State v. Knox
| Decision Date | 12 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | WD 80775 |
| Citation | 553 S.W.3d 386 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Sean David KNOX, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Evan J. Buchheim, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
David A. Kelly, Lee's Summit, MO, for appellant.
Before Division Three: Victor C. Howard, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge
Sean Knox ("Knox") pled guilty to one count of Rape in the First Degree in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Missouri. Following his guilty plea, but before sentencing, Knox obtained new counsel and filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.07(d). The court denied Knox's motion and sentenced him to 17 years' imprisonment. Final judgment was entered and this appeal followed.
Knox was charged with raping a woman he met at a party ("Victim").1 According to the Victim's statements, she had been drinking heavily throughout the evening. Victim laid down on a couch and later began throwing up in a trash can beside the couch. Victim awoke and remembered Knox asking if she wanted to go with him to the bedroom and she responded no. Victim then passed out on the couch and awoke to Knox having sex with her. She testified that she attempted to stop Knox, tried to push him off of her and told him she did not want to have sex but he did not stop. After he finished he kissed her forehead and said thank you and then stated that he was sorry. When Knox left the room, the Victim left the residence and reported the rape.
On December 19, 2016, Knox appeared before the circuit court and entered an open guilty plea, meaning that there was no plea agreement with the state and the sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court. The court questioned Knox regarding his mental capacity to plead, his satisfaction with his attorneys and the representation they had provided. The court also advised Knox of the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea, which he acknowledged.
The court questioned Knox under oath regarding the factual basis for his plea. When the court asked how the Victim lacked capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, the prosecutor answered that the victim was drunk and passed out. Defense counsel clarified to the court that Knox did not agree that she was "passed out" but he did agree that she was too intoxicated to consent. In further questioning directed at Knox, he acknowledged that she was "very drunk" but then equivocated as to whether he was aware at the time of the offense that she was too intoxicated to consent. After his equivocation the plea court stated, "Well, I need more than that." Knox then had a further consultation with his counsel off the record.
Knox then, back on the record, had the following exchange with the court:
The Court then gave Knox an opportunity to again confer with counsel. The Court instructed Knox Following consultation with counsel, Knox informed the court on the record that he wanted to plead guilty. The plea court informed Knox that he was not required to plead guilty and that it was his option whether to enter a plea or not and Knox acknowledged he understood that fact. The court went on to explain that he could not accept a plea of guilty unless the party admitted to committing the offense.
The following exchange then occurred:
The court then continued on to confirm that no one had threatened Knox or any family member to coerce him to enter his plea. The court also made clear that Knox understood the range of punishment to be five to 30 years or life imprisonment and that, as an open plea, the court could impose any sentence in that range. The court further made clear that he could be sentenced up to life in prison and that Knox would not be able to withdraw his plea, even if the court gave him the maximum sentence. Ultimately, the court accepted Knox's plea.
Before Knox was sentenced, Knox obtained new counsel and filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea pursuant to Rule 29.07(d)2 ("Motion"). Knox argued that his plea was not knowing, voluntary or intelligent. Specifically, Knox alleged that he was not advised by his attorneys that he would be ineligible for probation or that he must complete at least 85% of any sentence before being eligible for parole. Nor was he told that he must complete sex offender treatment prior to being eligible for parole, would be subject to lifetime GPS monitoring and supervision, would have to register as a sex offender, and could be subject to civil commitment. Further, Knox alleged that his counsel failed to explain to him all the elements of the crime and failed to provide him the Victim's deposition in which he alleges she never stated that the sexual contact was not consensual and also alleges she testified in the deposition to her belief that she was not incapacitated at the time of the rape.3 Knox stated that he only pled guilty out of fear because he felt threatened by his attorney who told him that if he did not plead guilty and went to trial the court would give him a worse sentence, possible life imprisonment.
The circuit court held a hearing on the Motion on March 6, 2017. Knox was the only witness and testified consistently with the allegations raised in the Motion on most issues. However, contrary to his Motion, Knox testified at the hearing that his attorneys did make him aware that he would have to serve at least 85% of any sentence imposed by the court before being eligible for parole. A point the circuit court recognized. Knox did not call his prior counsel as a witness at the hearing. Following the hearing, the court found the plea to be voluntary, intelligent and knowing, and denied the Motion to set aside the plea.
A sentencing hearing was held. The court sentenced Knox to 17 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Before we begin, we must address the State's initial argument that this Court lacks authority to consider this appeal. The State cites to several cases that have found that the denial of a Rule 29.07(d) motion is not a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. Stevens v. State , 208 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. banc 2006). The State later, however, admits that this is not an appeal from a denial of a Rule 29.07(d) motion. Knox is appealing the final judgment and sentence, raising the denial of his 29.07(d) motion as an allegation of error. Thus, the State's argument is without merit.
Next, the State argues that there is case law finding that an appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of "a Rule 29.07(d) motion that is filed and ruled on after sentencing when that motion seeks relief for claims that may be raised in a Rule 24.035 motion for post conviction relief." See Brown v. State , 66 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. banc 2002) (overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele , 301 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Mo. banc 2010) ). Since the Rule 29.07(d) motion in the case at bar was filed before sentencing, reciting the holdings of these cases also has no merit. This case is procedurally a direct appeal from the final judgment which incorporates allegations of error in the court's ruling on the 29.07(d) motion. It is not, as was the case in Brown , a post-conviction motion seeking to avoid the time limitations of Rule 24.035. Brown , 66 S.W.3d at 724-25.4
The State's argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction for this appeal runs contrary to the holding in Wilder v. State , 301 S.W.3d 122 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). In Wilder , the Eastern District of this Court found that, because Wilder could have raised the denial of his 29.07(d) motion on direct appeal, but failed to, he was then barred from raising it in a motion for post-conviction relief. Id. at 126.
It is clear from the case law, including those cases cited by the State, that this Court has authority to hear Knox's appeal. The State confuses the procedural posture of the cases it cites, correlating the holdings of cases in which the 29.07(d) motion was brought after sentencing as procedurally the same as cases, such as the present case, where the 29.07(d) motion was brought before sentencing. The State also supports its position with the holdings of cases not involving a Rule 29.07(d) motion challenge but merely addressing the direct appeal of a case in which the defendant did not seek to set aside his or her plea. See, e.g., State v....
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State v. Doolin
...be false or ill-founded, he should be permitted to withdraw his plea since the law favors a trial on the merits." State v. Knox , 553 S.W.3d 386, 393-94 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citations omitted). However, if the defendant’s plea "was voluntary and was made with an understanding of the charge......
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State v. Dickerson
...that "she would not have had the capacity to consent and to the point where she would be incapable of consent." State v. Knox, 553 S.W.3d 386, 395–96 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). During the plea hearing in that case, the defendant agreed that the victim had been "very drunk" but disagreed with the......
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State v. Hudson
...to withdraw his plea since the law favors a trial on the merits, State v. Rose , 440 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. 1969). State v. Knox, 553 S.W.3d 386, 393-94 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting State v. Nielsen , 547 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Mo. App. 1977) ) (internal footnote omitted).Analysis Preliminarily, w......
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State v. Wolf
...movant pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for which post-conviction relief under Rule 24.035 is not available); State v. Knox , 553 S.W.3d 386, 392 n.4 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (defendant's Rule 29.07(d) motion in which he claimed that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent was filed ......