State v. Kneeland

• Decision Date: 14 December 1988
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Richard KNEELAND.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 4

552 A.2d 4

STATE of Maine v. Richard KNEELAND.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 9, 1988.

Decided Dec. 14, 1988.

William R. Anderson, Dist. Atty., Geoffrey Rushlau (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Bath, for plaintiff.

Theodore K. Hoch (orally), Day & Hoch, Bath, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD and HORNBY, JJ.

CLIFFORD, Justice.

Based on the evidence gathered at an investigatory stop of his motor vehicle, the defendant, Richard Kneeland, was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (Supp.1987). Under the provisions of 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A, the State of Maine appeals from a order of the District Court (Bath; Henry, J.), granting Kneeland's motion to suppress all evidence obtained from that stop. Because the State has failed to provide us with a record adequate to allow us to consider properly the issues raised on appeal, we affirm the judgment.

The only evidence presented at the suppression hearing was that of Corporal Joel Merry of the Bath Police Department, the officer who stopped Kneeland in his vehicle and placed him under arrest in the early morning hours of January 1, 1988. Merry testified that he was told by another officer that a vehicle that turned out to be Kneeland's had backed into a snow bank in the parking lot of the Holiday Inn and made a wide turn in driving out of the parking lot. Merry then described how he caught up to the vehicle and followed it on several Bath streets, observing it cross the center line into the oncoming lane and operate at a low speed before he pulled the vehicle over.

In granting the motion to suppress, the motion judge commented that "the most damaging evidence would be backing into a snow bank across the parking lot;" that there was a lack of evidence as to the size of the snow bank; and that the lack of testimony as to the condition of the roads precluded an assumption on her part that the roads were icy. The motion judge said nothing about Corporal Merry's personal observations of the operation of Kneeland's vehicle, did not indicate whether she accepted all or part of Merry's testimony and did not give any focused reason for the granting of the motion to suppress. The State failed to request any findings of fact or conclusions of law.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the burden was the State's to prove that the stop of Kneeland's vehicle was based on an articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed. State v. Garland, 482 A.2d 139, 142 (Me.1984); State v. Fogg, 410 A.2d 548, 550 (Me.1980).

Whether the officer has a sufficient articulable suspicion to justify a stop is a factual determination for the motion judge to make, and that finding will be disturbed "only if the record presented to us on appeal establishes that the finding is clearly erroneous." State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me.1984). As the appellant, the State has the burden to ensure that that record is sufficient to allow us to properly consider the issues raised. State v. Marshall, 451 A.2d 633, 635 (Me.1982).

M.R.Crim.P. 41A(d) provides, in pertinent part:

(d) ... If the motion [to suppress evidence] is granted or denied, the court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law either on the record or in writing.

The language of Rule 41A(d) is mandatory because findings of fact on an order granting or denying a motion to suppress are essential for adequate appellate review of that order. D. Cluchey & M. Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 41A.5, at 41A-11 Vol. 2 (1st ed. 1987).

Even though the obligation of the court under Rule 41A to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law is "absolute rather than conditional," M.R.Crim.P. 41A advisory committee note to February 15, 1986 amendment; Cluchey & Seitzinger at 41A-2, as the party responsible for an adequate record, the appellant has the burden to request the court to make findings if none are made or to expand on inadequate findings in order for the record to be meaningful for appellate review. Marshall, 451 A.2d at 635.

Because the State had the burden of proof on the motion to suppress, in order to prevail in this appeal the State must demonstrate that the motion judge was compelled to find that the stop was based on articulable suspicion. Town of Eustis v. Stratton-Eustis Dev. Corp., 516 A.2d 951, 953 (Me.1986); Luce Co. v. Hoefler, 464 A.2d 213, 215 (Me.1983).

The entire evidence presented at the motion hearing consisted of the testimony of one police officer. The motion judge was not required to believe that officer's testimony. State v. Harriman, 467 A.2d 745, 747 (Me.1983). On this record, we must rely on the comments made by the motion judge at the time the decision was rendered to constitute findings. Those comments were incomplete and unfocused and do not reveal whether she accepted the historical facts testified to by the officer, and from them concluded that the officer's stated suspicion of criminality was not reasonable; or whether she did not believe all or portions of the testimony. Those comments do not "present a clear statement of the basis for the trial court's" decision, essential for our adequate appellate review. Conger v. Conger, 304 A.2d 426, 429 (Me.1973).

Before we reach the merits of the State's appeal from a fact-based order granting a motion to suppress, the State must meet its obligation as an appellant to provide us with a sufficient record that includes adequate findings of fact, or at least must take all procedural steps within its power to do so. Marshall, 451 A.2d at 635. Because the State has failed to provide such a record here, its appeal must fail. See State v. Drown, 447 A.2d 466, 472 (Me.1982).

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS and GLASSMAN, JJ., concurring.

WATHEN, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree that the State should have done more to ensure an adequate record for appeal, I would nevertheless vacate the order of suppression.

At closing time on New Year's morning, January 1, 1988, defendant Richard Kneeland left the Bounty Taverne at the Holiday Inn in Bath. In response to a radio message, Officer Merry, the arresting officer, picked up another officer at the Holiday Inn and was informed that Kneeland's car, had just backed across the Holiday Inn parking lot and struck a snowbank. The second officer also reported that the car made a wide turn as it left the parking lot and that a second car followed it. Officer Merry pursued the cars in his cruiser and quickly caught up with them. He saw Kneeland cross over into the left lane. Both cars travelled at a "noticeably slow" speed. Officer Merry eventually stopped the Kneeland vehicle because he believed the operator was under the influence. At the suppression hearing, after detailing his observations, he stated that he based his belief on the information related by the second officer and on the fact that Kneeland left a drinking establishment at closing time, approximately 2:00 a.m. The District Court judge granted Kneeland's motion to suppress although she characterized the case as "a very close call." In granting the motion, the court referred only to the fact that Kneeland had backed across the parking lot into a snow bank.

This Court has stated that "[i]n order to initiate an investigation involving brief detention short of a formal arrest, a law enforcement officer must act on the basis of 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.' " State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me.1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Such facts must give rise to "a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Id. A mere "inarticulate hunch" will not suffice. State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d 314, 317 (Me.1985). In assessing whether a reasonable suspicion existed, "a court must take into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop." State v. Jarrett, 536 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Me.1988).

Whether or not the police had the requisite articulable suspicion to justify a vehicular stop "is always a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge who hears the witnesses at the suppression hearing." State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me.1984). The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion has been characterized as a question of law. State v. Fillion, 474 A.2d 187, 190 (Me.1984). The ultimate question of justification combines both legal and factual issues. Id. The Law Court will therefore reverse a motion justice's decision regarding the suppression of evidence only if clearly erroneous. E.g., State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d at 963.

Relying on State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978 (Me.1987), the defendant argues in the present case that the motion judge could have properly concluded that Officer Merry had no more than an unsubstantiated hunch that the driver was operating under the influence. I disagree. In Caron, we held that the District Court clearly erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during an investigatory stop after a Maine State Trooper had observed the defendant straddle the center line of an undivided highway for 25 to 50 yards. We stated that "[t]he observation, even when taken with all rational inferences that can be drawn from it, did not give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was involved." Id. at 979. Our holding in Caron, however, is limited to the particular facts of that case. That decision stands only for the proposition that "[a] vehicle's brief, one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence and, in the absence of oncoming or passing traffic, without erratic operation or other unusual circumstances, does not justify an intrusive stop by a police officer." Id.

The facts of the present...