State v. Knox

Decision Date23 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 45854,45854
Citation250 N.W.2d 147,311 Minn. 314
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Gregory George Marshall KNOX, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Defendant, a convicted felon serving his sentence at the state prison in Stillwater, was committed as mentally ill and dangerous to the Minnesota Security Hospital at St. Peter by the Washington County Probate Court. Before expiration of his sentence for the felony, defendant departed from the security hospital without authority and did not return. It is held that this conduct constituted an escape 'while held in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime' in violation of Minn.St. 609.485, notwithstanding the fact that the Minnesota Corrections Authority had accorded to defendant a 'medical parole.'

2. The evidence introduced at trial was adequate to support a finding of guilty of the crime of escape.

3. The absence of legal counsel at pretrial proceedings involving a defendant accused of an 'escape' in violation of Minn.St. 609.485 is held not so prejudicial as to justify the vacation of a judgment of conviction.

4. Held that under circumstances of this case defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Mollie G. Raskind, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard G. Mark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary Hansen, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, William M. Gustafson, County Atty., St. Peter, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc.

SHERAN, Chief Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction entered against him on November 13, 1974, in the Nicollet County District Court, adjudging him guilty of violation of Minn.St. 609.485 (escape).

We affirm.

The facts of this case may be simply stated. In 1967, defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 0--10 years, and incarcerated at the state prison. On July 27, 1971, defendant was committed as mentally ill and dangerous to the Minnesota Security Hospital (MSH) at St. Peter, by the Washington County Probate Court.

Upon defendant's arrival at MSH, he was diagnosed as psychotic and delusional. A course of treatment was determined, which included the administration of antipsychotic drugs. This treatment continued through February 1973, when the antipsychotic drugs ceased to be administered. During this period, his delusions became less frequent and finally disappeared.

Defendant was granted a 'medical parole' to MSH on January 15, 1973, by the Minnesota Corrections Authority. Prior to that time, his confinement at MSH was based solely upon the order of civil commitment.

On June 11, 1973, it was discovered that defendant and another patient, Merle Campbell, had escaped. Egress from the hospital had apparently been gained by cutting through one of the bars on the window in defendant's room, crossing a courtyard, cutting through a wire gate, and climbing over two more fences. No one authorized defendant to leave MSH premises. He was taken into custody on October 13, 1973, in Orlando, Florida on charges of vagrancy and he was returned to MSH on October 30, 1973.

In May 1974, defendant was recommended for discharge from his civil commitment; the discharge became effective on May 30, 1974.

On May 14, 1974, the criminal complaint charging defendant with escape was executed by the medical director of MSH, Dr. Charles Sheppard. It was issued the same day. Defendant's case came on for trial on October 29, 1974. He waived his right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court. The court found defendant guilty, and he appealed.

Several issues are raised by defendant on appeal. They are:

1. Does Minn.St. 609.485 apply to the facts of this case, and, if so, is such an application constitutional?

2. Was sufficient competent evidence introduced at trial to support the trial court's findings?

3. Was defendant denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings against him?

4. Was defendant denied his right to a speedy trial?

1. Applicability and Validity of Minn.St. 609.485.

Defendant was convicted of violating Minn.St. 609.485, subd. 2(1). That statutory section provides, in pertinent part:

'Subdivision 1. 'Escape' includes departure without lawful authority and failure to return to custody following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period.

'Subd. 2. Whoever does any of the following may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4:

'(1) Escapes while held in lawful custody on a charge or conviction of a crime;

'Subd. 3. This section does not apply to a person who is free on bail or who is on parole or probation, or subject to a stayed sentence or stayed execution of sentence, unless he has been taken into actual custody upon revocation of the parole, probation, or stay of the sentence or execution of sentence.'

On appeal, defendant asserts that (a) his conduct does not fall within the proscription of the statute in fact; or (b) the parole exception of Minn.St. 609.485, subd. 3, applies; or, finally, in the alternative, (c) if the statute is applicable, such an application constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law.

(a) Applicability in Fact.

