State v. Sivin

• Decision Date: 16 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. MV,MV
• Citation: 225 A.2d 846,4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 93
• Court: Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Norman SIVIN. 9-25065.

Page 846

225 A.2d 846

4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 93

STATE of Connecticut v. Norman SIVIN.

No. MV 9-25065.

Circuit Court of Connecticut, Appellate Division.

Dec. 16, 1966.

Norman Sivin, Old Saybrook, appellant (defendant), pro se.

Salvatore F. Arena, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).

PRUYN, Judge.

The defendant in a trial to the court was convicted of speeding in violation of § 14-219 of the General Statutes and has appealed, assigning as error the trial court's conclusion upon all the evidence that he was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the portion of § 14-219 which provides that a speed greater than the posted speed is prima facie evidence of an unreasonable speed, upon which the court predicated its conclusion of guilt, is violative of article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution as a denial of due process of law.

No finding was necessary and none was made. The material facts are not substantially in dispute, and the trial court could reasonably have found them as follows: It was a clear day with the sun shining and a few clouds in the sky, April 4, 1966, when the defendant, driving a new Ford in excellent mechanical condition easterly on the Connecticut Turnpike in the right-hand lane, passed through a radar zone extending approximately three-quarters of a mile eastward from the Long Hill overpass in the town of Clinton at about 2:35 p.m. at an even speed of seventy miles an hour. The Connecticut Turnpike is a multiple-lane, limited-access highway with a statutory maximum speed limit of seventy miles an hour and has two lanes in each direction separated by a median divider, each lane being twelve feet wide. There were no exits or entrances to and from the eastbound lanes anywhere within the radar zone. Just west of the Long Hill overpass, there was a state traffic commission sign indicating a posted speed of sixty miles an hour; there were no speed signs in the radar zone. The defendant had his car under perfect control at all times and when signaled to stop came to a gradual stop without any abrupt braking. Had not the arresting officer been notified by the radar operator of the defendant's speed, he would have had no particular reason to notice the defendant. The traffic was extremely light, there being only one other car in the eastbound lanes several hundred feet behind the defendant, and no other cars during the five minutes or so involved in the stopping of the defendant and the issuing of the summons. The visibility was unlimited except for the topographical features of the highway itself. The road was dry. The driving conditions were ideal, well-nigh perfect. The radar equipment had been properly tested, was functioning properly and accurately checked the defendant's speed as seventy miles an hour.

Section 14-219 of the General Statutes, with the violation of which the defendant was charged, establishes as the test of speeding the reasonableness of the speed under the circumstances specified therein, with certain absolute speed limits; gives the state traffic commission authority to determine reasonable and safe speed limits and to post signs indicating such limits along the highways; and provides that speeds in excess of such posted limits shall be prima facie evidence of unreasonableness. ¹ Since 1905, the reasonableness of the speed has been and still is the criterion by which a violation of the law against speeding is determined. ² Until 1963, there had been no limitation upon the determination of reasonableness. In that year, the General Assembly added the provision that speeds in excess of seventy miles an hour on a multiple-lane limited-access highway and sixty miles an hour on any other highway were violations of the statute. ³ By this enactment, the legislature reaffirmed the principle of reasonableness of speed and made a legislative determination that speeds in excess of such limits were greater than were reasonable, irrespective of the prevailing conditions, thereby in effect establishing absolute speed limits.

Since 1907, with the exception of the period from 1927 to 1935, the statutes, with subsequent amendments, have provided that any speed in excess of certain specified limits was prima facie evidence that the speed was not reasonable and safe. ⁴ In 1935, the state traffic commission was first authorized to determine reasonable and safe speed limits and to erect and cause to be erected signs indicating such limits; any speed in excess of such posted limits was prima facie evidence that the speed was not reasonable. ⁵ 'The phrase 'prima facie evidence' means evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove. * * * (T)he fact which its specified to be prima facie evidence of the fact to be inferred or presumed must be a fact which in common experience leads naturally and logically to the fact inferred or presumed. In the mind of the trier, the proof of one must produce the belief that it is more, probable than not that the other, the ultimate fact, is thereby established.' Mott's Super Markets, Inc. v. Frassinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 489, 490, 172 A.2d 381, 385. 'However, the fact to be inferred or presumed from such evidence is not conclusive, and the ultimate burden of persuasion upon all the facts still remains upon the state. State v. Gargano, 99 Conn. 103, 108, 121 A. 657. It does, however, cast upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence that such speed was reasonable and proper. Radwick v. Goldstein, 90 Conn. 701, 707, 98 A. 583.' State v. Kilpatrick, 23 Conn.Sup. 437, 441, 1 Conn.Cir. 298, 032, 184 A.2d 191, 193. In other words, the prima facie evidence of the defendant's speed is not conclusive but is rebuttable by the defendant. There appears, however, to be a tendency to regard the posted speed limit as the absolute speed limit. See regulations of the state traffic commission, of which we may take judicial notice (Squires v. Wolcott, 133 Conn. 449, 453, 52 A.2d 305), and other examples as set forth in the footnote. ⁶ It is unnecessary for us in this case to decide the validity of those regulations.

In establishing absolute maximum speed limits by the 1963 amendment and by leaving unchanged the other provisions of the speeding statute, the legislature indicated its intent that there was to be no change in the law in respect to speeds which were below such limits and that the long-established principles of reasonableness of the speed under the prevailing circumstances and conditions and of the prima facie effect of evidence of speed in excess of the posted limits would continue in effect as to such speeds. But by this amendment the legislature has recognized that a speed up to but not exceeding the absolute limit, even though above the posted limit, may be a reasonable speed if the circumstances and conditions existing at the time are such as to justify a conclusion of reasonableness. Such is the logical and reasonable interpretation of the statute as amended. See City of Bridgeport v. Town of Stratford, 142 Conn. 634, 641, 644, 116 A.2d 508.

In view of the prima facie evidence provisions of the statute, the question then arises as to what evidence is sufficient to rebut the prima facie evidence of the unreasonableness of a speed over the posted limit. In the leading case of State v. Gordon, 144 Conn. 399, 132 A.2d 568, where the conditions were favorable, weather fair traffic light, visibility good, highway dry, the court held that the excess of speed over the posted speed limit was an essential element in the determination of reasonable speed, saying (p. 402, 132 A.2d p. 569): 'Nevertheless, * * * (the defendant) concedes, as he must, that the mere operation of a motor vehicle at a speed greatly in excess of the posted speed could, under any conditions, constitute a violation of the statute. The degree of excess of speed over the posted limit is an important factor to be considered by the trier in determining whether, under all the circumstances, a motor vehicle has been operated at a speed greater than was reasonable. * * * The defendant not only operated his automobile at a speed fifteen to twenty miles per hour in excess of the limit but, while doing so, passed three car.' The crux of the Gordon de...