State v. Hanson
Decision Date | 24 February 1981 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Citation | 302 N.W.2d 399 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Dora HANSON, Defendant and Appellee. o. 734. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Larry E. Stern, Asst. State's Atty., Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant.
Mack, Moosbrugger, Ohlsen, Dvorak & Senger, Grand Forks, for defendant and appellee; argued by Richard A. Ohlsen, Grand Forks.
This is an appeal by the Cass County state's attorney (State) from a district court's dismissal of a perjury charge against appellee, Dora Hanson (Hanson). The appeal was taken pursuant to § 29-28-07(1), NDCC. See, State v. Jelliff, 251 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1977); State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647 (N.D.1976). We affirm.
The facts of this case, that Hanson committed perjury and then recanted, are not disputed. As a witness in a probate hearing, she testified falsely regarding a meeting she had with the deceased testator. Her testimony was directly contradicted by two other witnesses and even her own diary, but Hanson subsequently resumed the stand and cleaved to her original story, even though she was well aware of the challenge to her credibility. After the hearing, but before any substantive ruling by the probate court, Hanson drew an affidavit in which she admitted lying. She was later charged with perjury pursuant to § 12.1-11-01, NDCC.
Before trial, Hanson offered to prove up the necessary elements for a retraction defense, § 12.1-11-04(3), NDCC, and moved the court to rule as a matter of law whether or not a defense was established. The State conceded, and the court ruled, that § 12.1-11-04(3) provided for a bar to prosecution, not simply a defense at trial. The elements of the retraction defense were then treated as issues of law, which, whatever the preliminary determination of the court, would not be presented to the jury. To the satisfaction of the court, Hanson proved that her perjury was retracted in accord with the requirements of § 12.1-11-04(3), and the case was dismissed before it could go to a jury.
Section 12.1-11-04(3) reads:
"It is a defense to a prosecution under sections 12.1-11-01 ... that the actor retracted the falsification in the course of the official proceeding or matter in which it was made, if in fact he did so before it became manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed and before the falsification substantially affected the proceeding or the matter." (Emphasis added.)
The court determined that Hanson had in fact retracted her testimony. It appears to have construed the second underscored clause to require that the retraction be made before the falsification becomes manifest to the court hearing the testimony. Finally, the third underscored clause was construed to require that the retraction be made before the falsification influenced the outcome of the case. Hanson called the judge of the probate court to testify before the district court. He stated that Hanson's testimony before the probate court was not transparently perjurious at the time, and that the presence of conflicting evidence merely presented an issue of credibility. We deem this testimony of the judge of the probate court to be of significance in determining the factual issues of whether or not Hanson thought the falsification had been discovered or was certain to be discovered, as well as whether or not the falsification did, in fact, materially affect the proceeding prior to the retraction. The trial court found that Hanson submitted her retraction before the final ruling in the probate matter. The fact that additional time, investigation and witnesses were needed, on account of Hanson's testimony, was held not to have "substantially affected the matter."
In a prosecution for perjury, the State must show that the false statement was material to the cause before the court. No showing of materiality was made, yet Hanson apparently does not contest this issue. The materiality of a falsehood is a legal question for the court, State v. Scott, 37 N.D. 105, 163 N.W. 810 (1917); 62 A.L.R.2d 1027, § 2, yet the trial court did not premise dismissal on a finding of immateriality. Therefore, in the absence of a dispute or an express holding, we proceed directly to the issues raised by the State.
As the district court determined, § 12.1-11-04(3) establishes not an affirmative defense to be asserted at trial but a bar to the commencement of trial. Whether or not a defendant is entitled to the benefit of a defense is a question of law for resolution by the trial court, with the assistance of an evidentiary hearing if necessary. If the court finds the defense established, prosecution of the case is foreclosed, but if the court determines that prosecution may continue, the defendant cannot re-submit the issue at trial. Evidence of retraction may be introduced at trial to show lack of intent to falsify, but not to revive the possibility of excusing the offense. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 284 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 57 S.Ct. 535, 539-40, 81 L.Ed. 808 (1937); see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). Because § 12.1-11-04(3) is an exceptional statutorily granted defense and not a determination of guilt or innocence, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of the statute have not been met. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1044 (D.C.Cir. 1979); contrast, United States v. Clavey, 578 F.2d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1978).
Section 12.1-11-04(3) was taken verbatim from § 1355(3) of the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. The Commission, noting that "the prime interest of the government is in obtaining truthful information," stated the rationale for allowing retraction, pursuant to the rule, as a defense to prosecution:
Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol. I, pp. 665-6, 674.
The statute attempts, then, to encourage rather than punish truthtelling by a witness, yet also to preserve the purity of motive behind the retraction and avoid subversion of the proceeding. See, Clavey, supra, at 1222, n. 5.
The federal rule regarding recantation of false testimony, 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d), is similar to the North Dakota rule.
"Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed."
The two prerequisites to retraction "has not become manifest" and "has not substantially affected" are separated by a disjunctive, unlike § 12.1-11-04(3) which has a conjunctive relation. While this suggests greater liberality in the federal rule, federal courts have not uniformly allowed defendants to establish a retraction defense by showing compliance with only one of the rule's conditions. See, Moore, supra. Our state statute does not contain the same ambiguity, and to have the benefit of the defense the defendant must retract in accordance with both provisions. Whatever the difference between the statutes on that count, the prerequisites of...
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