State v. Jury
| Docket Number | E-22-005 |
| Decision Date | 09 December 2022 |
| Citation | 203 N.E.3d 222 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Appellee v. Brian JURY, Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Brian Jury, Pro se.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
{¶ 1} Appellant, Brian Jury, appeals the January 20, 2022 judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas construing seven filings that Jury made over the course of three and one-half years as successive petitions for postconviction relief and summarily denying them. We affirm.
{¶ 2} In 2014, a jury found Jury guilty of two counts of rape, one count of felonious assault, two counts of abduction, and three gun specifications. State v. Jury , 6th Dist. Erie No. E-14-100, 2016-Ohio-2663, 2016 WL 1615406, ¶ 1. We affirmed Jury's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 77.
{¶ 3} In 2015, while his direct appeal was pending, Jury filed a petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, he asserted seven claims that boiled down to: (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) his conviction was based on illegally obtained evidence; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for a variety of reasons, both before and during trial; (4) the state violated Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to turn over emails and witnesses that could have provided Jury with an alibi; (5) the trial court relied on inaccurate information to justify imposing consecutive sentences; and (6) he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to sua sponte change the trial's venue due to pretrial publicity. The trial court denied Jury's petition, and Jury did not appeal that decision.
{¶ 4} Beginning in July 2018, Jury filed the seven documents underlying this appeal. Primarily at issue are his "MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIV. R. 60(B)" and "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A ‘DELAYED MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL’ UNDER CRIMINAL RULE 33(B)." He also filed (1) a document that he styled a "subpoena" in which he requested that the trial court order the wireless carriers for his and the victim's phones to provide "cell-site location information" ("CSLI")—data from a cellphone that is maintained by the wireless carrier and that gives time-stamped information regarding the phone's physical location—and text messages; (2) a motion for an emergency injunction to order the wireless carriers to preserve any CSLI and text messages; (3) a request for records that sought three of the sets of cellphone records that the state provided to defense counsel in discovery; (4) a motion to "renew" his Civ.R. 60(B) motion; and (5) a delayed motion for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(A)(6), which alleged that the CSLI data and the text messages—that Jury did not actually have—was newly-discovered evidence.1
{¶ 5} In his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, Jury argued that he was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) because the state violated Brady by failing to provide him with CSLI despite counsel's discovery requests for phone records. Notably, Jury did not allege that the state possessed CSLI for any of the phones; he merely claimed that CSLI "should have been part of * * *" the information requested in the subpoenas or warrants that the state issued to the cellular carriers so that the information that the state received from the carriers included CSLI. Jury claimed that he learned of the existence of CSLI on June 23, 2018, while watching a news story about the United States Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 201 L.Ed.2d 507 (2018). He filed his motion for relief approximately two weeks later.
{¶ 6} In his Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial, Jury argued that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering CSLI from his phone and the victim's phone on the date of the incidents underlying this case and from discovering the contents of more than 150 text messages between him and the victim (as opposed to the fact of text-message contact between them), despite his counsel's requests before trial for all cellphone records from Jury's and the victim's phone numbers. He argued that the state should have subpoenaed this information from the wireless carriers because the defense had requested "all" cellphone records, but that it failed to do so. He explained the reasons for the delay in filing his Crim.R. 33(B) motion.
{¶ 7} Jury also argued that the result of his trial would have been different if he had access to the CSLI and the text messages. He claimed that the location information would have corroborated his version of events and discredited the victim's version of events. He also alleged that the content of the text messages "would have shown a sex-for-hire relationship—mostly instigated by the alleged victim." Ultimately, Jury believed that "[s]uch physical, undisputable, exculpatory material evidence would have obviated [Jury's] testimony—the only link to the jury's finding [Jury] guilty on (2) two counts of rape [sic]."
{¶ 8} On January 20, 2022, the trial court issued a single judgment entry resolving all of the pending motions. The court found that Jury's filings were "in effect, ‘successive petitions for Post Relief Conviction[.] [sic]’ " (Footnote omitted.) The court "thoroughly reviewed the stated filings and the record of this case, including the appellate record * * *"—which apparently consisted of our decision in Jury's direct appeal and the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to decline jurisdiction over Jury's appeal from our decision—"as well as the applicable case law" before finding that Jury's "Motions are not well-taken, and should be denied." (Emphasis sic and footnote omitted.) Because the trial court construed Jury's filings as successive postconviction relief petitions, it did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.
{¶ 9} Jury now appeals, raising three assignments of error:
{¶ 10} For ease of discussion, before turning to Jury's assignments of error, we will address the overarching theme in Jury's brief: whether the state committed Brady violations by failing to subpoena CSLI data and text messages from the cellular providers for Jury's and the victim's cellphones. We find that it did not.
{¶ 11} Brady imposes on the government "an obligation to turn over evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment." State v. Osie , 140 Ohio St.3d 131, 2014-Ohio-2966, 16 N.E.3d 588, ¶ 154. In Brady , the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. The rule applies to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The court has also explained that evidence is material under Brady " ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ " Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), quoting Bagley at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. "A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 ; State v. Johnston , 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 529 N.E.2d 898 (1988), paragraph five of the syllabus.
{¶ 12} A Brady violation has three elements: (1) the state suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defendant as either exculpatory or impeachment evidence; and (3) prejudice results to the defendant—i.e., the evidence was material. Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 281-282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Determining whether the evidence was material "is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusions." Id. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Rather, the relevant question is whether, in the absence of the evidence, the defendant received a fair trial, "understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Kyles at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ; State v. Brown , 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 40. Thus, Brady is violated "when the evidence that was not disclosed ‘could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ " Id. , quoting Kyles at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The "materiality" of suppressed evidence must be considered collectively, not item by item. Kyles at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. We review of the materiality of evidence de novo. State v. Carroll , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1362, 2007-Ohio-5313, 2007 WL 2874353, ¶ 57.
{¶ 13} In this case, the basis for Jury's motion for relief from judgment, motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, and several of...
To continue reading
Request your trial