State v. Knowles

• Decision Date: 31 March 1977
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Richard P. KNOWLES.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 624

371 A.2d 624

STATE of Maine v. Richard P. KNOWLES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 31, 1977.

David M. Cox, Dist. Atty., Harold C. Hamilton, Paul W. Chaiken, Asst. Dist. Attys., Bangor, for plaintiff.

Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky by Marvin H. Glazier, Bangor, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.

WERNICK, Justice.

Defendant Richard P. Knowles has appealed from a judgment of conviction entered February 3, 1976 in the Superior Court (Penobscot County) upon a jury verdict (of January 30, 1976) finding defendant guilty, as charged by indictment, of the crime of 'Kidnapping While Armed with a Firearm' (17 M.R.S.A. § 2051-A). ¹

We deny the appeal.

Defendant committed the crime in question on November 28, 1974 when he was 17 years of age and thus a 'juvenile' for the purposes of 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 2501 et seq. ² Pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2601 et seq., a juvenile petition alleging commission of the acts in question was filed on December 4, 1974 in the District Court (District Three, Division of Southern Penobscot) sitting as the 'juvenile court.' 15 M.R.S.A. § 2551.

On January 7, 1975 the juvenile court Judge heard evidence in connection with the petition, and, as one alternative of disposition available to him under 15 M.R.S.A. § 2611, ³ he ordered defendant held for action by the grand jury. Section 2611, subd. 3. ⁴

One day later, on January 8, 1975, the grand jury returned an indictment against defendant charging him with violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 2051-A. This indictment was subsequently dismissed, on July 17, at the request of the State, because a similar indictment had been returned on April 2, 1975 purportedly to replace the January 8 indictment. The judgment of conviction here under appeal eventuates from defendant's trial, held in January, 1976, upon the April 2, 1975 indictment.

I.

After the return of the April 2, 1975 indictment but before defendant's jury trial, the Supreme Court of the United States, on May 27, 1975, decided Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).

In Breed the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 'double jeopardy' clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, has bearing upon certain practices concerning juveniles who become subjected to criminal proceedings as if adults. Specifically, the Court decide that whenever the manner of the conduct of a juvenile hearing is such that it can, or odes, result in an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, the juvenile is thereby placed in jeopardy. Subjecting the juvenile thereafter to a criminal prosecution for the same (or a lesser included) offense places the juvenile in jeopardy a second time and thus violates the federal 5th-14th amendment guarantees against double jeopardy. Under Breed, then, to avoid violation of the federal constitutional protection against double jeopardy in the prosecution of a juvenile as an alleged criminal, the initial juvenile proceeding from which emerges the order to hold the juvenile for action by the grand jury must be plainly identified in advance as being limited strictly, and solely, to consideration of the question whether the juvenile is to be held for action by the grand jury. Breed v. Jones, supra, p. 538 n. 18, 95 S.Ct. 1779.

One of defendant's contentions, here, is that the juvenile hearing in his case was not thus limited by the juvenile court Judge ⁵ and, therefore, the State subjected him to double jeopardy when it subsequently tried him as an alleged criminal.

We reject this contention of defendant, as predicated in its various ramifications upon the alleged applicability of Breed, because we conclude that Breed does not have such retroactive effect as to be here controlling.

Since May 27, 1975, the date Breed was decided, the highest courts of two States have had occasion to consider whether, and the extent to which, Breed should be given retroactive application. The Supreme Court of California, relying on Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973), held Breed fully retroactive and reversed a conviction where both the juvenile hearing and the adult trial preceded May 27, 1975. In re Bryan, 16 Cal.3d 782, 129 Cal.Rptr. 293, 548 P.2d 693 (1976). In contrast, finding Robinson v. Neil, supra, distinguishable, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held Breed prospective only. Stokes v. Commonwealth, Mass., 336 N.E.2d 735 (1975). ⁶ Further, the Massachusetts Court determined that the crucial event in terms of the application of Breed was the juvenile hearing rather than the criminal trial (as if an adult), reasoning that official reliance attached at the juvenile level:

'It was at that moment that the situation became irreversible, for by subjecting the defendant to former jeopardy in the . . . (juvenile court), any subsequent trial would necessarily constitute double jeopardy under the reasoning of Breed.' Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), Mass., 351 N.E.2d 521, 525 (1976).

