State v. Justus, 93-856

• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
• Writing for the Court: HORTON
• Citation: 140 N.H. 413,666 A.2d 1353
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Robert JUSTUS.
• Docket Number: No. 93-856,93-856
• Decision Date: 06 November 1995

Page 1353

666 A.2d 1353 140 N.H. 413 The STATE of New Hampshire
v.
Robert JUSTUS. No. 93-856. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Nov. 6, 1995.

[140 N.H. 414] Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General (John A. Curran, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief, and Mark D. Attorri, Assistant Attorney General, orally), for State.

David M. Rothstein, Assistant Appellate Defender, Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.

HORTON, Justice.

The defendant, Robert Justus, appeals the Superior Court's (Nadeau, J.) denial of his motion to dismiss the charges filed against him for violation of his right to a speedy trial. We affirm.

On June 8, 1990, the State filed eleven juvenile petitions against the defendant in Exeter District Court alleging that he had sexually assaulted two younger boys. He was arraigned in district court on June 20, 1990. The State subsequently filed a petition to have the defendant tried as an adult. After several hearings, the District Court (Cullen, J.) ordered certification. In January 1991, the State filed a petition to accept certification in superior court. The Superior

Page 1354

Court (Gray, J.) remanded the case to district court for further hearings relative to the certification. The Superior Court (Gray, J.) finally accepted the district court's certification on November 1, 1991. The defendant was indicted on December 3, 1991, and his original trial date was set for April 25, 1992. On April 15, 1992, the defendant moved to dismiss, asserting for the first time his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Superior Court (Nadeau, J.) denied the motion. The defendant was not actually tried until October 21, 1993. In the period between April 25, 1992, and October 21, 1993, the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial several times. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial in Superior Court (Coffey, J.) on October 25, 1993. The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the 706-day delay between his juvenile arraignment and the original trial date violated his right to a speedy trial under part I, article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.

We address the defendant's claims first under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), considering federal law only as an analytical aid, State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 594, 493 A.2d 1139, 1143 (1985). Where, as in the instant case, the federal law is not more favorable to the defendant, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), we make no separate federal analysis. See State v. Bernaby, 139 N.H. 420, 422, 653 A.2d 1124, 1126 (1995).

[140 N.H. 415] We apply a four-part test first enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-93, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), for determining whether a defendant's speedy trial right under part I, article 14 of the State Constitution has been violated. State v. Colbath, 130 N.H. 316, 319, 540 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1988). These factors are: "(1) the length of the pretrial delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay." Bernaby, 139 N.H. at 422, 653 A.2d at 1126. "No inquiry as to the remaining three Barker factors is required, however, unless the length of the delay is presumptively prejudicial." Humphrey v. Cunningham, Warden, 133 N.H. 727, 734, 584 A.2d 763, 767 (1990). For purposes of a speedy trial analysis in adult criminal proceedings the length of the pretrial delay is calculated beginning when the defendant is arrested or indicted, whichever comes first. State v. Quinlan, 122 N.H. 51, 53, 440 A.2d 13, 14...