State v. Koslik

Decision Date06 January 2004
Docket Number(AC 23570).
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD KOSLIK

Foti, Dranginis and West, Js. Joaquina Borges King, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Eliot D. Prescott, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

FOTI, J.

The defendant, Richard Koslik, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of representing himself falsely as or impersonating a registered home improvement contractor in violation of General Statutes § 20-427 (b) (3) and offering to make home improvements without having a certificate of registration in violation of General Statutes § 20-427 (b) (5). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court improperly omitted necessary instructions from its charge to the jury, thereby depriving him of his due process rights, and (3) the court failed to act, sua sponte, to strike certain testimony and to deliver a limiting instruction to the jury with regard to certain evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts underlying the conviction, as the jury reasonably could have found them, are as follows. The defendant was a registered home improvement contractor prior to August 26, 1998. On August 26, 1998, the department of consumer protection (department) suspended the defendant's registration. In 1998, Christine Burns contacted the defendant to discuss his remodeling the kitchen and the bathroom in her single-family home. Burns did not hire the defendant to undertake the job until February, 2001. In the period leading to his being hired for the job, the defendant spoke with Burns and, less frequently, with her husband, Eric Burns, about the project and its cost. During those conversations, the defendant falsely represented himself as or impersonated a registered home improvement contractor and offered to make home improvements to the Burns' home without having a current certificate of registration enabling him lawfully to do so.

Upon signing a written agreement with the defendant on February 8, 2001, Christine Burns paid the defendant an initial deposit of $8500. On or about March 26, 2001, the defendant, along with two other individuals, performed demolition work in the Burns' kitchen. The defendant and others thereafter performed more work at the home. By April 1, 2001, Christine Burns had paid the defendant in excess of $14,000. The defendant worked intermittently on the project during April and May, 2001, and Christine Burns repeatedly expressed to the defendant her displeasure with the pace of his performance. During May, 2001, the defendant stopped working on the project altogether.

Christine Burns spoke with the defendant via telephone. The defendant informed her that he needed more money and that she had lost her "time slot" in which he could complete her project. The defendant installed the cabinets in the kitchen, but left other aspects of the project, such as the installation of flooring and lighting in the kitchen, unfinished. The defendant also failed to perform any renovation in the bathroom that he had agreed to perform. Christine Burns obtained estimates from other contractors regarding the cost of completing the renovation. Those estimates ranged from between $13,000 and $15,000.

Frustrated by her failed attempts to get the defendant to return to her home to complete the remodeling project, Christine Burns filed a complaint with the department, and a department investigator looked into her complaint. The defendant's arrest followed. After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of one year imprisonment, suspended after 180 days, with three years of probation.1 This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence did not support his conviction of either charge.2 We disagree. "In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence. . . . The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . . In conducting this review, the probative force of the evidence is not diminished where the evidence, in whole or in part, is circumstantial rather than direct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holmes, 75 Conn. App. 721, 739-40, 817 A.2d 689, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 903, 823 A.2d 1222 (2003).

We shall first set forth some of the evidence that is relevant to the defendant's conviction of the charges. We will then define the elements that are integral to each of the crimes of which the defendant stands convicted and determine if the jury reasonably could have found that the state met its burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

A The Evidence

Christine Burns testified that she contacted the defendant in 1998 after she saw signs with his advertisement on them in her neighborhood. She told the defendant that she wanted to "redo" the kitchen and the bathroom in her single-family home. She testified that after she called the defendant and inquired about the remodeling work that she wanted him to perform, she and the defendant kept in contact. Specifically, she testified that in 2000 or in early 2001, the defendant visited her at her home to discuss the remodeling that she wanted him to do. She testified that the defendant showed her "a book of all the work that he had [done and] of all the work that he could do, a display of what he did showing the work that he was doing." She testified that there was an envelope in the back of this book in which "was a registration of some kind." She further testified as to the conversation that she had with the defendant after she viewed that document: "I said, `Are you legitimate? Are you sure?' [The defendant] says, `Are you crazy? Do you think I want to go to jail?' He goes, `Sure.' He goes, `If you don't believe me, I'll give you some references.'" She testified that the defendant "reassured" her and invited her to go to a home show to see examples of his handiwork on display.

The following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and Christine Burns:

"Q. Okay. Let me take a step back. So, when you referenced the card you were discussing in his book —

"A. In his book. In his display book.

"Q. Right.

"A. He had this one card with his license or registration in the book, in the back of the book.

"Q. Okay. So, did he direct you to that registration indicating that he was a registered home improvement contractor?

"A. Yes, because I asked him, `Are you legitimate?' because I needed to know because you just can't take anybody.

"Q. Right. And do you recall the registration number on the card that was in the back of the book that he showed you? "A. I don't remember, but he told me to call. He even said that I could check. He'd give me names of references and people that he did work for."

Christine Burns also testified that on February 8, 2001, she and the defendant entered into a written contract entitled a "retail sales contract." The contract, marked as a full exhibit at trial, listed various materials as well as detailed specifications for many of those materials, which Christine Burns agreed to purchase from the defendant. Those materials included custom cabinets, tile, skylights, flooring materials, a vanity, a toilet, a bathtub, shower walls, faucets and plumbing supplies, vinyl floorings, Sheetrock, a kitchen sink and various lighting fixtures. The contract contained the notation "no installation."

Christine Burns testified about the circumstances under which the defendant drafted the contract: "[W]hat [the defendant] did was, as he was writing, he said to me, `I'm going to — this is the things that we're going to do. Now, let's write it together. I'm going to write down the things that I'm going to do in your home.' So, we sat there together, and he said he was going to do it. This thing on [the contract] where it says no installation, if that was there, he did not present that to me. He must have did that after upon my signing because this — how could he say no installation when he sat here with me and we went over the things that he was going to do because I had to tell him what I wanted done. Who was going to do it?"

The prosecutor asked Christine Burns if the defendant had discussed with her the need to "arrange for installation" of the items listed on the contract. She replied: "No, [the defendant] didn't say that. He said that these are the things that he was going to do himself." Christine Burns also testified that she observed the defendant, along with other individuals that she had neither hired nor paid directly, perform installation work at her home. Specifically, she recalled observing the defendant installing ceiling lights and cabinets in her kitchen.3

Eric Burns testified that he, too, conversed with the defendant before his wife had hired the defendant. Eric Burns unambiguously testified that the defendant represented that he himself was going to do all of the installation at the Burns' home. Eric Burns also testified that he observed the defendant perform initial demolition work, complete "the majority of the installation on the cabinets" and perform the wiring work for some of the light fixtures. Eric Burns...

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    ...the jury ... and examine the charge in view of the factual posture of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Koslik, 80 Conn.App. 746, 762, 837 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 908, 845 A.2d 413 The state presented evidence that the defendant inflicted numerous injuries to......
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