State v. Knight
| Decision Date | 15 November 1927 |
| Docket Number | 38532 |
| Citation | 216 N.W. 104,204 Iowa 819 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. SANBORN E. KNIGHT, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Boone District Court.--SHERWOOD A. CLOCK, Judge.
Action in equity, under the provisions of Sections 2492 and 2499 Code of 1924, to revoke and cancel the license of the defendant to practice medicine and surgery in the state of Iowa, by reason of certain alleged immoral, unprofessional and dishonorable conduct on the part of the defendant. The trial court entered judgment and decree that the license be revoked, and that the licensee shall not engage in the practice of his profession within the state of Iowa on and after the entry of the decree. The defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Baker & Doran, for appellant.
John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Neill Garrett, Assistant Attorney-general, Walter Canaday, County Attorney, and Walter R. Dyer, for appellee.
WAGNER, J., not participating.
DE GRAFF, J.
This is a suit by the State of Iowa upon the relation of the county attorney of Boone County, Iowa. The objective is the revocation and cancellation of the license of the defendant, Sanborn E. Knight, to practice medicine and surgery in the state of Iowa. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decree entered by the trial court is seriously questioned by the appellant, Knight; but, before reviewing this point, we give attention to the proposition that the cause was not properly instituted, and consequently the court was without any jurisdiction whatever to try the proceeding. In brief, the appellant claims that the county attorney had no right to commence this action, for the reason that such authority must come "from those who are higher up," as stated by the appellant. This contention involves the construction of the statutory provisions having relation to the commencement of an action of this character.
I. The statute provides that:
"The district court of the county in which a licensee resides shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding to revoke or suspend his license." Section 2495, Code of 1924.
It is further provided that:
Section 2497 reads:
"The state department of health shall direct the attorney-general to file such petition against any licensee upon its own motion, or it may give such direction upon the sworn information of some person who resides in the county wherein the licensee practices."
It is further provided that:
"The attorney-general shall comply with such direction of the department [of health], and prosecute such action on behalf of the state, but the county attorney, at the request of the attorney-general, shall appear and prosecute such action when brought in his county." Section 2498.
Do these provisions contemplate and intend different methods of commencing such a proceeding? We answer in the affirmative. It is obvious that the department of health may take the initiative, and direct the attorney-general to act, and it is made his duty to comply; but a fair interpretation of these sections does not preclude the state department of justice from acting in the premises on its own initiative. In brief, the direction from the department of health is not a condition precedent for the commencement of an action by the attorney-general. The Medical Practice Act of this state is predicated on the police power, and likewise are revocations and suspensions of licenses to practice medicine and surgery within the state. If the department of health obtains information concerning the transgression of a licensee, it may, upon its own motion, take the preliminary steps, as provided by statute, and cause an action to be instituted. It is not the legislative intent that, before a petition is filed to revoke the license of a practitioner, information must first be received by the department of health and authorization given, either to the attorney-general or to the county attorney, for the commencement of such action.
The department of health has a duty enjoined by statute, to wit: To direct the attorney-general, in the exercise of his discretion, upon information received, to file such petition. This is done upon its own motion, or it may be done upon the information of some person residing in the county wherein the licensee practices. This does not prohibit the initiation of the action by the attorney-general or by the county attorney. The contrary thought is found in the statute.
The legislature had in mind the safeguarding of life and health, and the agencies named in the statute are but different methods to obtain the results contemplated by the statute. Direct methods were intended, and not circumlocution in securing the end in view. In this particular, the department of health, the attorney-general, and the county attorney are protective agencies. The department of health is privileged to use the attorney-general, but this is not exclusive. The statutory methods are concurrent, and the reason is apparent. The instant action was commenced by the county attorney, and properly so. It is not material that it might have been instituted by some other method.
II. Does the evidence sustain the decree entered? This is an action in equity, and triable de novo in this court. The statute provides that, in an action of this character, the state shall be named as plaintiff, and the licensee as defendant, and that the charges against the licensee shall be stated in full. Section 2499, Code of 1924. It is provided in Section 2492 that a license to practice a profession shall be revoked or suspended when the licensee is guilty of "immoral, unprofessional, or dishonorable conduct." The instant petition charges the defendant with certain acts and conducts which are, in their nature, clearly unprofessional and dishonorable.
It is alleged, inter alia, that a death certificate was issued for the burial of the body of Eva B. Newcomb, stating the cause of death to be double pneumonia, "when in fact said Eva B. Newcomb died of blood poisoning, following a criminal abortion;" that, on a certain date, said defendant administered drugs to and used instruments in and upon the body of a certain named woman, with intent and for the purpose of producing a miscarriage, the same not being necessary to save her life; that, on another named date, the said defendant administered drugs to and used instruments in and upon the body of another named woman, for the same purpose, and with the same result; that, on another named date, he administered drugs to and used instruments in and upon the body of another named woman, for the same purpose, and with the same results; that, on another date, the same act was performed upon another woman, with the same intent, and with the same results; that, on another date, the same operation was performed upon another named woman, with the same intent, and with like results; that, on another date, and upon another named woman, the same act was performed, with the same results.
We deem it unnecessary to outline the evidence which proves or tends to prove the acts charged. No purpose will be served in so doing. It is sufficient to state our conclusion. We believe that no unprejudiced person can read the record facts and not be convinced that the trial court was fully justified in the findings made. The record is replete with instances of immoral, dishonorable, and unprofessional acts on the part of the defendant in the practice of the profession which he was duly licensed to practice. It is not necessary that the State should establish, by satisfactory proof, all of the acts laid at the professional door of this defendant.
III. It is urged by the appellant that the court erred in permitting certain of the plaintiff's witnesses, on whom it was alleged abortive practices were used, to testify, over his objection, as to matters which exposed them to public disgrace and ignominy. These witnesses had previously given their testimony before the grand jury, and thereby waived the right, if any existed, to refuse to testify. It is said in State v. Rowley, 198 Iowa 613, 198 N.W. 37:
"If the privilege to the witness was denied wrongfully, the wrong was to the witness, and not to this defendant."
See, also, State v. Lewis, 96 Iowa 286, 65 N.W. 295; State v. Peffers, 80 Iowa 580, 46 N.W. 662.
As heretofore observed, the witnesses did not claim privilege when they testified before the grand jury, but when they were placed upon the witness stand by plaintiff in the instant trial, the counsel for the defendant made the objection on their behalf. They asked no protection. The privilege in question was for the witnesses to exercise, not for the counsel for the defendant. It was no part of the duty of the counsel for the defendant to advise witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiff. State v. Hardin, 144 Iowa 264, 120 N.W. 470.
IV. Error is predicated on the proposition that the court should have sustained objections to the offer in evidence of signed statements made by certain of the State's witnesses before the grand jury. As we read the record, these matters were not introduced for the purpose of impeachment. It is true that some of the witnesses were reluctant to testify and in certain details changed their original stories. It is quite apparent that someone had been tampering with certain of the witnesses, to secure a different recital of their relation with the defendant while he was acting in a professional capacity. It will be presumed that the trial court...
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