State v. Koeln
Decision Date | 07 April 1919 |
Docket Number | No. 21315.,21315. |
Citation | 278 Mo. 28,211 S.W. 31 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. AMERICAN MFG. CO. v. KOELN, Revenue Collector. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Benj. J. Klene, Judge.
Mandamus by the State of Missouri on the relation of the American Manufacturing Company, against Edmond Koeln, Collector of Revenue for the City of St. Louis. A peremptory writ was awarded, and the Collector appeals. Reversed and remanded.
The American Manufacturing Company, a corporation, seeks by mandamus to compel the collector of the revenue of the city of St. Louis to allow certain credits upon said corporation's income tax bill. The suit was originally instituted in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis.
Upon a trial in the circuit court a peremptory writ of mandamus was awarded, commanding said collector to allow the credits claimed by the corporation in its petition. The collector duly appealed to this court, and will hereinafter be referred to as appellant. The corporation will hereinafter be referred to as respondent. The facts necessary to an understanding of the issues are undisputed and may be summarized as follows:
Respondent is a foreign business corporation duly licensed to do business in this state, and is located in the city of St. Louis. Appellant is the collector of the revenue of the city of St. Louis.
During the year of 1918 the respondent corporation made due return of its taxable income for taxation by the state, to the assessor of said city, pursuant to the terms of the Income Tax Act, Laws 1917, p. 524 et seq. Thereupon the assessor duly made an assessment of income taxes against said corporation, for which an income tax bill was later issued and placed in the hands of appellant as collector of said city. The income tax bill by its terms was due and payable on or before December 31, 1918, without penalty.
During the year 1918 the respondent paid taxes which became due and payable in said year as follows, to wit:
Manufacturer's tax on its material, machinery, etc., under the provisions of article 16 and article 15 of chapter 117, R. S. 1000, paid August 1, 1918:
State property tax ......................... $ 818 25 State interest tax ......................... 54 55 State capitol building fund tax ............ 109 10 School fund tax ............................ 3,273 00
Also taxes which became due and payable in said year on real and personal property other than above, paid December 3, 1918:
General state revenue interest and capitol fund tax .............................. $ 511 23 Tax for public school purposes........... 1,789 32
After the payment of the above taxes, and on December 3, 1918, the respondent in an attempt to comply with section 32 of the Income Tax Act (see Laws 1917, p. 538), exhibited the paid tax receipts for all the above taxes to the assessor of the city of St. Louis, to the comptroller of the city of St. Louis, and to appellant as collector of said city, and requested each of them, that respondent be allowed credit on its said income tax bill to the full amount of said tax receipts. Each of the three officials refused to allow said credits, and this proceeding was instituted against the collector.
The determination of the questions presented by this appeal involves the construction of the Income Tax Act, and more especially section 32 thereof, which is as follows:
More specifically stated, there are but two questions presented, which questions, stripped of unnecessary verbiage, are as follows:
(1) Should the word "assessor" in said section be construed to read "collector"?
(2) Does the phrase, "who shall have paid a tax assessed upon his real or personal property to the state," as used in said section, include the taxes which respondent paid for school purposes?
These will be discussed in their order.
Charles H. Danes and H. A. Hamilton, both of St. Louis, for appellant.
Barclay & Wallace, of St. Louis, for respondent.
Frank W. McAllister, Atty. Gen., amicus curiæ.
WILLIAMS, J. (after stating the facts as above).
From the foregoing it appears that after March 1st of each year the assessor has nothing further to do with the income tax theretofore assessed by him, except to forthwith certify such assessment to the proper authorities.
Under the general laws (chapter 117, S. 1909) pertaining to the assessment and collection of taxes due and payable in any given year on real and personal property, the tax books are not required to be delivered into the hands of the collector until long after March 1st of each year, the date upon which the assessor is required to forthwith certify his income tax assessment lists to the proper officials.
It is therefore evident that a person or corporation against whom an income tax is assessed in any given year could not possibly procure a tax receipt for his real and personal taxes due and payable in that year in time to exhibit the same to the assessor before the assessor's duties in connection with such assessed income tax had entirely terminated.
To whom did the General Assembly intend such tax receipts should be exhibited? To the collector, who, from the time such tax receipts could first possibly come into existence, was the only official authorized by law to collect such income taxes, or to the assessor, who at such time had nothing further whatever to do with the assessment of the collection of said income taxes?
The act says that the receipts shall be exhibited to the full amount, not for the purpose of effecting the assessment of the income tax, but "in the payment of income taxes." The payment of the income tax is required to be made to the collector, and not to the assessor.
To hold that the General Assembly intended that the tax receipts should be exhibited to the assessor would be to hold that it "intended to enact an absurd law incapable of being intelligently enforced." The presumption is that the General Assembly did not Intend to enact an absurd law. Bingham v. Birmingham, 103 Mo. 345, loc. cit. 352, 15 S. W. 533.
When the entire act is read and considered in the light of the entire scheme of revenue assessment and collection, we are satisfied that it was the intention of the General Assembly that such receipts should be exhibited to the collector whose duty it is to collect the income tax, and that the word "assessor," in section 32 of the act, is the result of a clerical error, and should be construed to read "collector," in harmony with the true legislative intent. The correct rule here applicable is stated in 36 Cyc. 1126, as follows:
"Mere verbal inaccuracies or clerical errors in statutes in the use of words or numbers, or in grammar, spelling, or punctuation, will be corrected by the court whenever necessary to carry out the intention of the Legislature as gathered from the entire act."
To the same effect are the following authorities: Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, par. 319, and numerous cases therein cited; Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) vol. 2, par. 410, and cases therein cited; Frazier et al. v. Gibson, 7 Mo. 271 ( ); Ellis v. Whitlock, 10 Mo. 781 ( ).
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