State v. Kirkwood Leisure Hours' Social and P. Club

• Decision Date: 05 July 1916
• Docket Number: No. 14314.,14314.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LASHLY v. KIRKWOOD LEISURE HOURS' SOCIAL AND PASTIME CLUB et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

187 S.W. 819

STATE ex rel. LASHLY v. KIRKWOOD LEISURE HOURS' SOCIAL AND PASTIME CLUB et al.

No. 14314.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

July 5, 1916.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; John W. McElhinney, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Bill by the State, on the relation of Arthur V. Lashly, against the Kirkwood Leisure Hours' Social and Pastime Club. From an order punishing his disobedience of a temporary injunction, Mark Gumberts appeals. Reversed and rendered.

T. J. Rowe, T. J. Rowe, Jr., and Henry Rowe, all of St. Louis, for appellant. Arthur V. Lashly, of Clayton, for respondent.

ALLEN, J.

On August 12, 1913, the relator, the prosecuting attorney of St. Louis county, filed a bill in equity in the circuit court of that county averring that the defendant therein named, the Kirkwood Leisure Hours' Social and Pastime Club, was a corporation incorporated, by a pro forma decree, under the provisions of article 11, chapter 12, Revised Statutes 1899, its objects and purposes, as stated in its charter, being educational, literary, and fraternal in character; but that, under the fraudulent pretense of carrying out the purposes of its charter, the defendant at and about a certain building and premises on Manchester Road, in said county, through its officers, members, agents, servants, and employés, unlawfully sold intoxicating liquors, without a license therefor, on Sundays, as well as on other days. The petition further charged that such sale of intoxicating liquors caused a large number of persons, addicted to the use thereof, to be attracted to the defendant's premises, and by reason thereof much drunkenness, disorderly and immoral conduct, and lewdness were indulged in; that gambling and other immoral practices were permitted on the premises, and boisterous and hilarious conduct there permitted and encouraged; by reason whereof defendant's premises became and constituted a public nuisance to the great annoyance and injury of a large part of the inhabitants of the county. The prayer of the petition is that the defendant, its officers, agents, servants, employés, and members be restrained and enjoined from selling or disposing of intoxicating liquors on Sunday or on any other day within the county of St. Louis, and from engaging in or permitting gambling to be carried on at said premises or in any other place within said county, or from doing any of the wrongful acts or things complained of.

Upon the filing of this petition, the circuit court issued an order upon the defendant to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue as prayed. Defendant appeared and on September 2, 1913, after a hearing, the court granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendant, its officers, members, servants, agents, and employés from selling or otherwise disposing of intoxicating liquors, and from doing or committing any of the other acts complained of in the petition. Thereafter, upon application of the relator, the court issued a citation to this appellant, Gumberts, and to one Better and one Scott, as agents and servants of the defendant, requiring them to show cause why they should not be punished for an alleged violation of the aforesaid temporary injunction. Gumberts, Better, and Scott filed a return to this citation, and after a hearing the court dismissed the citation as to Better and Scott, but rendered judgment against Gumberts, finding him guilty of contempt as charged in the citation and assessing his punishment at a fine of $50 and imprisonment in the county jail for a period of 10 days. From this judgment, Gumberts prosecutes the appeal now before us.

It appears that the place in question known as Flora Fauna, was operated in the name of the defendant, with appellant as manager thereof, from July 2, 1913, to September 4, 1913, under a lease from appellant. On the latter date, two days after the issuance of the temporary injunction, this lease appears to have been canceled and possession of the premises was delivered to appellant. The evidence shows that...