Thus, under the approach of the Massachusetts Court, Breed does not bar the adult trial after May 27, 1975 of a juvenile subjected to former jeopardy at an omnibus hearing held before May 27, 1975. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), supra.

Such are the facts here. Defendant's criminal trial occurred after May 27, 1975 (in January, 1976) but his juvenile hearing was held prior to that date (on January 7, 1975).

Faced with the position of the Massachusetts Court enunciated in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), supra, several persons bound over as adults before Breed but not yet tried instituted a class action habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They sought a federal declaration that Breed barred their trials. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Chief Judge Coffin dissenting, upheld the view of the Massachusetts Court. Jackson v. Justices of the Superior Court of Massachusetts, 549 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1977).

We have previously made clear that even though only a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is the supreme law of the land on a federal constitutional issue, nevertheless 'in the interests of developing harmonious federal-state relationships it is a wise policy that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably possible, a decision (of its federal circuit court on a federal constitutional question) . . .' State v. Lafferty, Me., 309 A.2d 647, 667 (1973) (as stated for the Court in the concurring opinion of Wernick, J.)

While we recognize the cogency of the dissent in Jackson, we conclude that, here, we should adhere to our policy of deference to First Circuit decisions since we find also persuasive the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as upheld by the First Circuit majority in Jackson. Until the Supreme Court of the United States decides otherwise, we follow the holding of Jackson and decide that Breed v. Jones is without applicability to require reversal of the instant conviction on grounds of double jeopardy. ⁷

II.

We turn to other errors assigned by defendant regarding the propriety of the grand jury's action in returning indictments against him.

As set forth above, there was a first indictment against defendant returned on January 8, 1975, one day after the juvenile court Judge ordered defendant held for action by the grand jury. Defendant asserts that this bind-over order was subjected on January 1, 1975 ⁸ to a Superior Court review which culminated in the Superior Court's upholding the bind-over order of the juvenile court. On January 14, 1975 defendant moved to dismiss the January 8 indictment contending that (1) the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and (2) in any event it was erroneous to submit the matter for the consideration of the grand jury. The Justice presiding in the Superior Court denied this motion to dismiss on February 18, 1975. Eventually, however, on July 17, 1975 the Superior Court did dismiss the January 8 indictment because, as stated above, the State had requested dismissal since another indictment had been returned April 2, 1975 which purported to replace the indictment of January 8.

Apparently as a result of the July 17 dismissal of the January 8 indictment, all prior Superior Court records in the case, including the juvenile petition and accompanying findings, were 'expunged.' A subsequent Superior Court order, however, overrode the expungement, reinstated the records previously expunged and consolidated them with those relating to the April, 2, 1975 indictment.

On September 3, 1975 defendant moved to dismiss the April 2 indictment on the grounds that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the grand jury's return of the indictment was illegal and the substantive allegations of the indictment were insufficient to charge a crime. That motion was denied before the commencement of trial in January 1976.

Defendant now argues to us that the substitution of the April 2 indictment for that of January 8 was error because (1) the order reinstating the expunged records deprived defendant of the benefits accorded under the then 'expungement' statute, 16 M.R.S.A. § 600, and (2) the Superior Court had no power to try the April 2, 1975 indictment since (a) the expungement removed the foundation of the Superior Court's jurisdiction-the juvenile petition-and (b) the grand jury lacked authority to return a second indictment without a second, separate finding by the juvenile court that defendant should be treated as an adult pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2611, subd. 3.

A careful examination of 15 M.R.S.A. § 2661, subd. 1, the statute authorizing review of finding of the juvenile court, persuades us to reject each of defnedant's above-stated contentions.

II-A.

Section 2661, subd. 1 authorizes de novo review in the Superior Court...