State v. Kendall, 77-146-CR
Decision Date | 07 February 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 77-146-CR,77-146-CR |
Citation | 94 Wis.2d 63,287 N.W.2d 758 |
Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William KENDALL, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Donald S. Eisenberg and Eisenberg, Giesen & Ewers, Madison, on brief, for defendant-appellant.
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen. and Wm. L. Gansner, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief, for plaintiff-respondent.
In April, 1977, William Kendall, the defendant was tried on the charge of delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine, party to a crime, contrary to secs. 161.41(1)(b) and 939.05, Stats. After the jury had deliberated for many hours and failed to reach a verdict, the court concluded that "the jury is hung," declared a mistrial, and discharged the jury.
On July 6, 1977, the defendant moved to dismiss further prosecution on the ground that a second trial would place him twice in jeopardy contrary to the federal 1 and Wisconsin 2 constitutions. The motion was denied on July 19, 1977, and the defendant filed a notice of appeal to this court on July 20, 1977. We affirm the order of the circuit court denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
The first question is whether an order denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is appealable. This appeal arose prior to the creation of the court of appeals on August 1, 1978 and is one of the last cases which this court is deciding under the former code of procedure. 3 Because an interpretation of what constitutes an "appealable order" under the former code of procedure is not of significance in the future, we need not labor over deciding the question of the appealability of the order. We conclude that this court can and should decide the issue of double jeopardy by exercise of its superintending authority. This matter has been pending before this court for more than two years; the parties have briefed the merits of the double jeopardy issue.
As we explained in McEwen v. Pierce County, 90 Wis.2d 256, 269-270, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979), the court may treat an appeal as a proceeding seeking this court's exercise of its superintending power:
For the reasons expressed in McEwen, we reach the issue of double jeopardy in the case at hand.
We turn now to the merits of defendant's claim that further prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
Jeopardy had attached at the time the mistrial was declared. 4 The facts and circumstances of the case must be examined to determine if further prosecution is permissible. A brief description of the context in which the mistrial was declared by the circuit court follows. On April 12, 1977, several days prior to trial, defense counsel filed a "Motion to Compel Election of Charge and Motion in Limine," requesting that the district attorney be required to elect one subsection of sec. 939.05(2), Stats., "party to the crime," under which the state was going to proceed and to limit evidence according to the state's election. Sec. 939.05, Stats., provides:
An affidavit by defense attorney was attached to the motion stating that because the defendant did not know under which subsection the district attorney was proceeding the defendant was being denied due process. Before the jury trial began on April 18, 1977, defendant's motion was denied.
At trial there was testimony that an informant had asked the defendant if he knew anyone who could get him cocaine; that the defendant got Mr. Gonzales involved in the drug transaction; that the prospective buyers were law enforcement officers; and that the defendant apparently wanted to call off the deal and withdraw before the cocaine was purchased.
Over defendant's objection the jury was instructed with regard to both the aiding and abetting and conspiracy parts of sec. 939.05, Stats., much of the language of the instruction being taken from Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instruction No. 400, Parties to Crime. Because sec. 939.05(2)(a), Stats., "directly commits the crime," was not mentioned to the jury, the court, in its instructions, labeled aiding and abetting (I. e. sec. 939.05(2)(b), Stats.) as "A" and conspiracy (I. e. Sec. 939.05(2)(c), Stats.) as "B".
During deliberations, the jury made several written requests of the court. The first request stated:
The record is not clear whether the court responded to those two questions.
The court received a second set of questions from the jury at 5:15 p. m.:
Without consulting counsel, the court at 5:20 p. m. gave to the jury in typed form part of the jury instructions which were almost identical to the wording of sec. 939.05(2)(b) and sec. 939.05(2)(c), Stats.
At 10:20 p. m. the jury requested the reading of part of the cross-examination testimony of one of the state's witnesses concerning a telephone call between the defendant and Mr. Gonzales. The court responded, "I am sorry, but I feel that reading only a small portion of the testimony would unduly emphasize that evidence in relation to the remainder."
At approximately 11:35 or 11:40 p. m. the court sent a written question to the jury: "Ladies and gentlemen, do you feel that with further deliberation you can reach a unanimous verdict?" At 12:20 a. m. the jury responded: "Your Honor: No." At that time the jury had deliberated for approximately ten hours.
After summarizing this interchange of questions and answers on the record, the circuit court stated:
The jury was then called into ...
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State v. Kirschbaum
...that were not the case in a criminal proceeding, the defendant would be subjected to double jeopardy. See State v. Kendall, 94 Wis.2d 63, 68, 71-72, 287 N.W.2d 758, 760, 762 (1980) ("Jeopardy ... attached at the time the mistrial was declared. The facts and circumstances of the case must be......
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State v. Jennings
...225 Wis. 314, 321, 274 N.W. 411 (1937); see also Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 226, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996); State v. Kendall, 94 Wis. 2d 63, 66, 287 N.W.2d 758 (1980); McEwen v. Pierce County, 90 Wis. 2d 256, 269-70, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979). Whether this court in a given situation wil......
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State v. Copening
...if these tests are not met, the bar of double jeopardy applies, and the defendant may not be retried. See also, State v. Kendall, 94 Wis.2d 63, 72, 287 N.W.2d 758 (1980); State v. Harrell, 85 Wis.2d 331, 334, 270 N.W.2d 428 (Ct.App.1978). Most recently, the United States Supreme Court has s......
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State v. Mink
... ... (Ct.App.1981). The classic justification for a mistrial is that the jury is unable to agree. State v. Kendall, 94 Wis.2d 63, 71, 287 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1980) ... Generally, when a defendant requests a mistrial, double jeopardy rights are deemed ... ...