State v. Keith

• Decision Date: 22 December 1891
• Citation: 47 Minn. 559,50 N.W. 691
• Parties: STATE v KEITH.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

47 Minn. 559

50 N.W. 691

STATEvKEITH.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 22, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. An indictment for abduction, under the first subdivision of section 240 of the Penal Code, -taking a female under the age of 16 years for the purpose of sexual intercourse -sustained.

2. The taking need not be by force; it may be by persuasion or enticement.

3. It is not necessary to specify the particular means by which the taking or abduction was effected, nor to state from what place or from whose custody the girl was taken. The statement of the purpose held to be sufficient.

4. A conviction cannot be had on the unsupported testimony of the female. The corroborating evidence must extend to every essential ingredient in the offense. State v. Timmens, 4 Minn. 325, (Gil. 241,) followed.

5. Such corroborating evidence need not be sufficient in itself to establish the guilt of the defendant.

6. The results of a medical examination of a young girl, some eight months after the alleged abduction, held admissible in evidence.

7. It is a prejudicial circumstance, which may weigh heavily against one accused of crime, that witnesses were by him sent out of the state and kept away, so that their testimony might not be produced against him.

Appeal from district court, Lyon county; B. F. WEBBER, Judge.

Indictment against Wesley Keith for abduction. Verdict of guilty, and judgment thereon. From an order denying his motion for a new trial defendant appeals. Reversed.

C. E. Fuller, M. E. Matthews, and J. M. Thompson, for appellant.

V. B. Seward, Co. Atty., and Moses E. Clapp, Atty. Gen., for the State.

DICKINSON, J.

The defendant was convicted under an indictment for the offense of abduction, as specified in the first subdivision of section 240 of the Penal Code, by the terms of which a person who “takes a female under the age of sixteen years for the purpose of *** sexual intercourse” is declared to be guilty of this offense. The specification of the offense, as alleged in the indictment, is that the defendant, at a time and place mentioned, “did unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously take one Nora M. Greenslitt into a certain building (particularly described as a livery stable) for the purpose of sexual intercourse with him, the said Wesley Keith; *** she, the said Nora M. Greenslitt, being then and there an unmarried female, and under the age of sixteen years, to-wit, of the age of ten years; contrary to the form of the statute,” etc. This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial.

Numerous objections are urged to the indictment. Testing the indictment by the reasonable rules set forth in our statutes, and often referred to in our decisions, and applied in the criminal practice, rather than the extremely technical common-law rules of criminal pleading, this indictment must be sustained. See State v. Holong, 38 Minn. 368,37 N. W. Rep. 587, and statutes and cases cited. The purposes of pleading were accomplished by alleging that the defendant did feloniously “take”-which is the language of the statute-the girl to the place and for the purpose specified. It was not a necessary element in the offense charged that the taking be by force. Persuasion or enticement is enough. State v. Jamison, 38 Minn. 21,35 N. W. Rep. 712. Nor was it necessary to allege by what means the abduction was effected. State v. George, 93 N. C. 567. It was not necessary to state from what place, or from whose custody, the girl was taken, for that is not material under the statute. As to the purpose alleged, there can be no doubt. While the language is not well chosen, it could not be understood as having any other meaning than that specified in the statute cited.

The defendant urges, with greater reason, that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that a conviction could not be had upon the testimony of the girl, Nora Greenslitt, unless her evidence had been corroborated “upon every material point necessary to the perfection of the offense charged, to-wit, the taking away, and that such taking was for the purpose of sexual intercourse.” If in such cases corroboration to the extent here indicated is necessary, the refusal to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error for which a new trial must be allowed. The court did instruct the jury, in accordance with the terms of the statute, that there could be no conviction upon the testimony of the female, “unsupported by other evidence.” But this did not inform the jury as to whether the corroborating evidence must support the testimony of the girl in respect to all the essential facts constituting the crime alleged. Under the charge as given, the jury might understand that it was enough if the principal witness were corroborated in merely one material matter....