State v. Kinnane, 95-00565
| Decision Date | 13 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-00565,95-00565 |
| Citation | 689 So.2d 1088 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D2654 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Sandra Kay KINNANE, a/k/a Sandra Cruzan, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brenda S. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Ralph W. Rinehart, Tampa, for Appellee.
The state challenges the trial court's order granting Sandra Kinnane's motion to suppress on the ground that the officers' stop of Kinnane's car was pretextual. The state argues that the stop for a traffic infraction was valid. We agree and reverse.
On July 1, 1994, Officers Parks and Wuzinski were conducting a surveillance of Sandra and David Kinnane's residence on which a search warrant had been issued, but not yet served. The Kinnanes left the residence in a Corvette which was registered to them. The officers radioed to other officers in a marked car to stop the Kinnanes' car because the car was speeding and because it left the residence described in the search warrant. The officers stopped the car, and as they approached it, they observed the female passenger bending down, making "furtive movements" towards the floorboard. At that time, for their own safety, they asked the passenger and the driver to step out of the car. The officers found an open purse on the floorboard which contained a loaded semi-automatic handgun and a knife. Sandra Kinnane was arrested and charged with two counts of carrying a concealed weapon.
Kinnane filed a motion to suppress in which she argued that her car was not speeding and that her car was stopped solely because of the search warrant on her home. The trial court granted Kinnane's motion on the ground that the stop for speeding was pretextual.
Under Whren v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), any temporary detention of a motorist who has committed a traffic violation is permissible, regardless of whether "a reasonable officer" would have made the stop. Officer Parks testified that he ordered the stop of the Kinnanes' car because it was speeding. This was sufficient to validate the stop even though the officers also had another reason for making the stop, i.e., they had a search warrant for Kinnane's residence. See State v. Corvin, 677 So.2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (...
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Watson v. Boyd
...search is permissible when the officer believes the suspect is making furtive movements. (ECF No. 143 (citing State v. Kinnane , 689 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1996), reh'g denied , (Jan. 28, 1997)). Boyd states that he was searching the vehicle to determine Watson's identity......
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Dewberry v. State
...to a reasonable suspicion that someone is armed and dangerous."); C.G. v. State, 689 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); State v. Kinnane, 689 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Brown, 395 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 407 So.2d 1102 (Fla.1981); see also State v. Dilyerd, 467 So......
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State v. Toussaint
...that the suspect is armed and dangerous. E.G., Brown v. State, 863 So.2d 459, 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) ; see also State v. Kinnane, 689 So.2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding the defendant's furtive movements toward the floorboard of the car during a traffic stop justified the police o......
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Enich v. State
...U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1330, 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984); C.G. v. State, 689 So.2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (same); State v. Kinnane, 689 So.2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (same). Finally, when the police officer began to ask the defendant questions, the defendant "started stuttering and sh......