Central to defendant's claim that his conduct was not proscribed by Minn.St. 609.485 is the contention that he was held under civil commitment and not under 'a charge or conviction of a crime.' Defendant points out that the Advisory Committee Comment to the statute states, 'The proposed act does not include escapes from custody of a person held in a non-criminal proceeding, such as escapes from mental hospitals.' 40 M.S.A. p. 430 (1964). From this statement, it is argued, the intent of the legislature can be discerned to specifically exclude escapes such as the instant one from the operation of the statute. The defect in this reasoning is that the Comment seems to contemplate conduct of persons held Only in noncriminal proceedings, and may be read much more narrowly than defendant urges. Secondly, while the Advisory Committee Comment can be viewed as indicative of legislative intent, such intent must also be discerned from the factual context in which the statute is to be applied, the object of the statute, and the context of other pertinent statutory provisions. Minn.St. 645.16 Minn.St. 253.21 provides the authority under which defendant was transferred to MSH. That section provides:

'When any person confined in the state prison or the state reformatory is alleged to be insane, the warden or other person in charge shall forthwith notify the commissioner of public welfare, who shall cause the prisoner to be examined by the probate court of the county where he is confined, as in the case of other insane persons. In case he is found to be insane, he shall be transferred by the order of the court to the Minnesota Security Hospital or to a state hospital for the insane in the discretion of the court, there to be kept and maintained as in the case of other insane persons. If, in the judgment of the superintendent, his sanity is restored before the period of his commitment to the penal institution has expired, he shall be removed by the commissioner, upon the certificate of the superintendent, to the institution whence he came, and there complete the period of his sentence.'

Other pertinent sections of c. 253 provide:

253.23 'When any criminal shall be transferred to the Minnesota Security Hospital the original warrant of his commitment to the penal institution shall be sent with him and returned to the penal institution upon his return or discharge. A certified copy thereof shall be preserved at the penal institution.'

253.24 'A prisoner who is removed or returned under sections 253.20 to 253.27 shall be held in the place to which he is so removed or returned in accordance with the terms of his original sentence unless sooner discharged and the period for which he is removed shall be counted as a part of the term of the confinement.'

253.13 'When a state prison or reformatory convict who has been committed to a state hospital escapes therefrom or dies therein, the superintendent shall immediately notify the chief executive officer of such prison or reformatory of such fact.'

Read together, these provisions appear to rebut defendant's contention, and seem to indicate a legislative intent to treat prisoners who are transferred to MSH as being under the continuing custody of the state prison. The concept that a person who has been both civilly committed and sentenced to a term of imprisonment might be in the custody of both the Department of Public Welfare and the commissioner of corrections has been expressly embraced by this court in the recent case of Lausche v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974), cert. den., 420 U.S. 993, 95 S.Ct. 1430, 43 L.Ed.2d 674 (1975). While that case dealt with a civil commitment which occurred prior to the criminal conviction and incarceration, this fact would not seem to distinguish the conclusion that--

'* * * the appellant is under commitment to both the commissioner of public welfare and the commissioner of corrections. The commissioner of public welfare has the express statutory authority to transfer patients to a 'suitable' institution without disturbing a commitment. Minn.St. 246.14. * * * Since both proceedings are in accordance with due process of law, one commitment does not disturb the other.' 302 Minn. 65, 71, 225 N.W.2d 365, 369.

Minn.St. 253.21 would seem to provide authority to the commissioner of corrections analogous to that which Minn.St. 246.14 provides the commissioner of public welfare to 'transfer' persons under his custody. No reason suggests itself why a transfer by the commissioner of corrections of a prisoner should 'disturb' the incarceration and result in anything but concurrent...

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  • State v. Vail
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    ...v. Crosby, 277 Minn. 22, 24, 151 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1967). Such findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. State v. Knox, Minn., 250 N.W.2d 147, 154 (1976). These findings of fact are therefore The trial court went on to consider "inferences identifying the substance from nonsci......
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    ...factor under these circumstances is whether or not the delay caused actual prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Knox, 311 Minn. 314, 328, 250 N.W.2d 147, 157 (1976). For example, in a case where the defense was insanity and the delay made it impossible to obtain the opinions of experts ......
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