State v. Kaufman, Cr. N

Decision Date05 October 1981
Docket NumberCr. N
Citation310 N.W.2d 709
PartiesSTATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Frank KAUFMAN, Defendant and Appellant. o. 770.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Charles J. Gilje, State's Atty. and John E. Greenwood, Asst. State's Atty., Jamestown, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by Mr. Greenwood.

Hjellum, Weiss, Nerison, Jukkala & Wright, Jamestown, for defendant and appellant; argued by Charles M. Carvell, Jamestown.

PAULSON, Justice.

Frank Kaufman was convicted in the Stutsman County Court of Increased Jurisdiction of theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake, under § 12.1-23-04 of the North Dakota Century Code, and was sentenced to serve six months in the Stutsman County jail with 2 1/2 months suspended, pay a $100 fine and $79.75 in restitution. Kaufman appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.

In November and December, 1980, the Jamestown West End Hide and Fur Company, a junk dealership, purchased several large rolls of scrap copper wire from Otter Tail Power Company. This wire was stored in the hide and fur company's open yard. In early December, 1980, Mr. Archie Oster, a partner in the company, noticed that several rolls of wire were missing. In checking with the manager of Porter Brothers, another junk dealership in the area, Oster learned that a similar roll of wire had been purchased by Porter Brothers on December 4, 1980, from Frank Kaufman. At trial, Oster identified the wire that Porter Brothers had purchased from Kaufman as the same wire which had been missing from the hide and fur company's yard.

Jack Miller, Deputy Sheriff of Stutsman County, testified that he had contacted Kaufman during his investigation of the theft and that Kaufman had stated that he found the wire "out by Windsor". The trial judge found Kaufman guilty of theft of property "lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake", § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C., and sentenced him to six months in the Stutsman County jail, with 2 1/2 months suspended, and that he pay a $100 fine and $79.75 in restitution. Kaufman appeals his conviction and sentence.

Three issues are presented on appeal:

1. Is property which is stolen and later abandoned by the thief "lost" for the purpose of § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C., which makes appropriation of "lost" property unlawful?

2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction?

3. Did the trial judge consider impermissible factors in sentencing which warrant vacation of the sentence?

I

Kaufman's first contention is that the copper wire was stolen from the hide and fur company's yard, and, therefore, was not "lost" and could not be the basis of a prosecution under § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C., which provides:

"12.1-23-04. Theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. A person is guilty of theft if he:

"1. Retains or disposes of property of another when he knows it has been lost or mislaid; or

"2. Retains or disposes of property of another when he knows it has been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property,

and with intent to deprive the owner of it, he fails to take readily available and reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to have it."

Although this court has never previously been presented with this issue, courts in other jurisdictions have indicated that property which is stolen and abandoned by the thief is indeed "lost" to the original owner. For example, in Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Kirby, 25 Ala.App. 245, 144 So. 123 (1932), that Court stated that "when property is stolen and is afterwards abandoned by the thief at a place unknown to the owner, such property is lost within the meaning of our statute". Id. 144 So. at 124. See also Flood v. City National Bank of Clinton, 218 Iowa 898, 253 N.W. 509 (1934); First National Bank of Ottawa v. Brown, 117 Kan. 339, 230 P. 1038 (1924); In re O'Neil, 179 Misc. 455, 39 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup.Ct.1943).

Although Title 12.1, N.D.C.C., does not provide a definition of "lost", this court has previously discussed the term. In State v. Brewster, 72 N.D. 409, 7 N.W.2d 742 (1943), the court, in discussing a predecessor to § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C., noted that "The term 'lost' is concerned with the involuntary change of location or inability to find ". Brewster, supra 7 N.W.2d at 744 (emphasis added). Applying this definition to the evidence in the instant case, it is clear that the location of the hide and fur company's wire had been changed and it could not be found by the company at the time that Kaufman found it. We therefore conclude that the stolen wire was "lost" when Kaufman found it.

Support is lent to this conclusion by the anomalous result which would follow from the interpretation of the statute urged by Kaufman. Kaufman would have this court hold that stolen property abandoned by the thief is not lost and, therefore, cannot be the basis for prosecution under § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C. If this interpretation were adopted, a person who found property, believing it to be lost or mislaid, and who thereafter sold it or otherwise deprived the owner of possession might escape prosecution merely because, unbeknownst to him, the property had previously been stolen from the true owner.

