State v. Kasparek

• Decision Date: 12 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. DA 15–0053.,DA 15–0053.
• Citation: 375 P.3d 372,384 Mont. 56,2016 MT 163
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jason KASPAREK, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

384 Mont. 56

375 P.3d 372

2016 MT 163

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.Jason KASPAREK, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 15–0053.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 20, 2016.

Decided July 12, 2016.

For Appellant: Carolynn M. Fagan, Fagan Law Office, P.C., Missoula, Montana.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Carolyn Berkram, Glacier County Attorney, Cut Bank, Montana.

Chief Justice MIKE McGRATH

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Jason Kasparek (“Kasparek”) appeals from his conviction in the Ninth Judicial District, Glacier County, for felony burglary. We affirm.

ISSUES

¶ 2 We review the following issues on appeal:

Issue One: Did the District court err in denying Kasparek's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant?

Issue Two: Did the District Court err in denying Kasparek's motion to suppress his statements while in custody?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August, 27, 2013, Deputy Glacier County Sheriff Justin Stokes (“Deputy Stokes”) responded to a report about a burglary at Judy Como's (“Como”) residence in Browning, Glacier County, Montana. Como had been working from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. She told Deputy Stokes that her house had been burglarized during that time. Several items were missing, including several one-hundred dollar bills, a desktop computer, two boxes of jewelry, and ten packs of green Marlboro cigarettes. Como informed Deputy Stokes that her estranged husband Spencer Atchley's (“Atchley”) drug test results, which were at Como's residence, were also missing. There were also signs of forced entry on the front door.

¶ 4 Deputy Stokes then spoke with Como's neighbor, Doreen Momberg (“Momberg”). Momberg informed the Deputy that she saw a four-door white car with three people inside stop at Como's residence at 10:30 p.m. These people were later identified as Atchley, Noelle Martin (“Martin”), Atchley's mother, and Kasparek. Kasparek and Atchley stepped out of the car and entered Como's residence. Kasparek and Atchley then exited the house and left in the white car. Momberg reported that around fifteen minutes later, Kasparek, Atchley, and Martin returned to the house, but that Kasparek re-entered Como's residence alone. Atchley and Martin left while Kasparek was inside but returned fifteen-twenty minutes later and picked him up.

¶ 5 Deputy Stokes included all this information in an application for a search warrant for Kasparek's residence. The District Court issued the warrant. The record shows that upon searching Kasparek's residence, the police found several of the items missing from Como's residence. Based on that evidence, Kasparek was arrested and transported to a holding cell. Kasparek was not read his Miranda¹ rights. Captain Tom Seifert of the Glacier County Sheriff's Department (“Captain Seifert”) testified that around 3:00 p.m., while Kasparek was in the holding cell, Captain Seifert asked Kasparek whether he would like to speak with him, and Kasparek responded that he would “rather not.” Captain Seifert left the room and after working for another two hours he went off shift at 5:00 p.m. Captain Seifert went home and then returned to the jail around 8:00 p.m. Upon his return, Captain Seifert again asked Kasparek whether he understood why he was in the holding cell and reminded him that if he wanted to talk, he would have an opportunity do so. Kasparek then suddenly started “talking very fast” and provided a partial confession. Captain Seifert testified that he immediately stopped Kasparek and read him his Miranda rights, after which Kasparek told Captain Seifert his account of what had happened at the Como residence. Prior to trial, Kasparek made a motion to suppress the evidence found in his residence and the statements he made to Captain Seifert. On July 23, 2014, he pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of both motions. Kasparek now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 We review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court's application of the law is correct. State v. Minett, 2014 MT 225, ¶ 7, 376 Mont. 260, 332 P.3d 235

.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 Issue One: Did the District Court err in denying Kasparek's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant?

