State v. Khalil, A19-1281

• Citation: 956 N.W.2d 627
• Decision Date: 24 March 2021
• Docket Number: A19-1281
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Francios Momolu KHALIL, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

956 N.W.2d 627

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Francios Momolu KHALIL, Appellant.

A19-1281

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: March 24, 2021

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Megan Massie, Certified Student Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Anna Light, Assistant Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota; and Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant Anoka County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.

OPINION

THISSEN, Justice.

This case arises from an experience no person should ever have to endure. J.S. was intoxicated after drinking alcohol and taking a prescription narcotic. She went to a bar with a friend but was denied entry due to her intoxication. Appellant Francios Momolu Khalil approached J.S. outside of the bar and invited her to accompany him to a supposed party at a house. After arriving at the house, J.S. passed out and woke up to find Khalil penetrating her vagina with his penis. The question before us is whether Khalil's conduct is third-degree criminal sexual conduct: sexual penetration with another person when the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is "mentally incapacitated."

Our decision turns on the meaning of mentally incapacitated as defined by the Legislature in Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 7 (2020). The statute provides:

"Mentally incapacitated" means that a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person's agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration.

Id. Specifically, we are asked to determine whether the phrase "administered to that person without the person's agreement" applies to alcohol. Id. In other words, we must decide whether a person can be mentally incapacitated under the statute when the person voluntarily ingests alcohol, or whether the alcohol must be administered to the person without his or her agreement.

We hold that a person is mentally incapacitated under the definition adopted by the Legislature in section 609.341, subdivision 7, when that person is "under the influence of alcohol ... administered to that person without the person's agreement."¹ Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the district court for a new trial.

FACTS

The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. On the evening of May 13, 2017, J.S. consumed approximately five shots of vodka and one pill of a prescription narcotic. She then traveled to the Dinkytown neighborhood of Minneapolis with her friend S.L. Upon arriving, J.S. attempted to enter a local bar but was denied entry by the bouncer because she was intoxicated. Shortly thereafter, Khalil and two other men approached J.S. and S.L. outside the bar and invited them to a party. Khalil then drove the group to a house in North Minneapolis, arriving in the early morning hours of May 14, 2017. There was no party at the house.

S.L. testified that, after walking into the house, J.S. immediately laid down on the living room couch and soon fell asleep. J.S. testified that she "blacked out" due to her intoxication shortly after arriving at the house and did not clearly remember lying down on the couch. J.S. woke up some time later to find Khalil penetrating her vagina with his penis. She said, "No, I don't want to," to which he replied, "But you're so hot and you turn me on." J.S. then lost consciousness and woke up at some point between 7 and 8 a.m. with her shorts around her ankles. She retrieved S.L. from another room and the two called a Lyft and left the house. During the ride, J.S. told S.L. that she had been raped. Later that day, J.S. went to Regions Hospital in St. Paul to have a rape kit done.

On May 18, 2017, J.S. contacted the Minneapolis police department to report the incident. The police conducted an investigation and the State charged Khalil with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a mentally incapacitated or physically helpless complainant.² See Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d) (2020). The State chose not to charge Khalil with fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct which criminalizes nonconsensual sexual contact, a charge both the State and Khalil conceded would cover the conduct alleged in this case but which is a gross misdemeanor rather than a felony for a first offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451 (2020).

At trial, the district court issued jury instructions, which stated in part:

Mr. Khalil knew or had reason to know that [J.S.] was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.

A person is mentally incapacitated if she lacks the judgment to give reasoned consent to sexual penetration due to the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, or any other substance administered without her agreement.^[3]

During deliberations, the jury requested clarification on the mental incapacitation element of criminal sexual conduct.⁴ In the questions to the district court, the jury outlined two potential readings of the definition of mentally incapacitated. The first reading interpreted the definition as requiring J.S. to be under the "influence of alcohol [J.S.] administered herself or [the] influence of [a] narcotic J.S. administered herself or a thing administered [without] her agreement." The second reading required J.S. to be under the influence of "alcohol, narcotic, or another substance[,] none of which had been administered with her knowledge."

In other words, the jury sought to clarify whether it was sufficient that J.S. voluntarily consumed the alcohol or whether Khalil or another person had to have administered the alcohol to J.S. without her agreement for her to qualify as mentally incapacitated under Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 7. Over Khalil's objection, the district court instructed the jury that the first reading of the statute was correct, stating: "[Y]ou can be mentally incapacitated following consumption of alcohol that one administers to one's self or narcotics that one administers to one's self or separately something else that's administered without someone's agreement." The jury then found Khalil guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.

On appeal, Khalil challenged the validity of the jury instructions, arguing that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the definition of mentally incapacitated the way it did. State v. Khalil , 948 N.W.2d 156, 163 (Minn. App. 2020). In a divided opinion, the court of appeals rejected Khalil's argument and affirmed his conviction.⁵ Id. at 170. We granted review.

ANALYSIS

The jury convicted Khalil of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d), which states in relevant part:

A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if any of the following circumstances exists: ...

(d) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated , or physically helpless[.]

(Emphasis added.) Consequently, to convict Khalil of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under section 609.344, subdivision 1(d), the State was required to prove that when Khalil sexually penetrated J.S., he knew or had reason to know that J.S. was in a particular state; namely, that J.S. was mentally incapacitated.

It is certainly true that a commonsense understanding of the term mentally incapacitated could include a person who cannot exercise judgment sufficiently to express consent due to intoxication resulting from the voluntary consumption of alcohol. But here, we do not look at the ordinary, commonsense understanding of mentally incapacitated because the Legislature expressly defined the term in the general definitions section of Minnesota's criminal sexual conduct statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.341 –.3451 (2020). See U.S. Jaycees v. McClure , 305 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1981) ("The legislature defines a term only because it intends in some measure to depart from the ordinary sense of that term. Thus, there is a presumption that we are not to substitute the literal, ordinary meaning of [a term] for the definition the legislature has provided."). For the purpose of criminal sexual conduct offenses, " ‘[m]entally incapacitated’ means that a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person's agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration." Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 7.

The State does not claim that Khalil knew or had reason to know that J.S. was under the influence of alcohol administered to J.S. without her agreement. There is no evidence to support such a claim. On the other hand, Khalil does not dispute that there is sufficient evidence in the record that he knew or had reason to know that J.S. was under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, our decision in this appeal turns on whether the Legislature's definition of mentally incapacitated includes a state of mental incapacitation caused by the consumption of alcohol, voluntary or not, or whether it is limited to circumstances where the state of mental incapacitation results from consumption of alcohol administered to the complainant involuntarily without her agreement.

The State urges us to read the definition of mentally incapacitated like the district court did when it instructed the jury in response to the jury's questions: mentally incapacitated means that a person under the influence of alcohol, however consumed, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration. In contrast, Khalil challenges the...