Such a result would be contrary to the purpose of Chapter 12.1-23, N.D.C.C. Section 12.1-23-04 was adopted verbatim from § 1734 of the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. This court has previously indicated that the Commission's Working Papers may be considered when construing provisions of North Dakota's Criminal Code. State v. Hanson, 302 N.W.2d 399, 402 (N.D.1981); State v. Unterseher, 289 N.W.2d 201, 203 (N.D.1980); State v. Bourbeau, 250 N.W.2d 259, 264 (N.D.1977). The Comment to § 1734 indicates that the intent behind such section is to make the appropriation of found or discovered property constitute theft:

"The point, of course, is that the actor is just as culpable if he intends to appropriate property he knows to belong to another whether he takes it, finds it, or discovers it as it is being mistakenly delivered to him. And it is just as clear that the extent of his criminal liability should not turn on technical differences between whether the money was lost, mislaid, or simply placed somewhere for safekeeping. This, in any event, is the premise of the proposal to make appropriation of found or discovered property theft just like any other kind of theft." (Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol. II, p. 939 (1970)).

A result which would relieve a person from criminal liability simply because of the occurrence of a fortuitous act such as an unknown prior theft of the property would defeat the purpose of the statute.

We hold that property which is stolen and later abandoned by the thief is "lost" for the purposes of § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C., making appropriation of lost property unlawful.

II

Kaufman also contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty of the crime charged. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to prove that the copper wire which he sold to Porter Brothers was the "property of another", and that the State failed to prove that he knew the property was lost or mislaid.

We have consistently held that a verdict based upon circumstantial evidence is accorded the same presumption of correctness as other verdicts and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the verdict is unwarranted. State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664, 670 (N.D.1980); State v. McMorrow, 286 N.W.2d 284, 286 (N.D.1979). The role of the Supreme Court on appeal is to merely review the record to determine if there is competent evidence which allowed the factfinder to draw an inference reasonably tending to prove guilt and fairly warranting a conviction. State v. Olson, supra 290 N.W.2d at 671.

A. Identification of the Property

Kaufman first contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the copper wire which he sold to Porter Brothers was the same wire which was missing from the hide and fur company's yard. Section 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C. provides that it is unlawful to retain or dispose of "property of another" when the actor knows the property is lost or mislaid. "Property of another" is defined in § 12.1-23-10(7), N.D.C.C.:

"12.1-23-10. Definitions for theft and related offenses. In this chapter "7. 'Property of another' means property in which a person other than the actor or in which a government has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe without consent, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the property and regardless of the fact that the other person or government might be precluded from civil recovery because the property was used in an unlawful transaction or was subject to forfeiture as contraband.... 'Owner' means any person or a government with an interest in property such that it is 'property of another' as far as the actor is concerned."

Thus, the State must establish that someone other than the defendant had an interest in the property which the defendant was not privileged to infringe without consent in order to support a conviction under § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C.

We find ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Kaufman had disposed of "property of another". Mr. Oster, a partner in the Jamestown West End Hide and Fur Company, testified that such large quantities of copper wire on rolls were normally purchased only from Otter Tail Power Company, while smaller purchases from individuals usually were in the form of loose, unrolled wire. He further testified that the hide and fur company burned off the rubber coating on all copper wire which was purchased from Otter Tail Power Company. The copper wire purchased by Porter Brothers from Kaufman had had the rubber coating burned off. The close proximity in time between the theft from the hide and fur...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Goldstone, CIV 12-0257 JB/GBW
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • August 22, 2015
    ...shoes of the defendant to see what was actually in his mind at the time the wrongful conduct was engaged in.'" (quoting State v. Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709, 714 (N.D. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1986))(alterations omitted)(emphasis in State v. F......
  • State v. Stewart
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • July 29, 1999
    ...1997, and we apply the version of the statute in effect then. See State v. Goodbird, 344 N.W.2d 483, 486 (N.D.1984); State v. Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709, 715 (N.D.1981). Section 65-05-33, N.D.C.C., was amended by 1997 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 534, § 4.7 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 106, § 673 repealed ......
  • State v. Ennis
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • December 17, 1990
    ...prescribed by statute, or substantially relied on an impermissible factor. State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1986); State v. Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709, 714 (N.D.1981); State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1979); State v. Rudolph, 260 N.W.2d 13 (N.D.1977). Our appellate review of a crimin......
  • State v. Cummings
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 23, 1986
    ...the general rule against retroactive application. See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 41.02 (4 ed. 1978). In State v. Kaufman, 310 N.W.2d 709 (N.D.1981), this Court cited the general rule of Reiling v. Bhattacharyya in holding that NDCC Sec. 1-02-10 barred applying retroactively ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT