State v. King, 41627
| Citation | 176 N.W.2d 279,286 Minn. 392 |
| Decision Date | 26 March 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 41627,41627 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Francis KING, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The evidence, viewed as a whole, sustains the jury's finding that defendant possessed sufficient mental capacity at the time of the commission of the crime to be capable of premeditation, one of the essential elements for conviction of murder in the first degree.
2. Discovery of the identity of eyewitnesses during an interrogation of defendant which was held inadmissible by the trial court does not render inadmissible the testimony of such eyewitnesses.
3. Admissions voluntarily made by defendant to persons incarcerated with him in the county jail and to his brother are admissible.
4. The instruction given by the trial court on premeditation in response to a request for further instructions during the jury's deliberations, while not identical with that given before the jury retired, correctly defined the term and could not have misled the jury.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Minneapolis, John S. Gowan, Rochester, for appellant.
Douglas Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, D. P. Mattson, County Atty., Rochester, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a finding of a jury that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree and from the order of the trial court denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial.
Essentially the questions presented for review are: (1) Whether defendant was suffering from such a mental disorder as to be incapable of premeditation, which is one of the essentials required for a finding of guilty of murder in the first degree; (2) whether the testimony of two accomplices whose identity was discovered by an interrogation ruled inadmissible by the trial court was admissible; (3) whether testimony of two individuals who were inmates in the county jail at the time defendant was incarcerated there as to admissions made to them by defendant was admissible; and (4) whether instructions given to the jury properly defined premeditation.
Assuming that the trial court properly admitted testimony of witnesses whose testimony defendant sought to exclude, which will be discussed later, the evidence is virtually conclusive that defendant shot and killed one Floyd Joseph Haley, a Rochester, Minnesota, policeman, under the folowing circumstances: During the early morning of August 6, 1967, defendant and two companions, Larry Koontz and Steven Britt, were attempting to break into a bowling alley in Rochester. Defendant acted as lookout. While Koontz was trying to force open a door in the bowling alley, defendant noticed a patrol car coming into the bowling alley parking lot. Koontz was armed with a .25-caliber pistol. Defendant told Koontz and Britt to run toward defendant's car, which was parked alongside the road. Koontz testified that defendant said to him that if the cop came over there defendant would kill him. Koontz and Britt ran to the car and hid in thick weeds 20 to 25 feet back from the road. Defendant hid in weeds close to his car. Officer Haley stopped his car some 8 to 10 feet from defendant's car, got out, and walked to the car with a flashlight in his hand. As Haley was returning to his car, defendant jumped up and said, 'Reach.' Defendant then yelled for Koontz and Britt to help him get the officer's gun. They removed Haley's gun from its holster. As Koontz and Britt were walking away, they heard three shots. Defendant had discharged the police revolver three times; two of the shots struck the body of Haley, killing him instantly. Koontz testified that before shooting Officer Haley defendant had said, 'You know, you shouldn't have walked down there,' and the officer had replied that he knew that now.
Defendant then moved the patrol car and Officer Haley's body off the road. The three boys drove to Silver Lake in Rochester, where Britt threw Haley's gun into the water and Koontz threw the officer's flashlight in.
On August 21 defendant was arrested for a burglary not connected with this offense. He was interrogated by police regarding this and other burglaries the greater part of a day and a half and at the end of this interrogation he confessed to killing Haley. He led the officers to the place where the boys had thrown the revolver into the lake and it was recovered. It was during this interrogation that the identities of Koontz and Britt were discovered by the officers. After a lengthy pretrial hearing the court suppressed defendant's confession and the tangible evidence discovered as a result of such interrogation. On appeal by the state we affirmed the trial court's suppression of this evidence. State v. King, 279 Minn. 225, 156 N.W.2d 742.
1. From the record of the pretrial hearing held pursuant to State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3, it seems quite clear that defendant is suffering from a serious mental disorder. He was examined by Dr. Edward Litin, a psychiatrist from the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota, and by other psychiatrists. Dr. Litin testified that defendant was suffering from schizophrenia. He explained schizophrenia as follows: Schizophrenics' interpretation of reality is impaired and they have difficulty relating to other people. They are cold and aloof and when talking to a schizophrenic a person senses a lack of communication. Dr. Litin said schizophrenia is what is commonly known as split personality. One observes emotions in schizophrenics that one would not expect. He also diagnosed defendant as suffering from paranoia, which means that one is suspicious of his environment and fears others are against him. Other psychiatrists and psychologists testified as to defendant's mental condition. They said he had great anxiety and tended to act impulsively under stress. Defendant has had a troubled life from an early age, and his mental illness appears to be result of his relationship with an extremely cruel father whom defendant apparently justifiably hates. Dr. Litin was of the opinion that defendant, even though mentally disturbed, could distinguish between right and wrong and knew what he was doing. The court submitted this issue to the jury under the following instruction:
'The law states that no person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime while in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making a defense.
'Now with respect to insanity, I instruct you as follows, that the statute further reads: 'But the person shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act he was laboring under such a defect of reason from one of these causes as not to know the nature of his act or that it was wrong.'
In addition, the court gave a lengthy instruction on the necessity of proving premeditation in order to find defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
In addition to Dr. Litin's testimony that in spite of his mental condition defendant knew what he was doing, there is other evidence which sustains the jury's verdict. Defendant admitted to two witnesses, Robert Hennum and Marvin B. Herring, who were inmates in the county jail when defendant was incarcerated there, and to his brother, Ronald King, that he had killed a policeman. The evidence also discloses that defendant had committed a number of burglaries and that he and his accomplices were in the process of committing a burglary at the time Officer Haley discovered them. The evidence further establishes that defendant asked for and received a .25-caliber pistol from Koontz and stated that if Haley came over to his parked car defendant was going to shoot him, and that he did exactly that after asking Koontz and Britt to join him in removing Haley's .38-caliber revolver. There is no reasonable doubt that defendant shot three times, and that two of the shots hit Haley.
In the light of this evidence we are convinced that, while the jury could conceivably have found that defendant was suffering under such a mental disorder that he could not have formed a premeditated design to effect death, they could also find that the evidence did establish...
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