State v. Kingsley

• Decision Date: 02 February 1892
• Citation: 18 S.W. 994,108 Mo. 135
• Parties: The State v. Kingsley, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

18 S.W. 994

108 Mo. 135

The State v. Kingsley, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

February 2, 1892

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction. Hon. Jas. R Claiborne, Judge.

Reversed.

Adams & Rowland and E. W. Bannister for appellant.

The act of the legislature under which defendant was prosecuted is unconstitutional and void. First. Because it is in conflict with section 22 of article 2, constitution of Missouri, and denies defendant a trial by jury as contemplated by said section. Potter's Dwarris, pp. 437, 469; Wynehamer v People, 13 N.Y. 378; 2 Story on Const. [4 Ed.] sec 1943. The legislature has no power to pass any act by which the defendant could be deprived of her liberty without a trial, according to the course of the common law, of every element of the offense charged. At common law intent was an essential element of crime. 3 Greenl. Ev., sec. 13. The legislature could not declare what is conclusive evidence of a fact, and thus dispense with the submission of such question to the jury. Wantlan v. White, 19 Ind. 470; Railroad v. Payne, 33 Ark. 816. In criminal cases, the legislature cannot even prescribe what shall be prima facie evidence of a crime or misdemeanor; the utmost it can do is to prescribe rules for the admission of evidence, leaving the jury to determine its value and weight. Cooley's Con. Lim., p. 207. Second. The act is unconstitutional, because it denies the defendant equal protection of the law. Section 3564 provides a penalty for obtaining money, goods or other valuable thing by false pretenses. By this section the intent with which the act is committed is distinctly made an element of the offense to be submitted to the jury. The act under which defendant was prosecuted attempts to dispense with the question of intent. The act entitled an act to protect "hotel and innkeepers" also discriminates against persons obtaining board and lodging at a hotel or boarding house under certain circumstances, and makes the rules of evidence of the offense of obtaining such board or lodging by false pretenses much less stringent than in any other cases. Third. The subject of the act is not clearly expressed in its title inasmuch as the title of the act is "An act to protect hotel and innkeepers," whereas the purpose of the act as declared therein is to protect hotel and boarding-house keepers. A boarding house is distinctly different from a hotel or inn. Fourth. The evidence was wholly insufficient to support a conviction.

John M. Wood, Attorney General, Bernard Dierkes, Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas B. Harvey for the State.

(1) The evidence was entirely sufficient to justify the verdict. The testimony introduced by the state under the rulings of the court made out a very clear case of imposition and deception resorted to by the appellant to obtain the board and lodging in question; and, where there is substantial evidence, the appellate court will not interfere with the verdict. State v. Gee, 85 Mo. 647; State v. Hurt, 89 Mo. 590; State v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431. (2) The act is not unconstitutional, because the subject is not clearly expressed in the title. Nor is it unconstitutional because it denies to defendant the equal protection of the law, or because it attempts to declare what shall amount to proof of criminal intent.

OPINION

Thomas, J.

Defendant was sentenced by the St. Louis court of criminal correction to ten days' imprisonment in the jail of the city of St. Louis, for obtaining board at the Southern Hotel in that city by means of a trick, etc., and failing to pay for the same. A constitutional question was raised, and, hence, defendant brings her case to this court, instead of the St. Louis court of appeals for review.

I. The contention is that the act of the last general assembly (Sess. Acts, 1891, p. 159), entitled "An act to protect hotel and innkeepers," is unconstitutional: "First. Because it is in conflict with section 22 of article 2, constitution of Missouri, and denies defendant a trial by jury as contemplated by said section. Second. Because said act denies to defendant an impartial trial, in this, that it prescribes for the offense named therein a different rule of evidence and a different punishment from that established for a like offense when committed against any other person than a hotel or innkeeper. Third. Because the subject of the act is not clearly expressed in its title."

The first section of the act under which this prosecution is had is as follows: "Every person who shall obtain board or lodging in any hotel or boarding house by means of any trick or deception, or false or fraudulent representation, or statement or pretense, and shall fail or refuse to pay therefor, shall be held to have obtained the same with the intent to cheat and defraud such hotel or boarding-house keeper, and shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."

We do not think this act denies the accused the right of trial by jury of any fact constituting an essential element of the crime denounced by it. The crime consists in obtaining board or lodging by a trick, etc., and failing to pay therefor. It must be left to the triers of the fact whether the board was so obtained and not paid for. These facts, when proved, are declared by this act to be evidence of an intent to cheat and defraud. And this the legislature had the power to do. Com. v. Williams, 6 Gray 1; State v. Hurley, 54 Me. 562; State v. Day, 37 Me. 244; Bish. Stat. Cr., sec. 1050; Whar. Cr. Ev. [9 Ed.] sec. 715; 26 Alb. Law Journ. 63, and cases cited.

It may be conceded that the legislature has no power to create artificial presumptions of guilt, but the act in question does not do this nor attempt to do it. No affirmative right of the citizen is denied or taken away. It is morally wrong to obtain board "by means of a trick or deception or false or fraudulent representation or statement or pretense," and, hence, it is competent for the law-making power to declare it a crime, and provide for its punishment. State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 17 S.W. 646. A presumption of an intent to cheat and defraud arising from the fact that board is obtained by means of a trick, etc., is not an artificial but a probable and reasonable one, and the authorities above cited are to the effect that such a presumption may be declared by statute.

II. The second contention is that the title does not clearly express the subject of the act in question. We do not think this point well taken. State v. Burgdoerfer, supra.

III. It is urged that the act is unconstitutional, because it discriminates against persons obtaining board or lodging at a hotel or boarding house and makes the rules of evidence of this offense much less stringent than in other cases of false pretenses. This position is not tenable. This act is uniform in its application, operating upon all alike who come within its provisions. Burgdoerfer case, supra.

IV. The trial court ought to have directed the jury to acquit defendant on the evidence, which shows that she registered at the Southern Hotel, July 29, 1891, and was assigned to a room. On July 31, she sent for the manager of the hotel, and rented...