State v. King
| Decision Date | 23 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 20032-5-II,20032-5-II |
| Citation | 89 Wn.App. 612,949 P.2d 856 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Karl Dennis KING, Appellant. |
Leslie Eugene Tolzin, (Court Appointed), Tacoma, for Appellant.
Kathleen Proctor, Pierce County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Tacoma, for Respondent.
Arguing violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Karl Dennis King appeals his conviction for theft of a gun. We affirm.
On July 22, 1995, Detective Tom Davidson of the Tacoma Police Department was investigating a homicide in which the perpetrator had used a large black handgun, possibly a .45 caliber or 9 millimeter. Because an informant had said the gun was at the apartment of a person named Neletta Sentwali, Davidson went there in the company of Officers Feddersen and Quilio. The three contacted Sentwali, and Davidson advised her that they "were looking for a gun and that the gun had been last seen in her apartment." 1 He asked for consent to search the apartment, and she responded, according to Davidson, that "she had no problem with us coming in and looking." 2 As far as the record shows, none of the officers knew whether anyone else was in the apartment.
Upon entering the apartment, Davidson, Quilio and Sentwali went to the living room, while Feddersen commenced a precautionary check of the other rooms. Feddersen's purpose was "to make sure that there were no hazards to the police that were inside the apartment." 3 Looking into a bedroom, Feddersen saw an unidentified man sitting on the bed. According to Feddersen, the man "was covering up an item on the edge of the bed with a sheet," and "[u]nderneath the sheet appeared to be the outline of a handgun." 4 Concerned for his safety, Feddersen asked the man what he had just covered up, and the man said a gun. Immediately, Feddersen ordered the man away from the bed, handcuffed him, and patted him down for other weapons. Returning to the bed, Feddersen then seized a loaded .22 caliber handgun. Feddersen did not know if the handgun was the gun Davidson was seeking, 5 and his subjective reason for seizing it was officer safety.
Once in possession of the gun, Feddersen asked the man who he was, and whether the gun was his. The man replied that he was Karl King, and that the gun was his.
Feddersen ascertained the gun's model and serial number, apparently by viewing its exterior. He then radioed dispatch to run "the weapon for stolen" and "the defendant for warrants." 6 Within a short time, dispatch responded that the gun had been reported stolen; that King was currently on probation; and that King's probation prohibited him from possessing firearms. At this point, Quilio had joined Feddersen and King, but Davidson and Sentwali were still elsewhere in the apartment, looking for the gun used in the homicide.
After receiving dispatch's response, Feddersen told King he was under arrest. He also gave King the Miranda warnings for the first time.
After King had been taken to the police station, Feddersen or another officer gave the Miranda warnings a second time. At this point, according to the trial court's findings of fact, King "understood the ramifications of his statements ... and agreed to talk to the police." 7 In response to police questions, King said that he had purchased the gun on the street for $20, and that he knew the gun was probably stolen.
The State charged King with theft of the .22 caliber handgun. Before trial, he moved to suppress the gun and his statements to the police. At the ensuing suppression hearing, he testified that he and Sentwali were "in a relationship," that he was generally spending more time at her apartment than his own, and that he had stayed at Sentwali's for the two nights immediately preceding the night on which he was detained by Feddersen. The trial court refused to suppress the gun, King's statement identifying himself, and King's statements at the police station. It agreed, however, to suppress King's apartment-house statement that the gun was his, because he had not yet received Miranda warnings. King was convicted as charged, following a bench trial on stipulated facts.
Because the officers were acting without a warrant, the State has the burden of justifying their actions. 8 To do that, it argues (1) that the officers were lawfully in the apartment because Sentwali "gave lawful consent to search"; 9 (2) that Feddersen was entitled to detain King and the gun because, under Michigan v. Summers, 10 "[p]ersons present during a lawful search of the premises may be detained, identified, and asked preliminary questions"; 11 (3) that Miranda warnings were not required before King answered questions at the apartment because, under Berkemer v. McCarty, 12 "[p]olice questioning in the context of an investigative detention does not require Miranda warnings"; 13 and (4) that once King received the Miranda warnings, he validly waived his rights and agreed to speak. King responds that the detention of his person and the seizure of the .22 caliber handgun was not justified by probable cause, by an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, or by Sentwali's consent to search the apartment for the gun used in the homicide. He also claims that Feddersen's questions at the apartment violated Miranda v. Arizona, and that the violation tainted and rendered inadmissible all of his ensuing statements, including those made at the police station.
We first analyze whether Feddersen acted constitutionally when he detained King and seized the gun. To do that, we ask whether Feddersen, without engaging in an unreasonable search or seizure, (A) reached King and the gun; (B) initially seized King and the gun for purposes of officer safety; (C) observed the gun's model and serial number; (D) obtained information from dispatch that the gun had been reported stolen; and (E) seized the gun as evidence and placed King under custodial arrest.
Feddersen reached King and the gun without engaging in an unreasonable search or seizure. In general, an officer who enters a house with consent may go where the consent allows. 14 Even assuming, as King argues, that Sentwali consented only to the officers' searching for the gun used in the homicide, she did not limit her consent to particular rooms of the apartment; on the contrary, she authorized the officers to look through the entire apartment. 15 It follows that Feddersen had a right to be where he was when he first observed King and the gun, and also a right to be where he was when he first seized King and the gun.
Feddersen initially seized King and the gun without engaging in an unreasonable search or seizure. The Fourth Amendment secures "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 16 Its "key principle," or "ultimate standard," is one of "reasonableness." 17
This key principle has many specific applications. Of those involving the detention of persons, undoubtedly the most fundamental is that it is reasonable for an officer to detain a person indefinitely, e.g., for appearance in court or prosecution, only if the officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a crime. 18 Another, narrower application is that even in the absence of probable cause, it is reasonable for an officer to detain a person briefly, for investigation, if the officer harbors a reasonable suspicion, arising from specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot. 19 A third, still narrower application is that even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is reasonable for an officer executing a search warrant at a residence to briefly detain occupants of that residence, to insure officer safety and an orderly completion of the search. 20
None of these specific applications precisely fits this case, because the issue here is whether police officers executing a consent search may briefly detain a person and a gun unexpectedly discovered in the course of that search. Thus, we revert to the Fourth Amendment's key principle of reasonableness. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court, we apply that principle by " 'balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.' " 21
The circumstances faced by Feddersen obviously created a very strong need to briefly seize King's person and the .22 caliber handgun. The government has an important interest "in minimizing the risk of harm to ... officers," and this includes "exercis[ing] unquestioned command of the situation." 22 Feddersen and the other officers were in the apartment to search for a murder weapon. When they entered, they had no reason to think anyone but Sentwali was present. Within moments, however, Feddersen unexpectedly encountered King, with a gun on the bed beside him. In an instant, the situation turned from one that was relatively routine to one that was potentially lethal, and a reasonable person in Feddersen's shoes would have reacted by temporarily seizing King and the gun until the situation could be sorted out.
On the other side of the coin, the initial invasion of King's interests was limited in both time and purpose. King's interests were his liberty interest in his person and his possessory interest in his gun. 23 Feddersen initially seized King and the gun only briefly, to exercise control over a potentially lethal situation and to insure the safety of all concerned. If dispatch had not said the gun was stolen, King and the gun would have been released within a short time. Balancing the need to insure the safety of the officers and Sentwali against the limited invasion of King's interests, we hold that the initial, temporary seizure of King's person and gun was constitutionally reasonable.
Insofar as our holding deals with the initial seizure of the gun, it is directly supported by State...
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