State v. Knowles
| Decision Date | 12 February 1904 |
| Citation | 98 Me. 429,57 A. 588 |
| Parties | STATE v. KNOWLES. SAME v. BARTLETT. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
(Official.)
Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Frauklin County.
La Forest Knowies and Fred D. Bartlett were convicted of burglary, and except. Exceptions overruled.
Indictments for burglary in the nighttime.
The respondents were each indicted for breaking and entering the dwelling house of one John Vehue in the nighttime, a person being then and there lawfully therein, with intent, etc., and then and there in said dwelling house 60 pounds of pork, of the value of $6, etc., did take, steal, and carry away, etc., on the 18th day of April, 1903. The two indictments were the same, except the names of the parties. Both parties were tried together by agreement.
Fred D. Bartlett, one of the respondents, who was a witness, was asked by the county attorney if he had ever been convicted of crime before, which was objected to, but the court overruled the objection and directed him to answer.
Said Bartlett, also against objection of the respondents, was required by the county attorney to give his version of the talk be had with the officer who arrested him, after he was indicted, in regard to his pleading on his trial.
Byron M. Small, clerk of courts, against objection, was allowed to introduce his docket entries and also the complaints in two criminal prosecutions (one against each of the respondents) which had been commenced before the municipal court and brought into the supreme judicial court by appeal at the May term, 1903; said minutes showing that said cases were appealed and brought into this court wherein the respondent in each case retracted his plea and pleaded guilty; thereupon each case was continued for sentence, and each defendant recognized without sureties. No extended record of these cases had been made. To the point first and last above named the presiding justice instructed the jury that such evidence could only affect the credibility of the parties convicted.
To these instructions and directions the defendants took exceptions.
H. S. Wing, Co. Atty., for the State.
H. L. Whitcomb, for defendants.
Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and WHITEHOUSE, STROUT, POWERS, PEABODY, and SPEAR, JJ.
The respondents were severally indicted for burglary and tried together by agreement The exceptions present two questions, which are insisted upon in argument.
1. Against objection the docket entries and also complaints in two criminal prosecutions, one against each of the respondents, which had been commenced before the municipal court, and brought into the supreme judicial court by appeal, were introduced by the state to affect the credibility of the respondents. The docket entries show that the cases were appealed and brought into this court, where the respondent in each case retracted his plea, and pleaded guilty, and thereupon each case was continued for sentence, and each defendant recognized without sureties. No extended record of the cases had been made.
It is settled that the sentence is no part of the conviction. It matters not whether the guilt of the accused has been established by plea or by verdict of guilty. When no issue either of law or fact remains to be determined, and there is nothing to be done except to pass sentence, the respondent has been convicted; and the record of that conviction, or the docket entries where no extended record has been made, are admissible against him to prove such conviction. State v. Elden, 41 Me. 165; State v. Neagle, 65 Me. 408; State v. Hines, 68 Me. 202.
2. The respondent Bartlett was a witness in his own behalf, and upon cross-examination was asked by the county attorney if he had ever been convicted of crime. Objection was made, but the presiding justice overruled the objection, and directed the respondent to answer, and in his charge instructed the jury that the evidence thus elicited could only affect the credibility of the party convicted.
Whether, to impeach his credibility, the conviction of a witness may be proved by questioning him on cross-examination, has been variously decided by different judicial tribunals. Formerly, when conviction of an infamous crime rendered a witness incompetent it was universally held that for that purpose the conviction could be proved by the record alone. In many of those jurisdictions, however, where the conviction of crime no longer affects the competency, but simply goes to the credibility, of the witness, there has been a tendency, sometimes by legislative enactment and sometimes by judicial decision, to broaden the sources of evidence, and permit the conviction to be shown by cross-examination of the witness himself. In a technical sense the record may be the best evidence, and the rule of primariness may require its production. This general rule, however, is of no great value, unless in its application to the subject under consideration it is necessary for the interests of justice to avoid error, exclude falsehood, and promote the truth. It can hardly be claimed that a record of conviction is any more convincing to the mind, or less liable to error, than is the witness' own admission of the fact under oath. He may well be presumed to know what the truth is. There is very little possibility of his being mistaken as to the fact of the conviction, and none as to the identity of the party convicted. He has every inducement of self-interest to protect his good name and reputation, and it is inconceivable that he will falsely accuse himself. In many cases also the prompt and proper administration of justice requires the acceptance of a broader and more liberal rule of evidence. The opposing party frequently has no knowledge that the witness is to testify until he takes the stand. It may then be too late to obtain a record of his conviction from other courts or counties, or even from distant states, without delaying the trial. Even if possible to obtain it, its production may be accompanied by great expense. Why should this burden be imposed upon a party seeking to impeach the credibility of the witness, if the witness himself is willing to admit the fact sought to be proved? If he does not admit it, it must then be proved by the record, and the record is conclusive. If he does admit it, it would seem only reasonable to explore the source of evidence which is ready at hand, rather than to seek for that which is far away,...
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...does not demand the production of the record when the object, as here, is solely for the purpose of discrediting." In State v. Knowles, 98 Me. 429, 432, 57 A. 588, 589, 590, the court squarely discusses the question of whether to impeach a witness' credibility his conviction may be proved b......
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