. The impact pushed the Tahoe backwards into "a pole or something," tearing the back bumper. The repairs totaled $3,992. Davis identified Jones as the driver of the grey SUV.
Jones did not stop after striking Davis. Instead, Jones steered his SUV onto the sidewalk, went around Davis's Tahoe, and drove away. Davis followed Jones for about 20 minutes, on and off the interstate, down side streets, back on the highway, then through more city streets. At one point, Jones stopped and a woman roiled out of the SUV. The woman stood up and pointed at Jones. Jones, however, was off again. Davis followed. Later in the chase, Jones attempted to turn left but he hit another vehicle in the intersection. Jones continued driving until he hit a tree. Jones then exited the SUV and started running. Davis yelled, "Stop, you're under arrest," and pursued Jones on foot. Two officers saw Jones hit the tree and joined in the foot pursuit. Davis, his associates, and the officers eventually apprehended Jones in an alley. A grand jury indicted Jones on two felony counts: Count I for second-degree assault and Count II for leaving the scene of a motor-vehicle accident. Both
counts related to Jones's collision with Davis.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The State presented its case largely as outlined above. Jones testified as the only defense witness. Jones maintained that he tried to avoid the collision with Davis, but that Davis was speeding, driving recklessly, and swerving into the other lane. Jones claimed that he left the scene because he did not know who was driving the Tahoe and he was afraid. Once Jones crashed into the tree, he immediately got out of his car and ran towards the police officers, telling them that someone was chasing him and that he feared for his life.
Instruction No. 5 was the verdict director for the second-degree assault charge. The jury instruction was submitted by the trial court without any objection from the parties. To convict Jones of second-degree assault, the instruction required the jury to find that Jones "attempted to cause physical injury to Randall Davis by means of a dangerous instrument by striking Randall Davis's vehicle with his vehicle." Although the Note on Use 7 for MAI-CR 3d required the term "dangerous instrument" to be defined for the jury, Instruction No. 5 lacked that definition.
The jury convicted Jones on both counts. The trial court sentenced Jones as a persistent felony offender to prison for 15 years on Count I and five years on Count II. Jones appeals.
Points on Appeal
Jones raises three points on appeal, the first two points challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and the last point alleging instructional error. First, Jones posits that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second-degree assault because no evidence was adduced proving that he intended to cause physical injury when he drove his SUV into Davis's Tahoe. Second, Jones claims there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of leaving the scene because the evidence presented at trial suggested that he left the scene of the collision because of his reasonable "apprehension of danger." Finally, Jones argues that the trial court plainly erred by giving Instruction No. 5 the verdict director for the second-degree assault charge without defining the term "dangerous instrument."
Discussion
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Because Jones's first two points focus on the sufficiency of the State's evidence, we address these points together.
A. Standard of Review
To determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, we consider each element of the crime. State v. Grim , 854 S.W.2d 403, 411 (Mo. banc 1993). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and grant the State all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id. Conversely, we disregard all contrary inferences unless they are "such a natural and logical extension of the evidence that a reasonable juror would be unable to disregard them." Id. Viewing the evidence in this light, the issue becomes "whether a reasonable juror could find each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
B. Point One—Assault in the Second Degree
A person commits assault in the second degree, as charged here, if he or she attempts to cause physical injury to another person by means of a dangerous instrument. Section 565.060.1(2) (Cum.
Supp. 2013).1 Importantly, Jones does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence for the "dangerous instrument" element. A motor vehicle qualifies as a dangerous instrument when it is used under circumstances where it is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury. State v. Williams , 126 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Mo. banc 2004). A juror reasonably could have concluded that an SUV "zooming" into oncoming traffic was a dangerous instrument. Jones's defense to the assault charge was premised solely on his argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove the first element of the assault charge, in that he attempted to cause physical injury to Davis while driving the SUV.
Section 564.011 governs all attempt crimes, including attempt-based assault in Section 565.060.1(2). State v. Ransburg , 504 S.W.3d 721, 723 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting Williams , 126 S.W.3d at 381 ). Attempt has only two elements: "(1) defendant has the purpose to commit the underlying offense, and (2) the doing of an act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that offense." Id. (quoting State v. Withrow , 8 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Mo. banc 1999) ). A person acts purposely "with respect to his conduct or to a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result." Section 562.016.2.
Accordingly, to prevail on the assault charge, the State needed to present sufficient evidence that Jones (1) intended to cause physical injury to Davis and (2) performed an act that was a substantial step toward causing that physical injury. Intent is rarely susceptible to proof by direct evidence; rather, it is usually inferred circumstantially. State v. Lammers , 479 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Mo. banc 2016). A jury may determine a defendant's mental state from the defendant's conduct before the act, from the act itself, and from the defendant's subsequent conduct. State v. Hineman , 14 S.W.3d 924, 927–28 (Mo. banc 1999).
Deliberately driving a vehicle into another person's vehicle while traveling at a high rate of speed reasonably supports an inference that the driver acted with the purpose of causing physical injury. State v. Ise , 460 S.W.3d 448, 456 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). In Ise , the defendant and the victim "got into a little road rage" with each other on the highway. Id. at 453. The defendant's car cut across traffic and hit the victim's car in the rear quarter panel. Id. at 453–54. The impact caused the victim to spin off the highway and into a concrete median. Id. at 454. The Western...
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