State v. Joyce

• Decision Date: 25 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15394,15394
• Citation: 243 Conn. 282,705 A.2d 181
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Wallace JOYCE.

Page 181

705 A.2d 181

243 Conn. 282

STATE of Connecticut v. Wallace JOYCE.

No. 15394.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 23, 1997.

Decided Nov. 25, 1997.

William H. Cashman, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, and Michael A. Pepper, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

NORCOTT, Associate Justice.

The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a)(4) ¹ rendered after a jury trial. He appeals directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b). ²

The defendant originally was convicted of the same crime in 1990, ³ but on appeal, this court concluded that the state's chemical testing of the defendant's burned clothing without a warrant constituted an unreasonable search in violation of article first, § 7, of the state constitution. ⁴ State v. Joyce, 229 Conn. 10, 27-28, 639 A.2d 1007 (1994). We reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial. After our decision in that case, the state applied for and obtained a search warrant to test the defendant's clothing, which was still in the custody of the Superior Court clerk's office.

The defendant now contends, on a number of grounds, that the trial court improperly failed to suppress the results of the chemical analysis conducted pursuant to the search warrant in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the state constitution. The defendant also claims that: (1) the state was collaterally estopped from introducing evidence of insurance proceeds as a motive for the defendant to commit arson; (2) the state's failure to preserve the contents of a gasoline can found on the premises violated his right to due process under the state and federal constitutions; (3) the trial court improperly restricted the defendant's closing argument in violation of his sixth amendment right to effective counsel; (4) the trial court improperly precluded him from cross-examining the fire marshall regarding the adequacy of the investigation of a third party; and (5) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On January 29, 1990, Patricia Altrui and John Donroe were sitting in the living room of their home at 128 Maple Street, East Haven. Their living room has a picture window that overlooks 125 Maple Street. The house at 125 Maple Street had been unoccupied since the death of its owner, Lawrence Joyce, the defendant's father. At approximately 3:45 p.m., Altrui noticed that the front door to the house was partially open and that it remained open for approximately ten minutes. At approximately 4 p.m., Donroe also observed that the front door was open. It remained open for approximately two to three more minutes before he heard a "whooshing" sound. Altrui heard the sound as well. Both Altrui and Donroe looked across the street and saw an orange glow in the picture window of the house and a man in flames run out of the house and down the embankment to the river. Firefighters and paramedics arrived in response to a 911 call by Altrui and Donroe reporting that there had been an explosion at 125 Maple Street. When firefighter paramedic Charles Licata arrived, the defendant was standing in a nearby river, waist deep in water. The defendant appeared to be severely burned. When Licata asked him what had happened, the defendant stated that he had entered the house and that there was an explosion. He was not sure if he had been blown out of the house, or if he had run out of the house to the river. Licata helped the defendant out of the water and up onto an embankment. The defendant's clothing was burned and smoldering. He had first, second and third degree burns over approximately 40 percent of his body. His hands were degloved, meaning that the skin was intact but was hanging off his hands. Licata cut off all the defendant's clothing in order to treat his injuries and placed it on the ground by the side of the road. Licata told Detectives Paul Hemingway and Bruce Scobie that the defendant's clothing had been left by the side of the road. After being treated at the scene, the defendant was transported by ambulance to Yale-New Haven Hospital. Scobie put the clothes in the trunk of a police car so that they would not be lost or thrown out.

Licata and Hemingway rode in the ambulance with the defendant to the hospital. In the emergency room, Hemingway identified himself and asked the defendant what had happened. The defendant said he had opened up the door and there was an explosion. Hemingway then asked the defendant if he had a car. The defendant stated that he had a pickup truck and that it was parked in the parking lot of the Professional Building on Route 80 in East Haven. Hemingway asked the defendant why the car was parked elsewhere, and the defendant responded that he had experienced mechanical problems. The conversation lasted only one minute because of the defendant's condition. Hemingway also spoke with the defendant's wife and informed her about the fire and the vehicle.

Pursuant to a search warrant, the clothes were taken to the state laboratory to be tested. ⁵ A gas chromatography analysis was performed on the defendant's clothing on January 12, 1995. The presence of gasoline was found on the defendant's jeans, a boot and his belt. Prior to trial the defendant moved to suppress the results of the tests. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

During trial, the defendant testified that on the day of the fire, he was working as a handyman in Clinton. He left for home at 3:25 p.m., driving on Interstate 95 to the Cedar Street exit. After he exited the highway and entered the hilly section of Cedar Street, his truck began to buck heavily. It continued to buck as he drove along Route 80. He pulled off Route 80 and parked his vehicle at the Professional Building. The defendant then walked to the house at 125 Maple Street, which was two tenths of one mile away, to call his family for a ride. Upon reaching the house, he noticed that the pantry window was open and that there was a ladder leaning against the side of the house. After unlocking the door and disengaging the alarm, he turned on the dimmer switch and immediately thereafter flames hit him.

The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motions for acquittal and a new trial. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be discussed as they become relevant in the context of the defendant's specific claims.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to suppress the results of the 1995 gas chromatography tests of his clothing. The defendant argues that the chemical analysis was derived from the illegal seizure of his clothing, and should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Specifically, the defendant contends that: (1) the warrant affidavit contained references to the first chemical analysis; (2) the state's retention of the clothing following our decision in State v. Joyce, supra, 229 Conn. 10, 639 A.2d 1007, constituted an illegal seizure; and (3) the initial transmittal of the clothing in 1990 to the state laboratory for chemical analysis was an illegal seizure that tainted the subsequent testing. ⁶

"Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... Practice Book § 4061; State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 645, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992); State v. Kyles, 221 Conn. 643, 660, 607 A.2d 355 (1992). [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colvin, 241 Conn. 650, 656, 697 A.2d 1122 (1997).

The defendant first claims that the affidavit in support of the warrant contained evidence derived from the original illegal search. Additionally, he claims that the evidence is not admissible under the independent source doctrine because, with the offending references removed, the warrant to transmit the clothing for testing was not supported by probable cause. We disagree.

At the suppression hearing, the trial court, sua sponte, excised references to the illegal search contained in the warrant affidavit. ⁷ The court held that, without the references to the illegal search, the warrant nonetheless contained sufficient lawfully obtained evidence to establish probable cause to test the defendant's clothing.

Our disposition of this issue turns on the application of the independent source doctrine. It is well recognized that "the exclusionary rule has no application [where] the [g]overnment learned of the evidence from an independent source." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385-86, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); see Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 485, 83 S.Ct. at 416; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). "Independent source, in the exclusionary rule context, means that the tainted evidence was obtained, 'in fact,' by a search untainted by illegal police activity. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539, 108 S.Ct. 2529 [2534], 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)." State v. Vivo, 241 Conn. 665, 672-73, 697 A.2d 1130 (1997). The...