State v. Keen, 59A83
Decision Date | 09 August 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 59A83,59A83 |
Citation | 305 S.E.2d 535,309 N.C. 158 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Joseph Daniel KEEN, Jr. |
Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Daniel F. McLawhorn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.
Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove by Roger W. Smith and Mark J. Prak, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.
By his sole assignment of error defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to strike certain testimony of Dr. J.D. Danoff. We find merit in this assignment and hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Dr. Danoff, a professor in the Department of Psychiatry at East Carolina University School of Medicine, who observed and treated Langley in the Pitt Memorial Hospital for approximately eight days, testified as a witness for the State. It was stipulated that Dr. Danoff was an expert "in the general field of psychiatry with a specialty in the area of adolescent psychiatry." Among other things, Danoff testified that while Langley was in the hospital, he was in an acute anxiety state, was suicidal, angry and hostile. Danoff further testified that emotions commonly associated with the type of incident described by Langley included anxiety, anger, shame, guilt and feelings of worthlessness.
Defendant's assignment of error relates to the following questions, answers and rulings of the trial court:
Q. Doctor Danoff, do you have an opinion based upon your medical training and experience as to whether or not James was fantasizing in any manner in his account of this situation?
A. Yes, I do.
Court: The answer to that question is yes or no; do you have an opinion?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. That an attack occurred on him; that this was reality.
Motion to strike.
Court: Motion denied.
Dr. Danoff's answer was not responsive to the question asked by the prosecutor. If an unresponsive answer produces irrelevant or incompetent evidence, the evidence should be stricken and withdrawn from the jury. See State v. Ferguson, 280 N.C. 95, 185 S.E.2d 119 (1971). Dr. Danoff was asked for his opinion whether Langley "was fantasizing in any manner in his account of this situation." Instead of answering the question, the witness stated his opinion "that an attack occurred on [Langley]; that this was a reality."
The evidence provided in the answer was incompetent. G.S. 8-58.13 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.
We think the most reasonable interpretation of the answer given by Dr. Danoff is that, in his opinion, Langley had been "attacked" and that this was a "reality". In so answering, the witness went beyond the point of assisting the jury in determining a fact in issue. He, in effect, expressed an opinion as to the guilt of defendant.
In State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 733, 268 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1980), Justice Carlton, speaking for this Court and relying on State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978), an opinion by Justice Exum, said:
[Expert] testimony is properly admitted if
(1) the witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have an opinion on the subject than the trier of fact.
(2) the witness testifies only that an event could or might have caused an injury but does not testify to the conclusion that the event did in fact cause the injury, unless his expertise leads him to an unmistakable conclusion and
(3) the witness does not express an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. [Footnote omitted.]
In applying the criteria set forth in Brown and quoted above, criteria (1) was unquestionably met since the parties stipulated as to Dr. Danoff's expertise.
It is clear that the witness exceeded criteria (2). He did not testify that Langley's mental state was consistent with that of one who had been sexually attacked, or that an attack as described by Langley could or might have caused his mental state. On the contrary, the witness stated that in his opinion such an attack had been committed on Langley and that "this was reality."
Our conclusion that the witness exceeded criteria (2) in instant case is further supported by...
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