State v. Kimes

• Decision Date: 11 January 1910
• Citation: 124 N.W. 164,145 Iowa 346
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. DAVID KIMES, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

124 N.W. 164

145 Iowa 346

STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. DAVID KIMES, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

January 11, 1910

Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. MILO P. SMITH, Judge.

DEFENDANT was convicted upon an indictment charging him with the larceny of a harness, and appeals.

Reversed.

Tom. H Milner and Thomas Powell, for appellant.

H. W Byers, Attorney-General, and Chas W. Lyon, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

I.

The evidence upon which the state relies to sustain the conviction is wholly circumstantial, and the principal inculpatory circumstance is the alleged fact that the harness which was stolen in December, 1907, was found in appellant's possession in the month of April following. It is urged by his counsel that this possession is so remote in time from the date of the theft that the ordinary rule as to unfavorable inferences arising from the possession of property recently stolen has no application. Did the record present the bald proposition of a theft in December and the discovery of the property in appellant's hands four months later, and no more, it may be conceded that the inference of guilt to be drawn therefrom would not be of very persuasive character. But such is not the record, for defendant himself concedes and shows that he acquired possession of the property within a day or two after the prosecuting witness claims it was stolen. Such being the case, we think the question as to appellant's guilt of the theft was a question for the jury under proper instruction from the court.

II. Bearing upon this feature of the case, the trial court instructed the jury that, if the stolen property was found in appellant's possession soon after the theft, then he was presumptively guilty, and might be convicted of the larceny unless he had "satisfied the jury that he came rightfully" into such possession. Stating this rule in another form, the court said that the "possession of recently stolen property is presumptive evidence that the person in whose possession it is found stole it unless it appears from the evidence that he came honestly by it." The thought here expressed was emphasized by its reiteration in several distinct paragraphs of the court's charge, and, upon the giving of the rule thus laid down, the appellant assigns error. We think the exception must be sustained. While there are precedents (and some among our own cases) which lend color of support to the doctrine of these instructions, it has been distinctly repudiated by this and many other courts, and is not in our judgment sustainable upon principle. The law never presumes the guilt of any person charged with crime and never casts upon him the burden of satisfying the jury of his innocence. It authorizes the jury to find the fact of guilt from a given state of circumstances, but it does not command such a finding. The burden of establishing guilt is at every stage of the trial upon the state, and, if after giving proper consideration to all the inculpatory circumstances adduced in support of the prosecution there remains in the minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled to an acquittal, even though they are not satisfied with the truth or the sufficiency of his explanation. The effect of the instructions here under consideration is to require the accused, not only to negative his guilt of the theft charged in the indictment, but to do so by showing that his possession was rightful or honestly acquired. Now, he may have acquired such possession unlawfully or even criminally, and yet have had no guilty connection with the theft for which he is on trial. For example, he may have had no part or lot in the larceny, and yet have received the property knowing it to have been stolen; or he may have stolen it from the thief who committed the larceny of which the prosecuting witness complains. In neither case would his possession be "rightful" nor "honest," yet the unlawful and dishonest character of such possession would not support a verdict of guilty of the particular crime for which he is being tried. This view of the law has been frequently affirmed by us. See State v. Bartlett, 128 Iowa 518 at 520, 105 N.W. 59; State v. Brady, 121 Iowa 561 at 568, 97 N.W. 62; State v. Brundige, 118 Iowa 92 at 96, 91 N.W. 920; State v. Miner, 107 Iowa 656, 78 N.W. 679; State v. Richart, 57 Iowa 245, 10 N.W. 657.

III. It appeared in evidence that, after the discovery of the harness in appellant's possession, the complaining witness brought suit in replevin therefor against the appellant before a justice of the peace. Over objection as to the materiality and competency of the evidence, the state was permitted to show that notice of the replevin suit was served upon the accused, and that he did not appear or make defense to such action. With reference to this circumstance the court instructed the jury as follows:

(10) In determining whether the...