State v. Jones, 52046
| Decision Date | 29 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 52046,52046 |
| Citation | 748 S.W.2d 898 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Edwin JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Henry B. Robertson, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Kurt A. Hentz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-defendant.
Facing trial on charges of burglary in the first degree, stealing property of a value of at least $150, and resisting arrest, defendant, a black man, moved to quash the jury before it was sworn, alleging the State had used its peremptory challenges to exclude black veniremen from the jury solely because of their race. The State opposed the motion, articulating what it now characterizes as "racially neutral and not facially frivolous" reasons for having challenged the veniremen in question. The circuit court refused to quash the jury, which eventually found defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant was sentenced by the court as a prior and persistent offender to twenty years imprisonment on the burglary count and to three years on each of the other counts, the sentences to be served concurrently. Defendant appeals, asserting, inter alia, that his motion to quash should have been granted.
The State denies a black defendant his right to equal protection of the laws if, on the assumption that no black juror can fairly judge a black defendant, it uses its peremptory challenges to exclude black veniremen from the petit jury. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The defendant, of course, is required to make a prima facie showing that the State's use of its peremptory challenges amounted to purposeful discrimination; but once he has, the State must rebut the inference of discrimination with "a neutral explanation related to the case to be tried" that persuades the trial court the veniremen were not challenged because of their race. Id. at 1723-1724.
The ultimate burden of persuasion, however, lies with, and never shifts from, the defendant. State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 63 (Mo. banc 1987). Thus, if the State rebuts the inference of discrimination with neutral explanations for having exercised its peremptory challenges, the defendant's motion to quash the jury can succeed only if the defendant persuades the trial court that the State's explanations are a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 64.
The State in this case apparently concedes defendant raised an inference of purposeful discrimination. It claims it rebutted this inference, however, with "racially neutral and not facially frivolous" explanations for having exercised the challenges in question. The trial court implicitly found there had been no purposeful discrimination when, without comment, it denied defendant's motion to quash.
In his first point, defendant urges this court to find that the explanations the State advanced for having struck members of defendant's race from the venire were pretextual. Whether the State's explanations were disingenuous, however, is a question of fact which the trial court has already resolved adversely to defendant. A finding of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the record demonstrates the finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Antwine, supra, 66.
When asked to explain why he used his six peremptory challenges to remove black members from the venire, the prosecutor responded that he struck venireman Ferguson because he questioned her ability to be impartial, that he struck venirewoman Dean because Dean had shot and killed her son and had been investigated by the police in connection with the homicide, that he struck venirewomen Dunn and Parker because they were unresponsive during voir dire, that he struck venireman Barber because of the views Barber expressed on the credibility of police testimony, and that he struck venirewoman Reese because Reese was a schoolteacher and seemed overly assertive on the issue of defendant's rights.
Though he was obliged to do so, defendant in this case made no attempt to persuade the trial court that the prosecutor's explanations were a pretext for discrimination. State v. Antwine, supra, 64. He asserted merely that the "... Defendant, however, has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1716. Equal Protection guarantees only that the State will not exclude members of the defendant's race from the jury venire on account of race. Id. at 1717-1718.
The trial court concluded that the prosecutor did not use his peremptories to discriminate against members of defendant's race. The conclusion is finding of fact to which we must defer unless our review of the record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court was mistaken. State v. Payton, 747 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Mo.App. 1988). We therefore turn to the record of voir dire.
During voir dire, venirewoman Ferguson, whose home had been twice burglarized, stated, A venireman's admitted inability to hear the evidence impartially will justify a peremptory challenge, and can often justify a challenge for cause. Ms. Ferguson's frank statement of prejudice against defendant supports the trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor genuinely questioned Ms. Ferguson's ability to hear the evidence impartially. The conclusion is not clearly erroneous.
Defendant does not challenge the strike exercised against venirewoman Dean, the woman who stated she had shot and killed her son. We therefore assume he concedes Ms. Dean was not stricken on account of race, and turn to his claim that race was the basis for the strikes exercised against venirewomen Dunn and Parker.
The prosecutor challenged venirewoman Parker ostensibly because she was unresponsive during voir dire. Her answers to questions the prosecutor posed were indeed monosyllabic, and in any case, a venireman's responsiveness or unresponsiveness is a matter of demeanor which we cannot, and will not, judge on the cold record. The trial court, which witnessed Ms. Parker's demeanor found the prosecutor's explanation credible. We defer to that finding.
The prosecutor stated he struck venirewoman Dunn because she failed to respond to his voir dire questions and gave unreasonable responses to questions posed by defense counsel. Ms. Dunn did say very little during the prosecutor's voir dire, but even more troubling was her statement to defense counsel that she would automatically believe a witness who took the stand and identified defendant as the perpetrator of the burglary. As we have already stated, a venireman's apparent inability to hear the evidence impartially justifies a peremptory strike. The trial court found that Ms. Dunn's demeanor and her apparent bias in favor of an identifying witness were the true reasons for the strike. We find no error.
Venirewoman Reese was another who was stricken ostensibly on grounds of demeanor. The prosecutor stated Reese impressed him as overly assertive on the issue of defendant's rights. We do not find an indication of this assertiveness in the record of voir dire, but we deal with mere words on a page. The trial court observed Ms. Reese first hand and was persuaded that the prosecutor genuinely found her overly assertive. We defer to this finding.
The prosecutor also based his strike against Ms. Reese on the fact that she was a school teacher. Though he did not raise the matter in the trial court, defendant now argues that a white schoolteacher remained on the jury panel. The record does indicate that a professor from St. Louis University remained on the panel. Neither the professor's race nor sex, however, is a matter of record and, in any event, the prosecutor articulated a legitimate ground for striking Ms. Reese that was unrelated to her profession.
The prosecutor challenged venireman Barber ostensibly because of Barber's views on the credibility of police testimony. On voir dire, venireman Barber made a statement to the effect that though he did not consider police officers more honest than other witnesses, he might find them more credible because they "... would be more adapted (sic) to details than your average citizen." When responding to an allegation of Batson error, the prosecutor need not support his peremptory strikes with explanations that would justify challenge for...
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