State v. Keil

Decision Date01 February 2017
Docket NumberCase No. 16CA28
PartiesSTATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. COREY KEIL Defendant-Appellant
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2015CR1037D

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee

DANIEL ROGERS

Richland County Prosecutor

38 South Park Street

Mansfield, OH 44902

For Defendant-Appellant

JOHN C. O'DONNELL, III

10 West Newlon Place

Mansfield, OH 44902

Gwin, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant Corey Keil ["Keil"] appeals his conviction and sentence after a jury trial in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas on one count of felonious assault.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On January 14, 2016, a Richland County Grand Jury indicted Keil on one count of Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).

{¶3} On December 8, 2015, Keil and his brother Izak Williams were passengers in a tan 1998 Ford Taurus car being driven by the boys' mother. Keil's vehicle was inadvertently in a left turn lane and veered back into the through lane. Keil's mother did not see a red van driven by Ronald Earles and occupied by Earles' eleven-year-old autistic son. In response to being cut off and nearly struck, Earles honked his horn at Keil's car.

{¶4} As Earles' van continued behind Keil's car Earles observed Keil's mother driving ten to fifteen miles per hour below the posted 35 mph speed limit. The two vehicles stopped at the red light at the intersection of Trimble Road and Marion Avenue. When the light turned green, Keil's car did not move for ten to fifteen seconds, causing Earles to honk his horn a second time.

{¶5} As Keil's car continued to travel below the posted speed limit on Trimble Road, Earles went into a turning lane and passed the car. After passing, Earles stopped his van at the intersection of Trimble Road and Millsboro Road due to traffic build up in both directions caused by a crane in the road. Keil's car stopped behind Earles' van and Keil and his brother yelled "fucking move" at Earles. After yelling at Earles, Keil and his brother began throwing soda cups at Earles' van.

{¶6} As Earles stepped out of his van to speak with Keil and Williams, the pair rushed at Earles. Earles, a carrying a concealed weapons permit holder, reached back inside his van to retrieve his Smith and Weston .9 mm handgun. However, before Earles could get both feet out of his van and point his gun, Keil and Williams began punching him, causing Earles to lose control of his handgun. As Earles wrestled Williams to the ground, Keil picked up Earles' handgun from the ground. Keil then struck Earles in the head with the handgun. After striking Mr. Earles in the head Keil walked back towards his mother's car carrying Earles' gun.

{¶7} Earles suffered a cut and chipped bone in his elbow when he wrestled Williams to the ground and a cut to his head when Keil struck him with Earles' gun.

{¶8} Richland County Sheriff Steve Sheldon, who was driving on Trimble Road in his unmarked 2004 Ford Explorer, observed stopped traffic and people outside their cars near the intersection of Trimble and Millsboro. Sheriff Sheldon activated his emergency lights and stayed in the middle lane to investigate. Sheriff Sheldon observed Keil, Keil's mother, and Williams walking towards Keil's mother's car and a bloody Earles walking back towards his van.

{¶9} Tammie Wilson, who was parked directly across from Keil's car and observed the entire incident, advised Sheriff Sheldon that Keil had a gun. Sheriff Sheldon displayed his gun, stood behind the door of his vehicle for safety, and requested back up. Officers from the Mansfield Police Department ("MPD"), Richland County Sheriff's Office ("RCSO") and Lexington Police Department arrived on scene to assist Sheriff Sheldon.

{¶10} Sheriff Sheldon observed Keil holding Earles' handgun and ordered Keil to place the gun on the hood of Sheriff Sheldon's ear. Sheriff Sheldon then ordered Keil to place his hands on the trunk of Keil's car and Williams to place his hands on the hood of Keil's car. MPD Officers Williams and Gearhart handcuffed Keil, Keil's mother, Williams, and Mr. Earles, and cleared Keil's car and Earles' van.

{¶11} Officer Jodie Williams made contact with Earles. Officer Williams observed a laceration on Earles' head, blood on Earles' elbow, hands and shirt, dirt on Earles' hands and arm, blood splatter on both sides of the front driver's side door of Earles' van, and handprints on the front driver's side window of Earles' van. Officer Williams obtained an oral statement from Earles regarding the incident. Earles subsequently reported to MPD and provided a taped statement describing the incident.

{¶12} Officer Williams then made contact with Keil and Mr. Williams to get their version of events. Keil and Williams, who had been placed in separate cruisers both told Officer Williams that they were involved in a road rage incident with Earles that they both punched Earles, and that Keil grabbed Earles handgun and struck Earles in the head with it. Keil and Williams were arrested and transported to Richland County Jail.

{¶13} Officer Williams also obtained statements from Tammie Wilson, John Northrup and David Schindler.

{¶14} Mr. Northrup, who was driving on Trimble Road at the time of the incident, observed two young men and a woman beating up another man next to the driver's side of a red van, but could not positively identify any of the participants.

{¶15} Mr. Schindler observed the incident while sitting in his car in a parking lot approximately fifty yards away and mistakenly identified Izak Williams rather than Keil as the person whom grabbed Earles' gun and struck Mr. Earles. {¶16} Earles, who declined medical attention immediately following the incident, went to the Third Street Clinic several months later for X-rays. The X-rays revealed the chipped bone in Earles' elbow that he suffered when he took Mr. Williams to the ground.

{¶17} The jury found Keil guilty Felonious Assault. Following the jury's verdict, the Trial Court ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation (hereinafter "PSI") and scheduled a Sentencing Hearing for April 4, 2016.

{¶18} On March 18, 2016, Keil filed a "Motion for Judgment of Acquittal" with the Trial Court pursuant to Ohio Crim.R. 29(C). On March 25, 2016, the Trial Court overruled Keil's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.

{¶19} On April 25, 2016, the Trial Court sentenced Keil to four years community control.

Assignments of Error

{¶20} Keil raises three assignments of error,

{¶21} "I. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

{¶22} "II. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR FELONIOUS ASSAULT WAS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶23} "III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY ADMITTING HEARSAY STATEMENTS AND DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S STATEMENT."

{¶24} For ease of discussion, we shall address Keil's assignments of error out of sequence.

II.

{¶25} In his second assignment of error, Keil contends that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶26} Our review of the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction is governed by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which requires a court of appeals to determine whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.; see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673, 175 L.Ed.2d 582(2010) (reaffirming this standard); State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 2010-Ohio-1017, ¶146; State v. Clay, 187 Ohio App.3d 633, 933 N.E.2d 296, 2010-Ohio-2720, ¶68.

{¶27} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue, which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief." Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) at 1594.

{¶28} When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a "'thirteenth juror'" and disagrees with the fact finder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). However, an appellate court may not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that "'the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.'" State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720-721 (1st Dist. 1983). Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for "'the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.'" Id.

"[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.

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"If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing
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