State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 22 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CR-50 |
| Citation | 169 N.E.3d 397 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant v. Justin JONES, Appellee |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Tyler G. Banks, Deputy Attorney General, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: David R. Hennessy, Indianapolis, Indiana
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 20A-CR-664
The confidential informer's privilege allows the government to withhold the identity of those who provide information about crimes, furthering important law-and-order interests. But these interests must be balanced with a defendant's right to prepare a defense and have a fair trial. So, the general rule of nondisclosure can be overcome if a defendant demonstrates that an exception to the privilege should apply. And when a defendant makes an argument for disclosure, a trial court must balance the countervailing concerns at play.
Yet, courts need not engage in such a balancing inquiry unless the State makes a threshold showing that the confidential informer's privilege even applies—by establishing that fulfilling the defendant's discovery request would reveal the informant's identity. Beville v. State , 71 N.E.3d 13, 21 (Ind. 2017).
Today, we hold that, as a matter of law, an informant's identity is inherently revealed through their physical appearance at a face-to-face interview. Thus, when a defendant requests such an interview—as Justin Jones did here—the State has met its threshold burden to show the informer's privilege applies. And because the trial court did not apply the established balancing test before ordering disclosure, we reverse and remand.
During the early hours of a June morning, two men, one masked and one not, broke into a home. They tied up, assaulted, and robbed a woman while her two young children watched. The armed men then spent hours ransacking the house, stealing thousands of dollars’ worth of items.
Later that day, officers discovered the victim's stolen vehicle; and next to it, they found Justin Jones's phone. The phone would reveal, among other information, that Jones knew the victim through his girlfriend; he had been in the victim's neighborhood for approximately two hours during the time of the attack; and he had made a fourteen-minute call to his girlfriend during that period.
Two months later, a confidential informant (CI) provided a detective with information. The CI relayed the names of the two men who allegedly broke into the house and said that a third man, someone named "Haughville Cody"—later identified as Jones—had organized the crimes. The CI claimed to have learned this information at "the Clubhouse" while talking with a few other people, including a man who said he had participated in the robbery. Jones and two men were subsequently charged with burglary, armed robbery, kidnapping, criminal confinement, and auto theft.
Jones and his codefendants attempted to learn the CI's identity by deposing the detective and later filing a motion to compel. The State, however, refused to disclose the informant's identity. It explained that, though the CI was mentioned in the probable cause affidavit, the CI was not a witness to the crime. It further explained that the information the CI provided was used only to develop potential suspects, the CI would not testify, and none of the information provided by the CI would be offered at trial.
Upon informal direction from the trial court, the parties attempted to reach a consensus on what information could be revealed. But Jones was unsatisfied, so he sought to interview the CI. Jones claimed he had a right to know the details of the conversation between his codefendant and the CI, along with any other information the CI had learned. The trial court then directed the parties to find a way to allow Jones's counsel to interview the CI without revealing the CI's identity.
The first attempt allowed Jones's counsel to question the CI using a voice-disguising machine. But the machine malfunctioned, so the State relayed the CI's answers to defense counsel by phone. Jones's counsel determined this format wasn't working because the CI's answers differed from the detective's answers at the earlier deposition. A few weeks later, the parties tried again. This time, Jones provided written questions; the State recorded the CI's answers using a voice-disguising device; and the State sent the answers to Jones. But Jones again found this unsatisfactory because some of the recording was difficult to understand and he could not ask follow-up questions. The State finally agreed to provide Jones with a transcript of the interview and said Jones's counsel could come to the State's office to ask additional questions to the CI on speakerphone.
Jones took the State up on this offer. With the CI in one room and Jones's counsel in another, the State relayed questions and answers over the phone. But Jones objected, complaining of pauses before the CI would answer and contradictions between the CI's answers and the detective's previous testimony. At this point, Jones insisted the CI was a necessary witness for trial and so he needed to interview the informant face-to-face.
The trial court agreed and ordered the State to produce the CI for a face-to-face interview with Jones's counsel. The order required defense counsel not to ask "any questions that may disclose the [CI's] identity, identifiers, residence, etc." The State then brought this interlocutory appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the State did not meet its burden to show the confidential informer's privilege applied because it hadn't shown the CI's identity "would be" revealed by a face-to-face interview. State v. Jones , 155 N.E.3d 1287, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The panel added that, even if the State had satisfied its burden, Jones had established an exception to the privilege should apply—by showing the CI had information relevant and helpful to his defense or necessary for a fair trial. Id.
The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Because trial courts have broad discretion on issues of discovery, we review discovery rulings for an abuse of that discretion. Hardiman v. State , 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 2000). But the particular issue before us—whether the confidential informer's privilege applies to physical appearance revealed through a face-to-face interview—raises a question of law that we review de novo. See State v. Moss-Dwyer , 686 N.E.2d 109, 110 (Ind. 1997).
The confidential informer's privilege allows the State to withhold the identity of a person who provides information to the government. Lewandowski v. State , 271 Ind. 4, 7, 389 N.E.2d 706, 708 (1979) ; see also Roviaro v. United States , 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). The privilege promotes law and order, but it also implicates another significant concern: a criminal defendant's ability to obtain useful information to prepare a defense or ensure a fair trial. Lewandowski , 271 Ind. at 7, 389 N.E.2d at 708. And, so, a defendant may argue that disclosure is nonetheless necessary, requiring the trial court to balance countervailing interests and decide whether an exception to the privilege applies. Id. at 7–8, 389 N.E.2d at 708–09.
But such a determination isn't necessary unless the State has made the threshold showing that it can invoke the confidential informer's privilege. Beville , 71 N.E.3d at 21. Specifically, the State must demonstrate "that the CI's identity would be revealed" if it were to comply with the defendant's discovery request. Id.
Here, the State argues that disclosing the CI's physical appearance through a face-to-face interview necessarily reveals the CI's identity, triggering application of the privilege. Jones asserts that a face-to-face interview doesn't inevitably disclose a person's identity—rather, that occurs only when the interviewer recognizes the CI or the CI somehow reveals "other identifying information."
We agree with the State. As a matter of law, the confidential informer's privilege protects a CI's physical appearance. Accordingly, because Jones requested a face-to-face interview with the CI, the State satisfied its threshold burden to show the privilege applies. And so the trial court must employ the established balancing test to determine whether an exception to the confidential informer's privilege is warranted.
Before we explore these issues in depth, however, we provide a brief background on the principles underlying the privilege.
The long-standing confidential informer's privilege furthers and protects the public's interest in law and order. Roviaro , 353 U.S. at 59, 77 S.Ct. 623. By promising anonymity to informants, the privilege encourages citizens to report crimes, prevents retaliation, and ensures individuals feel safe helping law enforcement. Beville , 71 N.E.3d at 19. Thus, the general rule is one of nondisclosure. Randall v. State , 474 N.E.2d 76, 81 (Ind. 1985).
While these law-and-order concerns are significant, they conflict with a defendant's important interest in obtaining relevant information that could lead to an acquittal. Lewandowski , 271 Ind. at 7, 389 N.E.2d at 708. So, where the disclosure of an informer's identity "is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause," the privilege must yield. Id. , 389 N.E.2d at 708 (quoting Roviaro , 353 U.S. at 60–61, 77 S.Ct. 623 ). These exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure stem from our fundamental concern for fairness. Roviaro , 353 U.S. at 60, 77 S.Ct. 623.
Thus, when a criminal defendant argues that a confidential informant's...
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