State v. Knott

Decision Date18 April 1899
Citation32 S.E. 798,124 N.C. 814
PartiesSTATE v. KNOTT.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from superior court, Forsyth county; McIver, Judge.

Cicero Knott was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, and he appeals. Reversed.

Prosecutor went to accused, and said he understood he was agent for F., who would furnish money to any one at the rate of $10 for each $1 invested; and afterwards on the same day he made a bargain with accused that on payment of $21.50 accused would procure $150 for him from F., and accused told him he had furnished money at those rates to others. Held, the money not having been furnished as agreed, that it did not constitute obtaining money under false pretenses, since there was no false representation of a subsisting fact.

Moore & Sapp, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for the State.

FAIRCLOTH, C.J.

The defendant is indicted for obtaining money under a false pretense. Code, § 1025. The state's witness testified that "he went to the defendant, Knott, and told him he understood he was an agent for one Franklin, who would furnish good and lawful money to any one at the rate of $10 for each $1 invested, and that he afterwards on the same day made a bargain with defendant, Knott, that upon the payment of $21.50 the said Knott was to procure for him from said Franklin the sum of $150; that defendant, Knott, told him he had furnished money at these rates for Ogburn, Hill & Co." and others; further, that said money had not been received by him. Does this evidence constitute an indictable offense under our Code? It does not. It shows a promise to be performed in the future, but does not show a false representation of a subsisting fact. This question was fully explained in State v. Phifer, 65 N.C. 325, which has been followed as a leading case. There it was held that "there must be a false representation of a subsisting fact, calculated to deceive, and which does deceive," but it does not extend to mere tricks of trade. It makes no difference whether the prosecutor was a prudent or imprudent man, or one easily imposed upon; for, if he was deceived, it was done by a promise, and not by a false representation of an existing fact. New trial.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT