State v. Key
Decision Date | 29 January 2020 |
Docket Number | NO. CAAP-18-0000064,CAAP-18-0000064 |
Citation | 456 P.3d 191 (Table) |
Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Patrick KEY, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Hawaii Court of Appeals |
On the briefs:
Kevin O'Grady, for Defendant-Appellant.
Chad Kumagai, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
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Defendant-Appellant John Patrick Key (Key ) appeals from the Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment filed on January 11, 2018 (Judgment ), in the District Court of the First Circuit, Wahiawa Division (District Court ).1 Key was convicted of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII ), in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS ) § 291E-61(a)(1) (Supp. 2018).2
Key raises three points of error on appeal, contending that the District Court erred when it: (1) failed to dismiss the case for violation of Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 ; (2) denied Key's motions to compel; and (3) failed to conduct an adequate Tachibana colloquy.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve Key's points of error as follows:
(1) HRPP Rule 48(b)(1) requires criminal charges to be dismissed if trial does not commence within 180 days from arrest or the filing of the charges, whichever is sooner. State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai‘i 17, 28, 881 P.2d 504, 515 (1994). HRPP Rule 48 provides, in relevant part:
Key contends the District Court erred when it found that only 147 includable days elapsed between Key's arrest on January 16, 2016, and the filing of his Motion to Dismiss for Rule 48 Violation on December 29, 2016. Key submits that 189 includable days elapsed during that time period due to a delay for court congestion without exceptional circumstances pursuant to HRPP Rule 48(c)(2).
It is undisputed that there was no finding of an exceptional circumstance to continue the hearing on November 17, 2016. However, as the District Court noted, Key had filed a motion to suppress, which was still pending at the time of his Rule 48 motion. Under HRPP Rule 48(d)(1), the time period from the filing of a motion to suppress through the prompt disposition is excludable. State v. Sujohn, 64 Haw. 516, 520-21, 644 P.2d 1326, 1328-29 (1982). "Every pretrial motion is subject to prompt disposition through due diligence by all concerned."3 State v. Soto, 63 Haw. 317, 320, 627 P.2d 279, 281 (1981) overruled on other grounds by Hoey, 77 Hawai‘i 17, 881 P.2d 504. Thus, the prompt disposition requirement is subject to a due diligence standard, not an exceptional circumstance standard.
Key acknowledges a defense continuance from October 13, 2016, to November 17, 2016 (which took the includable period to 147 days), but argues that there was congestion on November 17th, which makes the subsequent period includable. The District Court rejected this argument, finding that so long as the motion to suppress is handled in an expeditious manner, the period that the motion is pending is not counted against the State. On that basis, the District Court denied Key's Rule 48 motion. We conclude that the District Court was not wrong in its determination that only 147 includable days had elapsed.
(2) Key argues that the District Court erred by denying various motions to compel.
"[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule because such evidence is favorable to the accused and, if used effectively, may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citations omitted).
In Birano v. State, 143 Hawai‘i 163, 181, 426 P.3d 387, 405 (2018) (quoting State v. Tetu, 139 Hawai‘i 207, 219, 386 P.3d 844, 856 (2016) ), the Hawai‘i Supreme Court held: "Central to the protections of due process is the right to be accorded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." (Brackets omitted). "Therefore, the prosecution has a constitutional obligation to disclose evidence that is material to the guilt or punishment of the defendant." Id. at 182, 426 P.3d at 406 (citation omitted). "The duty to disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused includes evidence that may be used to impeach the government's witnesses by showing bias, self-interest, or other factors that might undermine the reliability of the witness's testimony." Id. (citation omitted). "The U.S. Supreme Court thus has rejected any ... distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence in the context of Brady disclosure obligations." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Key sought to compel disclosure of impeachment evidence. "In every instance where a witness is sought to be impeached, the only issue that arises is whether the witness is telling the truth." Asato v. Furtado, 52 Haw. 284, 292, 474 P.2d 288, 294 (1970). "It is character and reputation for truth and veracity, not any other character trait, that is in issue." Id.
Key challenges the denial of his various motions to compel impeachment material on the grounds that: (1) some material was destroyed, but the State did not reveal when it was destroyed and by whom, the State failed to preserve the material, and the State failed to disclose the material to Key; (2) the State would only disclose material relating to truth or veracity; and (3) Key should have received all personnel files, information regarding whether an officer was found not credible, information regarding false statements, information regarding abuse of power, and annual reviews and assessments, including training manuals. Key suggests that Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998 (9th...
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