State v. Keefer
| Decision Date | 13 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 19CA2,19CA2 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 2419,138 N.E.3d 519 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher KEEFER, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Benjamin E. Fickel, Hocking County Prosecutor, Logan, Ohio, for Appellant.
Timothy P. Gleeson, Logan, Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Hocking County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry granting Christopher Keefer's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant. Pursuant to the evidence discovered from the search warrant, the State charged Appellee with seven drug-related offenses. The State appeals the trial court's judgment that granted Appellee's motion to suppress contending that 1) the trial court erred when it found the affidavit for the search warrant did not sufficiently support a finding of probable cause, and (2) the trial court erred when it found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to prevent exclusion of the evidence recovered pursuant to the search warrant. Because we sustain the State's second assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this decision.
{¶2} On March 28, 2017, Detective Dustin Robison, seeking a search warrant, filed an affidavit alleging that he had good cause to believe numerous drug-related offenses were occurring at 18692 Laurel Run Road in Nelsonville, Ohio. The following is a summary of the averments made in Robison's affidavit:
{¶3} Pursuant to the affidavit, a municipal judge signed the warrant. In executing the warrant, the State alleges that law enforcement officers recovered 60 grams of heroin, 10 grams of cocaine, 32 grams of methamphetamines, 2 firearms, 2 cell phones, and $3,000.00 at the Laurel Run Road address.
{¶4} On May 4, 2018, the State charged Appellee with possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(E), trafficking in heroine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(6)(F), possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(B), trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(C), two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(1)(D), and having weapons while under a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), all with forfeiture specifications in violation of R.C. 2941.1417.
{¶5} On October 2, 2018, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to a March 28, 2017 search warrant because it was defective and the evidence recovered from the warrant should be suppressed. The State filed a motion in opposition.
{¶6} In a January 2, 2019 judgment entry, the trial court addressed whether Detective Robison's affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to support the search warrant that had been issued. Generally, the trial court determined the overall reliability of the confidential information, as well as his or her assertions in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the affidavit were not sufficiently corroborated, and the information regarding the issuance and execution of the arrest warrant for Appellee made in paragraphs 3 and 4 was stale.
{¶7} The court determined that But, ultimately, the court concluded that it was not enough, under the totality of the circumstances, to find that there was probable cause to support the warrant.
{¶8} The court then set a hearing to determine if the evidence should be suppressed under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court indicated that this judgment was not a final order.
{¶9} At that hearing, on direct examination, Detective Robison testified that he had been employed with the Hocking County Sheriff's Office for 19 years. He testified that he received peace officer training, a college education, as well as ongoing police training. Detective Robison testified that he was part of the Sheriff's interdiction unit for narcotics and was investigating Appellee and others. He testified that he "worked on well over a hundred [search warrants]."
{¶10} Detective Robison testified that met with the Hocking County Prosecutor and obtained a search warrant pertaining to Appellee at the Laurel Run Road address. Detective Robison testified that both the prosecutor and the judge reviewed the warrant and that the warrant was signed by Judge Moses from the Municipal Court.
{¶11} On cross examination, after Detective Robison told Appellee's counsel that there was no record regarding his application for the warrant, Appellee's counsel did not cross examine Detective Robison, asserting that review of the warrant was limited to the four corners of the affidavit.
{¶12} On February 13, 2019, the trial court issued a final judgment entry recognizing its prior ruling that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, but the majority of the decision addressed the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
{¶13} The court found its review of the Good Faith Exception was limited to the four corners of the affidavit, citing State v. Klosterman , 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332, 683 N.E.2d 100 (2nd Dist.1996). The court stated "that the defects in warrant are such that there was very little information as to the reliability of the informant and that some of the information relied on was stale," with the lack of information regarding the reliability of the informant being the more serious defect. Therefore, the court found "that a well-trained deputy would have known that the information in the affidavit did not establish probable cause because it did not contain information which would allow the issuing judge to find that the informant was reliable." Consequently, the trial court held that the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule did not apply and granted Appellee's motion to suppress the evidence discovered pursuant to the search warrant.
{¶14} It is from this judgment that the State appeals, asserting two assignments of error.
{¶15} The State argues that the trial court erred when it found that the affidavit did not support probable cause so as to justify the search warrant. Specifically, the State argues that the informant's personal observation demonstrates the basis of his knowledge (i.e. the informant gave names, addresses, and the type of car that Appellee drove), and that detailed information, along with verifiable information, offered an "indicia or reliability" regarding the informant's knowledge. Therefore, the State asserts that there were sufficient facts discernable from the affidavit to find that there was probable cause to hold that the search warrant was valid.
{¶16} Alternatively, the State argues that even if there was insufficient probable cause to justify the search warrant, the evidence should not be excluded under the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, in pertinent part, because the affidavit was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable" and the warrant was approved by a neutral and detached magistrate.
{¶17} Appellee acknowledges hearsay may support probable cause so as to justify the issuance of a search warrant. However, Appellee argues that the informant's assertions in this case are nothing more than uncorroborated hearsay. Therefore, Appellee argues that the affidavit lacked probable cause and the evidence recovered from the search warrant should be excluded from consideration under the exclusionary rule.
{¶18} Appellee also argues that the Good Faith exception to the...
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State v. Siegel
...presume it to be valid. State v. George, supra , at 331, 544 N.E.2d 640, citing Leon at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405.{¶43} In State v. Keefer , 2019-Ohio-2419, 138 N.E.3d 519, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.), this Court noted that the law was unsettled as to whether a reviewing court may look beyond the four corne......
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State v. Siegel, 20CA17
...officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. State v. George, supra, at 331, citing Leon at 923. {¶43} In State v. Keefer, 2019-Ohio-2419, 138 N.E.3d 519, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.), this Court noted that the law unsettled as to whether a reviewing court may look beyond the four corners of the ......