State v. Joseph

• Decision Date: 19 October 1921
• Citation: 115 A. 85,96 Conn. 637
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. JOSEPH.

115 A. 85

96 Conn. 637

STATE v. JOSEPH.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

October 19, 1921

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Frank D. Haines, Judge.

Francis Joseph, alias James Joseph, was convicted of larceny, and he appeals. No error.

Nathan O. Freedman and William H. Lewis, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.

Hugh M Alcorn, State's Atty., of Hartford, and Newell Jennings Asst. State's Atty., of Bristol, for the State.

WHEELER, C.J.

The accused was tried for and convicted of the crime of larceny. No evidence was offered in his behalf in disproof of this charge. His sole defense was that at the time of its commission he was mentally irresponsible.

Three grounds of appeal are pressed:

(1) " Since the state never put on any evidence that the defendant was sane (and the presumption of sanity was wiped out by the introduction of insanity on the part of the defendant), the verdict should have been directed for the defendant."

Three reasons, each one sufficient, may be suggested which show that this ground is not well taken:

(a) " The court, in a criminal case, cannot direct the return of any particular verdict." State v Fetterer, 65 Conn. 287, 289, 32 A. 394; State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 133, 37 A. 80, 36 L.R.A. 623, 61 Am.St.Rep. 30; G. S. 1918, § 6641.

(b) This ground of error assumes that the mere introduction of evidence by the accused to establish his insanity overcame the presumption of sanity upon which the state could in the first instance rely, or that this offer in fact established the insanity of the accused.

Neither assumption is sound. The state had a right in the first instance to rely upon the presumption of sanity, and thereupon it became the privilege of the accused to offer such evidence as he desired upon the subject of his mental condition. The state might then rebut this evidence if it desired or submit the issue to the jury upon the evidence offered. In either case the burden of proving the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt rested upon the state. The charge upon this subject was unexceptionable:

" Now, having heard all the evidence, it is for you, taking it all into careful account, to say whether the legal sanity of this man has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, bearing in mind that, the issue having been raised, the burden rests upon the state, as it does in all other particulars in this case, to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that this man was legally sane and responsible at the time these offenses were committed. That simply means that, taking all the evidence together, offered by both sides in this case, you are to decide whether the burden which the state carries has been met; and it has been met if, upon all that evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the man was sane and responsible."

(c) No request to charge of this character appeared in the finding, and only those requests to charge which do appear in the finding can be made a ground of appeal under our practice.

(2) That the court erred in not granting the accused's motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial.

The most careful study of the evidence has not satisfied us that the verdict of the jury which necessarily included a finding that the accused was mentally responsible was so palpably and manifestly against the evidence as to have warranted the court in granting a new trial. State v. Lee, 69 Conn. 189, 192, 37 A. 75. On the contrary, we do not think the evidence would...