¶ 8 The Montana Constitution states that “[n]o warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 11

. Montana's protections against warrantless searches are consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See

State v. Bar–Jonah, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 63, 324 Mont. 278, 102 P.3d 1229. In Montana, a judge shall not issue a warrant unless the application for the search warrant:

(1) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed;

(2) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that evidence, contraband, or persons connected with the offense may be found;

(3) particularly describes the place, object, or persons to be searched; and

(4) particularly describes who or what is to be seized.

Section 46–5–221, MCA

. The sufficiency of a warrant is assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether any alleged defect in the warrant application is sufficient to affect the substantial rights of the accused. Muir v. Bilderback, 2015 MT 180, ¶ 11, 379 Mont. 459, 353 P.3d 473 (citing State v. West, 1998 MT 282, ¶ 8, 291 Mont. 435, 968 P.2d 289 ). We have adopted the “totality of the circumstances test” to evaluate the existence of probable cause in a search warrant application. State v. Reesman, 2000 MT 243, ¶ 24, 301 Mont. 408, 10 P.3d 83. Under that test, we consider if “the issuing judicial officer [made] a practical, common sense determination, given all the evidence contained in the application for a search warrant, whether a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT 203, ¶ 29, 333 Mont. 220, 142 P.3d 809 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). Furthermore, probable cause must be found within the four corners of the warrant application. Muir, ¶ 12. The judge's determination that probable cause exists is entitled to “great deference and every reasonable inference possible [must] be drawn to support that determination of probable cause.” Muir, ¶ 12 (citing State v. Tucker, 2008 MT 273, ¶ 17, 345 Mont. 237, 190 P.3d 1080 ) (internal quotations omitted).

¶ 9 Kasparek challenges the validity of the search warrant application on the grounds that the application did not contain sufficient facts to support the existence of probable cause, and that the search warrant contained misleading information. First, Kasparek claims that the search warrant application, as supported by Momberg's rendition of his activities that night, does not explicitly depict Kasparek burglarizing Como's home. Kasparek argues that the warrant application only places him at the scene of the crime and mere presence at a crime scene is not sufficient for probable cause. See State v. Nalder, 2001 MT 270, ¶ 15, 307 Mont. 280, 37 P.3d 661

.

¶ 10 However, while it is correct that mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to exercise a warrantless arrest, that is not the analysis we apply to determine the sufficiency of a search warrant application. Nalder, ¶ 15. Kasparek conflates the analysis for assessing the legality of an arrest with the existence of probable cause in a search warrant application. In this case, the issuing official had to determine whether “a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” based upon the information provided in the warrant application. Barnaby, ¶ 29 Deputy Stokes investigated the crime scene and after interviewing Como established that the burglary happened between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. Kasparek was identified and seen entering Como's house twice during that time. The first time Kasparek entered the home he was in the company of Atchley. Atchley and Kasparek entered Como's house while Como was not there. Fifteen minutes later Kasparek was seen entering the house alone. Although Kasparek was not seen carrying the burglarized items out of the front door, he was seen leaving twenty minutes later. Como also reported that her schedule was known to Atchley. All of this information was included in the application for a search warrant. In sum, the information establishes more than mere presence at the scene.

¶ 11 Second, Kasparek claims that the search warrant contained misleading information because the application did not include the fact that Atchley had Como's permission to enter the house or that Momberg did not see Kasparek carry the stolen items out of Como's residence. In support of his argument, Kasparek cites State v. Worrall, 1999 MT 55, ¶ 33, 293 Mont. 439, 976 P.2d 968

. In Worrall, we held that it is the defendant's burden to show that a search warrant application is deficient and that “a judge or magistrate is required to evaluate only the facts asserted within the four corners of a search warrant application.” Worrall, ¶ 33 (internal citation omitted). Defendants have long had an opportunity to challenge the legality of searches based primarily on the sufficiency of probable cause in the search warrant application. Tucker, ¶¶ 17–18; Barnaby, ¶ 29 However, Worrall has approved assessing information alleged to have been omitted from a search warrant application, and therefore not within the four corners of the affidavit. Worrall, ¶¶ 43–45. Worrall held that the sufficiency of a search...