State v. Knowles
| Decision Date | 11 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | A17-0004,A17-0708 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jerrmaine Winston Knowles, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
Ramsey County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his conviction of identity theft involving eight or more victims, his sentence, and his restitution order. He also raises other pro se arguments. We affirm.
After the discovery of documents in appellant Jerrmaine Knowles's car and shared bedroom at a halfway house that contained the identities, birthdates, social security numbers, and driver's licenses of 12 people, respondent State of Minnesota charged Knowles with one count of identity theft involving eight or more victims in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subds. 2, 3(5) (2012). Knowles signed a plea petition, acknowledging that he was pleading guilty to identity theft involving eight or more victims and that the maximum penalty the court could impose was 20 years in prison. He then entered a straight Alford plea to the district court on one count of identity theft. The prosecution offered nothing to Knowles in exchange for his plea. The district court accepted Knowles's Alford plea, scheduled sentencing, and conditionally released Knowles "to Project Remand to verify treatment, inpatient treatment program."
The record before us is unclear as to when Knowles was released from custody, but on September 8, 2014, Knowles filed a motion for a downward dispositional sentencing departure or, in the alternative, permission to withdraw his plea. The district court did not consider Knowles's motion because he failed to appear for his sentencing hearing on September 17.
On July 12, 2016, after his apprehension, Knowles filed a motion to withdraw his Alford plea. The district court heard the motion on August 9 and denied it. At his sentencing hearing on October 5, Knowles moved to proceed pro se and again moved to withdraw his plea. The court granted his motion to proceed pro se but denied his plea-withdrawal motion. The court then sentenced Knowles to a middle-of-the-box presumptive guidelines term of 108 months' imprisonment, based on a criminal-history score of seven. At a contested restitution hearing, the court ordered Knowles to pay restitution of $1,000 per victim, totaling $11,000.
This consolidated appeal from Knowles's conviction and restitution order follows.
Validity of Alford plea
At the plea hearing, the prosecution summarized the evidence that it would offer at trial, including evidence of Knowles's prior record of using people's identities to purchase phones. The prosecution discussed its intention to offer testimony from Stanley Luckett that he and Knowles would use the information, which they called "profiles," to open new cellphone accounts in other people's names and then sell the phones to a different store for money. The prosecution also planned to introduce conversations of phone calls made by Knowles from jail in which he discussed needing to "get[ ] rid of" the "profiles" found in his car as soon as possible.
Knowles acknowledged the prosecution's summary of evidence and agreed that a substantial likelihood existed that a jury would conclude that he committed theft by swindle and was participating in identity theft, and he agreed that a jury "probably" would find himguilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court found that the evidence summarized by the state was sufficient to support Knowles's Alford plea, and that Knowles entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
In his July 2016 motion to withdraw his plea, Knowles argued that his plea was not supported by a sufficient factual basis, particularly regarding the element of intent. The district court found that Knowles's plea was supported by an adequate factual basis, including the element of intent, and was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and denied the motion. Knowles now asks this court to "invalidate" his plea.
"A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it." State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). Id. (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. "Second, a court may allow withdrawal any time before sentencing if it is fair and just to do so." Id. (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. "A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid." Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Knowles appears to argue that he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to avoid a manifest injustice. We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id. at 94.
The supreme court has "held that there are three prerequisites to a valid guilty plea: it must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent (i.e. knowingly and understandingly made)." Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
"In the context of an Alford plea, an adequate factual basis must be established to ensure the plea is voluntary and represents an intelligent choice of the alternative coursesof action available." Id. at 37-38 (quotations omitted). "[A] defendant who enters an Alford plea must, despite maintaining his innocence, agree that the evidence the State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict." Id. at 38 (citing State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007)). Citing Theis, the supreme court has "outlined the factual basis necessary for a proper Alford plea." Id. at 38. "[T]he better practice is for the factual basis to be based on evidence discussed with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing." Id. (quoting Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649). If a plea is entered without an adequate factual basis, the district court must permit the plea to be withdrawn. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 650.
A person commits identity theft under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 2, when he or she "transfers, possesses, or uses an identity that is not the person's own, with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any unlawful activity." The statute defines "identity" as "any name, number, or data transmission that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual or entity," including: "a name, Social Security number, date of birth, official government-issued driver's license or identification number, government passport number, or employer or taxpayer identification number." Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 1(d)(1) (2012). "Direct victim" is defined in the identity-theft statute by reference to the restitution statute, in which "victim" is defined as a natural person who incurs loss or harm as a result of a crime, including good faith efforts to prevent a crime. Id., subd. 1(b) (2012) (referencing Minn. Stat. § 611A.01(b) (2012)).
"The accuracy requirement exists to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of if he were to go to trial." Id. (quotation omitted). An Alford plea is acceptable when "the State demonstrate[s] a strong factual basis for the plea and the defendant clearly expresse[s] his desire to enter the plea based on his belief that the state's evidence would be sufficient to convict him." Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 647 (quotation omitted).
Knowles argues that his plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis because the state failed to discuss any evidence that would prove that any of the 12 purported identity-theft victims suffered a loss or harm. Knowles's argument is unavailing. Although "[t]he [identity-theft] statute does not define 'harm,'" this court has concluded that the statute does not require a showing of economic loss to establish loss or harm. State v. Moua, 874 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Minn. App. 2016) (), review denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2016). "[R]eal harm occurs even in the absence of economic loss, and it follows that the legislature intended direct victims to include those who incur such non-economic harm." Id.
Here, the evidence discussed at Knowles's plea hearing clearly showed that Knowles possessed documents containing the identities, birthdates, social security numbers, and driver's licenses of 12 people, and that Knowles did not have permission to possess the documents. The documents in Knowles's possession fall squarely within the definition of "identity" under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 1(d), and the 12 people clearlyexceed the requirement of 8 or more victims under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 2. Under Moua, real harm occurred. 874 N.W.2d at 817.
To succeed on an identity-theft charge under section 609.527, subdivision 2, the state must prove that Knowles possessed identities with the intent to commit, aid, or abet any unlawful activity, which includes theft by swindle under Minn. Stat. § 609.527, subd. 1(g) (2012). Knowles argues that the facts discussed by the state at his plea hearing were not adequate to establish his intent to commit an unlawful activity while possessing other people's personal information and insufficient to establish the elements of theft by swindle. We disagree.
"Intent is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person's words or actions in light of all the...
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