State v Keen
| Decision Date | 05 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | 97-00147 |
| Citation | 31 S.W.3d 196 |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DAVID M. KEENIN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Automatic Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 90-06629
The appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of eight-year-old Ashley Nicole Reed in 1990. On automatic appeal, this Court reversed the sentence based upon improper jury instructions, and we remanded the case for resentencing. See State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1994). At the second sentencing hearing, the appellant was again sentenced to death, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal from this second sentencing hearing, this Court has requested additional argument and briefing on the following five issues: (1) whether the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance; (2) whether permitting the jurors to find either "torture" or "serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death" denied the appellant his constitutional right to a unanimous jury finding of the basis for the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance; (3) whether the jury instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance failed to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty; (4) whether the trial court's failure to permit the jury to consider the sentencing option of life without parole violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, sections eight and sixteen of the Tennessee Constitution; and (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's special request for an instruction on circumstantial evidence. We hold that none of these issues warrants reversal of the sentence. We further hold that the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury are amply supported by the evidence, and we agree that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we hold that the sentence of death was not arbitrarily or disproportionately applied in the appellant's case. With respect to all other issues not specifically discussed in this opinion, we agree with and affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
W. Mark Ward, Assistant Shelby County Public Defender, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, David M. Keen.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Michael J. Fahey, II, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, J., not participating.
OPINIONThe present appeal in this capital case arises from the resentencing of the appellant, David M. Keen, who pleaded guilty in February of 1991 to first degree murder in perpetration of the rape of eight-year-old Ashley Nicole (Nikki) Reed. The appellant was sentenced to death by a Shelby County jury, but this Court reversed the sentence on automatic appeal after finding reversible error in the "failure of the trial judge to properly include in the jury instructions that aggravating circumstances must be proven to outweigh any mitigating circumstances 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'" See State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tenn. 1994). We remanded the case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a new sentencing hearing, and on August 15, 1997, a jury again sentenced the appellant to death for the murder of Nikki Reed. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of death after this second hearing.
On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), the appellant's case was docketed in this Court. The appellant raised fourteen issues in his initial brief, and after carefully examining the entire record and the law-including the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the briefs of the appellant and the State-this Court entered an order limiting argument and requesting additional briefing on the following five issues:
(1) whether the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance;
(2) whether permitting the jurors to find either "torture" or "serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death" denied the appellant his constitutional right to a unanimous jury finding of the basis for the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance;
(3) whether the jury instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance failed to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty;
(4) whether the trial court's failure to permit the jury to consider the sentencing option of life without parole violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, sections eight and sixteen of the Tennessee Constitution; and
(5) whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's special request for an instruction on circumstantial evidence.
For the reasons given herein, we find that none of the issues raised by the appellant merits reversal of the sentence, and we remand this case for enforcement of the judgment of this Court.
The evidence presented at the second sentencing hearing was substantially similar to the evidence presented by the State and the appellant at the first sentencing hearing in 1991. Nevertheless, because many of the issues raised in an automatic appeal involve questions concerning the evidence supporting the applicable sentencing criteria, it is necessary to review anew all of the evidence presented during this second sentencing hearing.
At the time of the tragic events giving rise to this case, the appellant was living with his then-fiance, Deborah Wilson, in a three-bedroom mobile home in Millington, Tennessee. Also living with the appellant and his fiance were Deborah's four children, including Ashley Nicole, her mother, and her father. During the late afternoon of March 17, 1990, the appellant and Deborah met her mother and father at the VFW Club in West Memphis, Arkansas, to eat dinner and play bingo. All of Deborah's children were spending the night with various friends. Shortly after the appellant and Deborah arrived at the VFW Club, Deborah's father, Jessie Wilson, expressed some concern over Nikki's arrangements to sleep over at a friend's house. The appellant offered to go back to Millington to check on Nikki, and Mr. Wilson allowed the appellant to borrow his car to make the short trip.
The appellant left the VFW Club at about 5:30, and he returned about two hours later. Upon returning, he told everyone that Nikki was spending the night with her friend, Shantell. The group stayed at the VFW Club until about 10:30 that evening, and on his way back home to Millington, Mr. Wilson noticed that the green blanket he usually kept in his car was missing. Mr. Wilson questioned the appellant about the blanket, but the appellant merely replied that he put the blanket in the back seat of the car because he did not want to sit on it.
The next morning, Deborah and the appellant went shopping at the local Wal-Mart while Mrs. Wilson went to pick Nikki up for church. When Mrs. Wilson returned home, she told her husband that Nikki did not go to her friend's house the previous evening, and the two of them searched around the mobile home park for Nikki. When Deborah and the appellant returned from shopping, they joined the search for Nikki. After searching all day and finding no trace of his granddaughter, Mr. Wilson told Deborah to report Nikki's disappearance to the police. Deborah and the appellant then left on foot for the police station to file a missing persons report.
In the meantime, Mr. Wilson and his wife again searched the trailer park, and after waiting some time for Deborah and the appellant to return from the police station, they decided to drive to the police station themselves. As soon as Mrs. Wilson opened the door to get into her car, she saw a pair of panties lying on the passenger-side floorboard. Mr. Wilson told his wife not to move the panties, and they drove to the police station where they notified an officer about their discovery. When Mr. Wilson later approached the appellant about the panties in the car, the appellant was evasive and would not answer his questions.
The next day, a detective with the Millington Police Department asked the appellant and Deborah to come to the police station for questioning. Although the appellant initially denied any involvement in Nikki's disappearance, he admitted after further questioning by the police that he "threw her in the river." The appellant then took the detective and others officers to Memphis along the north end of Mud Island in the Wolf River, where the police found Nikki's naked body wrapped in a green blanket. Although the police found a blue denim skirt and a pink shirt wrapped with the body, the officers found no panties.
The appellant was taken to the Memphis Police Department where he again confessed to the murder of Nikki Reed. The appellant stated that when he found Nikki, he intended to take her back with him to West Memphis because he was unsure whether she could spend the night with her friend. In his initial statement to the Millington police, the appellant stated that on the return trip to West Memphis, he and Nikki argued about something concerning her seat belt. The appellant stated that during this argument, he became very angry, grabbed...
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