State v. Juvenile Division, Tulsa County Dist. Court

• Decision Date: 14 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. J--76--668,J--76--668
• Citation: 560 P.2d 974
• Parties: The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. JUVENILE DIVISION, TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 974

560 P.2d 974

The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. JUVENILE DIVISION, TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, Appellee.

No. J--76--668.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Feb. 14, 1977.

S. M. Fallis, Jr., Dist. Atty., Cary W. Clark, Asst. Dist. Atty., Tulsa County, for appellant.

John Dratz, Public Defender, Tulsa, for appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLISS, Judge:

Appellant, The State of Oklahoma, appeals from an order of the Juvenile Division of the Tulsa County District Court dismissing the Petition filed in Case No. JFJ--76--514, styled 'In the Matter of: L.A.R., A Child Under the Age of Eighteen (18) Years,' alleging L.A.R. to be a delinquent child.

The State alleges the dismissal of the Petition was predicated upon noncompliance with the statutory requirement in Oklahoma necessitating the authorization of the Juvenile Court prior to the filing of a Petition against a juvenile. ¹ The State urges that this statutory procedure violates the separation of powers provision in the Oklahoma State Constitution, ² because the Juvenile Court, as an arm of the Judicial Branch, is improperly delegated authority which is exclusively within the province of the Executive Branch. The State contends the prosecuting attorney is the only arm of the Executive Branch authorized to prosecute juvenile cases.

We do not find any unconstitutional delegation of power in either 10 O.S.Supp.1976, § 1103(a) or 10 O.S.1971, § 1109(c). ³ Certainly the theory of separation of the three powers of government does not mean that the distinction between the three can be carried out with precision, and thus there may be a certain degree of blending in the three powers. See Bailey v. State Board of Public Affairs, 194 Okl. 495, 153 P.2d 235. Where a particular power cannot be conclusively categorized as either Executive or Judicial and when such powers are not expressly granted to either the Judicial or Executive Branch by the Constitution, then the Legislature may properly determine the Branch to whom the power is to be entrusted and the manner in which it will be exercised, for the exercise of the power may be incident and necessary to the agency or department's function. Further, we note the powers and authority of the prosecuting attorney can be enlarged or diminished by the Legislature. See Article XVII, § 2 of the Oklahoma State Constitution and Childs v. State, 4 Okl.Cr. 474, 113 P. 545 (1910).

The court-related intake function, as delineated in the aforementioned statutes, was legislatively implemented to achieve the important objective of the screening of juvenile cases. The judge, as Pater Patriae, functions neither exclusively as a judicial member nor exclusively as an executive officer. No encroachment upon the Executive Branch occurs in the discharge of this duty. The Juvenile Court is the legally trained and proper discretionary authority who must balance the societal interests in the case against those of the child, in light of the misconduct charged, to determine whether or not informal adjustment or diversion is preferable rather than the institution of formal juvenile proceedings. Such discretion is incident and necessary to facilitate and effectuate the purpose of the Juvenile Code which is that the care and custody and discipline of the child shall approximate, as nearly as may be, that which should be given by its parents, and that as far as practicable, any delinquent child shall not be treaed as a criminal. See 10 O.S.1971, § 1129, and Taskforce Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967).

In summary, we conclude the Legislature has properly granted the Juvenile Court the necessary discretion in the intake process. ⁴

The State further urges the Juvenile Court dismissed the instant juvenile proceeding without good cause, as allegedly required by 10 O.S.1971, § 1116(4). ⁵ We need only observe this statute is applicable only...