State v. Kirk

Citation150 N.W. 91,168 Iowa 244
Decision Date19 December 1914
Docket Number30001
PartiesSTATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. WILLIAM KIRK, Appellant
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Johnson District Court.--HON. R. P. HOWELL, Judge.

THE defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree and convicted of manslaughter. He appeals.--Reversed and Remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

George Cosson, Attorney General, Wiley S. Rankin, Special Counsel W. R. Hart, and C. S. Ranck, for appellee.

Wade Dutcher & Davis, O. A. Byington, for appellant.

LADD C. J. DEEMER, GAYNOR and WITHROW, JJ., concur.

OPINION

LADD, C. J.

The defendant shot and killed his wife, Frances E. Kirk, September 6, 1913, and was put on trial the 29th day of the same month. He justified by pleading self defense. They had lived in Iowa City about a year and one-half and were engaged in selling Indian Medicine remedies, he being of Indian-Portuguese extraction and she a French-Canadian. He was forty-five years of age and she some years older. She had begun an action for divorce and had procured a writ of injunction restraining him from visiting the premises previously constituting their home. Negotiations for the adjustment of her claim for alimony were pending, though she had declined an offer made by him, and his attorneys had advised him to see his wife and try to reach an agreement. In the evening of September 6, 1913, he had been sitting on his porch without coat and with shoes untied and, at about 7:30 o'clock, took a revolver he had purchased three months before from a dresser and walked across the street to Kostal's store, ostensibly to buy a cigar. His wife who was sitting on the store porch, went in and a discussion between them followed concerning some rent she had collected and the adjustment of her claim of alimony. Evidence that he told her that she had lied in saying she had left the rent with her attorney was undisputed and the character of their controversy may be inferred from the fact that Kostal requested them to leave the premises and accompanied her about 100 feet on her way home, some 500 feet distant, while Kostal's wife advised her to remain. The defendant went the same way, though out in the street or on the opposite side. She appears to have walked rapidly and when across an intervening bridge about 200 feet long, according to Nettie Eagan, then 13 years old, dared defendant, who was on the other side, over, to which he responded: "Never mind I will get you yet." The defendant testified that he told her he wanted to talk with her this evening and that they there arranged to meet at her gate. After they were there a few minutes, several revolver shots were heard, some witnesses saying four, others five and still others as high as seven. When found she was lying on the ground dead with four wounds, two of which were necessarily fatal. Two bullets entered the left shoulder, one the neck and the other the fleshy part of the left arm. Powder marks were on her clothes and person. A nickelplated revolver with three empty and three loaded shells was lying in or near her left hand. It was dark and there was no eye-witness other than the defendant. All the witnesses agree that the first three shots were fired in rapid succession and that then there was a pause and thereafter one, two, three, or four shots were fired, the greater number fixing them as two after the pause.

The defendant testified that after a few words had passed, he had said:

"You know next week that divorce case is coming off and my purpose over here is to compromise, to see if I can compromise with you. You seen your lawyer and I seen mine. You know about the property and that is what I want to see you about. My lawyer says to see you if we couldn't compromise and I said I would be willing to give you $ 1,000 and you get a divorce and it would be all right. I didn't want any notoriety at all. Enough notoriety here the way it is. She got awfully nervous. She was standing in the gateway and stepped back just a little bit. She had her hands behind her or down rather. Then she commenced awfully loud. She says, 'I have seen my lawyer and you seen your lawyer,' she says, 'I will tell you what I want. I want $ 1,500 and half the medicine and the right to sell my medicine.' I says, 'If you are going to fuss I am going home.' She talked pretty loud. I had my hand on a picket, there was a picket fence. It was a little wider there and a very small terrace place anyway. She had a gun and the fire went right in my face almost. It was so close. I had a blue steel gun in my hip pocket and I slipped just then. I slipped a little just as I said, 'I am going home,' and I pulled myself up right by the side of the fence with my hand on the picket. Before she shot she says, 'You black son-of-a-bitch, I will get it all.' I shot, I don't know how many times. I do not know how many times she shot. It was all done in a flash."

Nettie Eagan testified to seeing him walk over to the gateway, place his left hand on his wife's right shoulder, his right hand by his side and that her hands appeared to be down and that within three minutes she heard three or four shots. The defendant was known as Dr. Deerfoot. Though not a practicing physician, he had traveled over the country selling medicines for others or himself since attaining maturity, was a good shot and had married the deceased 18 or 19 years previous, she being his second wife. She had been a snake charmer in a circus, was somewhat addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, of violent temper, was jealous of him, and had threatened his life. The evidence was in conflict as to whether she was peaceably disposed. They were of the same height, she weighed 160 or 170 pounds while his weight was only 130. It is impractical to set out all the details. Enough of them have been mentioned to indicate that the issue of self-defense was for the jury. The theory of appellant is that his wife fired three times and thereupon he discharged the four bullets into her person. But if she discharged the revolver, none of the bullets hit him and this he may have known before he fired. She was within a few feet of him as the powder on her dress proved and he admitted she was within seven feet. An expert was of the opinion that his revolver must have been within six inches of her shoulder. In these circumstances was it necessary for him to take her life in order to protect his own? There was a pause after the first three shots; if she had fired these did she then quit and if so, might he not then have seized her revolver rather than have shot and killed her? Again, some witnesses testified that, though in a situation to hear, they heard but four shots; if so, the defendant must have fired them. The evidence tended to show that she screamed immediately after the first three shots; if so, was this because of being wounded or owing to fright when defendant drew his revolver? If but four shots were fired the infliction of the wounds must have occasioned the scream. Moreover, the defendant might have been found to have armed himself with his revolver and to have gone over to the store for the purpose of interviewing the deceased and bringing on trouble and to have followed her home with that purpose as well as to talk with her concerning the alimony to be allowed her in the divorce suit. So that under the evidence the jury might have concluded that the deceased did not fire at defendant or that if she did fire he could have disarmed her and thereby protected himself without taking her life or that because of being the assailant he could not avail himself of the plea of self-defense. What we have said indicates with sufficient clearness that the finding that defendant did not act in the reasonable apprehension of imminent peril to his life or person has such support in the record as to preclude any interference by this court.

II. The clothes worn by the deceased were introduced in evidence over objection that they were not shown to have been in substantially the same condition as at the time of the shooting. With reference thereto, the coroner testified that he identified them without question and he was handed the waist and explained how it was worn and pointed out where the bullets passed through it.

Q. "Now can you from your knowledge of affairs determine whether or not those black marks, what is this black mark?"

A. "These powder marks are the same as they were when I had the body in my possession."

Q. "Tell from what knowledge you have of affairs what those black marks are?"

A. "Powder marks show that the gun must have been very close to the body when fired."

Q. "Now is that in the same condition at this time that it was when you took it from the body, taking into consideration the effects of the elements upon the blood?"

A. "Practically the same condition."

The corset was then handed to the witness and identified as that taken off the body of the deceased. All the clothes were then introduced in evidence over objection. None other than the jacket were shown to be in the same condition as at the time of the shooting.

The witness was asked:

Q. "Has this clothing been in your possession ever since?"

A. "Why, I have had it at Snyder Bros. in their possession."

It is manifest that there was error in receiving the clothes other than the jacket without any showing that they were in substantially the same condition as when removed from the body of the deceased. However, as the killing was admitted, the only bearing of this testimony was with respect to the powder marks as tending to show how near the revolver must have been at the time of being discharged and, as will be observed, these marks were shown to have been the same as when the coroner took charge of the body; so...

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  • State v. Kirk
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1914

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