State v. Kilpatrick

Decision Date08 June 1962
Docket NumberNo. MV,MV
Citation184 A.2d 191,23 Conn.Supp. 437
CourtCircuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
Parties, 23 Conn.Supp. 437 STATE of Connecticut v. Frank M. KILPATRICK. 13-1003.

Armand A. Korzenik, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Joseph Asbel, Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).

DEAPINGTON, Judge.

The defendant has appealed from a conviction of speeding (General Statutes § 14-219), stating he desires to have reviewed the court's conclusion on the facts. Cir.Ct.Rule 7.21.1. Pursuant to Rule 7.22.1, the court made a finding, and the defendant has assigned error in the denial of his motion to correct the finding.

The finding sets forth the following essential facts: On July 12, 1961, at about 4:55 p. m., the defendant, while operating his 1961 Ford in the town of Windsor, entered route 91 and proceeded in a southerly direction. It was daylight, the weather clear, the road dry and the traffic medium. Route 91 runs in a general north and south direction and is a four-lane highway. When the defendant came off the ramp and entered on route 91, the swung into the left lane and 'stepped on it to get out and get by and get back in again.' A state police trooper in the rear of the defendant followed him from the Kennedy overpass for a distance of six-tenths of a mile, during which time the defendant passed four southbound cars and was clocked at seventy to seventy-four miles per hour. The posted speed limit for vehicles on route 91 in this area was fifty-five miles an hour. The defendant admitted to the officer that he was proceeding at seventy miles per hour.

The defendant moved to correct the finding in certain respects. The finding of the facts sought would not directly affect the ultimate facts upon which the judgment depends. No useful purpose would therefore be served by correcting the finding as requested. Beach v. First National Bank, 107 Conn. 1, 4, 138 A. 905. To add more detail is unimportant, for if the additions were made they would not affect the result. Bent v. Torell, 139 Conn. 744, 748, 97 A.2d 270.

The defendant further requested the court to add to its finding the following: There was no evidence of excessive speed before and after passing the other vehicles; the only evidence concerning speed in excess of the posted limit occurred in the course of passing; after passing, the defendant returned to the right-hand lane; there was no evidence that his speed thereafter was not reasonable. The action of the court in denying this request was proper. We held in State v. Plant, 22 Conn.Sup. 436, 439, 174 A.2d 539, 542, that '[r]equesting a finding that there is 'no evidence' concerning a subordinate fact not found is * * * unnecessary, because if that fact is essential to the conclusion, the appellant can attack the conclusion on the ground that the fact was not found. * * * If the fact about which there is claimed to be 'no evidence' is not essential to the conclusion, the weight to be given to the 'no evidence' about that fact is a decision for the trial court, not the appellate court.' See Tiernan v. Savin Rock Realty Co., 115 Conn. 473, 476, 162 A. 11.

In his second assignment of errors, the defendant attacks the conclusions reached by the court. The conclusions which the court has reached are to be tested by the facts found and must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with those facts or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Monick v. Town of Greenwich, 144 Conn. 608, 611, 136 A.2d 501. The conclusions of the court as to the posted speed limit, the speed of the defendant's car and the unreasonableness of such speed are conclusions which could reasonably and logically be drawn from the subordinate facts and cannot be disturbed.

In his third assignment of error, the defendant seeks to correct the finding in respect to a claim of law which he alleges was made during his summation argument and not after judgment, as found by the court. In short, the defendant seeks to correct the sequence. We cannot determine the precise sequence, since the argument of counsel is not a part of the record. Under our practice, arguments are seldom taken down by the reporter. Hence, it is well, if counsel deems the matter serious, to request the court to note or have the reporter make immediate note of it. See Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. §§ 69, 283. Since the point of law the defendant claims to have raised, whether before or after the court's judgment, is considered hereinafter, no good purpose would be served in further considering this assignment of error.

In his fourth assignment, the defendant claims error in the court's rejecting his claim of law that passing at a speed in excess of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • State v. McCarthy
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 20 Agosto 1985
    ...were not available, and therefore could not have been judicially noticed, at the time of trial. See State v. Kilpatrick, 1 Conn.Cir.Ct. 298, 303, 23 Conn.Sup. 437, 184 A.2d 191 (1962). To hold otherwise would be to permit a party to appeal a case on a basis completely different from that pr......
  • State v. Sivin
    • United States
    • Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
    • 16 Diciembre 1966
    ...forward with evidence that such speed was reasonable and proper. Radwick v. Goldstein, 90 Conn. 701, 707, 98 A. 583.' State v. Kilpatrick, 23 Conn.Sup. 437, 441, 1 Conn.Cir. 298, 032, 184 A.2d 191, 193. In other words, the prima facie evidence of the defendant's speed is not conclusive but ......
  • Frenis v. Strazzeri
    • United States
    • Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
    • 6 Noviembre 1962

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT