State v. King, 91CA005065
Decision Date | 18 December 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 91CA005065,91CA005065 |
Citation | 610 N.E.2d 1028,81 Ohio App.3d 210 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. KING, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Gregory A. White, Pros. Atty., Elyria, for appellee.
Hollace B. Weizel, Lorain, for appellant.
Appellant, Henry King, was indicted by the Lorain County Grand Jury on eleven counts of forgery, in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(3). The facts surrounding King's indictment involved his alleged use of photocopied election petitions from his 1986 campaign for Lorain County Commissioner in his 1990 campaign for Governor.
Prior to trial, King filed a motion to dismiss, contending that he had been charged under the wrong statute and that any prosecution should proceed under R.C. 3599.14 ( ). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the case proceeded to a bench trial wherein King was found guilty on all eleven counts. King was placed on probation for two years and ordered to pay the costs of his court-appointed counsel.
King appeals, asserting four assignments of error. We reverse.
In his first assignment of error, King asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss as the state charged him under the wrong statute. The state contends that the motion was properly denied as the determination of such a motion requires that the court have before it all of the relevant facts, and that, as such, the issues could not be resolved through a Crim.R. 12(B) motion.
R.C. 2913.31(A)(3) under which King was indicted provides:
King contends that the proper charges would have been under R.C. 3599.14, which at the time of King's alleged acts provided:
Where there is no manifest legislative intent that a general provision of the Revised Code prevails over a special provision, the special provision takes precedence. State v. Volpe (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 191, 527 N.E.2d 818, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Frost (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 121, 11 O.O.3d 294, 387 N.E.2d 235. Where it is clear that a special provision prevails over a general provision or the Criminal Code is silent or ambiguous as to which provision prevails, under R.C. 1.51, a prosecutor may charge only on the special provision. State v. Chippendale (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 118, 556 N.E.2d 1134, paragraph two of the syllabus. R.C. 1.51 provides:
Where, however, it is clear that a general provision applies coextensively with a special provision, R.C. 1.51 allows a prosecutor to charge on both. Chippendale, supra. R.C. 1.51 is applicable only when general and special provisions constitute allied offenses of similar import and additionally do not constitute crimes committed separately or with a separate animus for each crime. Id. at 120, 556 N.E.2d at 1136. When this is the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Sufronko
...at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Frost (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 121, 11 O.O.3d 294, 387 N.E.2d 235; State v. King (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 210, 212, 610 N.E.2d 1028, 1029-1030. Appellant relies on R.C. 1.51, which states "If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provisi......
-
State v. Dale Sufronko, 95-LW-0369
...See, also, State v. Hunter (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 75, 466 N.E.2d 183 (forgery and uttering found to be separate conduct). 6. Chippendale and King statutes that are irreconcilable as the same conduct receives different penalties under two different statutes. --------- ...
-
Machnics v. Sloe, 2008 Ohio 1133 (Ohio App. 3/14/2008)
...imposed a jail sentence instead of imposing the penalty provision contained in R.C. 2727.12. {¶62} Appellant's reliance on State v. King (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 210, for the proposition that the trial court erred by imposing a jail sentence instead of a fine under the special penalty provisi......