State v. Kouzounas
| Decision Date | 08 January 1941 |
| Citation | 17 A.2d 147 |
| Parties | STATE v. KOUZOUNAS. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, York County.
William Kouzounas was convicted of arson, and he brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.
Argued before STURGIS, C. J, and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, WORSTER, and MURCHIE, JJ.
Joseph E. Harvey, Co. Atty, of Biddeford, for the State.
Willard & Willard, of Sanford, and Ralph M. Ingalls, of Portland, for respondent.
Convicted of arson, the respondent presents exceptions relating to the admissibility of certain rebuttal testimony by the State. He had denied in cross-examination that following his arrest he went to Portland for the purpose of consulting counsel with one Nadeau, who had so testified for the State. It was permitted to rebut this denial by the evidence of the consulted attorney.
The contention is that the cross-examiner elicited a collateral fact binding upon the State without right of contradiction.
"It is true that a witness cannot be cross-examined on collateral matters for the purpose of subsequently contradicting and impeaching his testimony in relation to such collateral matters * * *." State v. Priest, 117 Me. 223, 230, 103 A. 359, 363; Bessey v. Herring, 121 Me. 539, 541, 118 A. 423; Finn v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 101 Me. 279, 281, 64 A. 490; State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267, 287; Davis v. Roby, 64 Me. 427, 430; Brackett v. Weeks, 43 Me. 291, 293; State v. Sargent, 32 Me. 429, 431; Page v. Homans, 14 Me. 478, 483; Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl. 42, 8 Me. 42, 52-55.
The rule applies only to collateral facts. Evidence relevant and material, although drawn out by the cross-examiner, may be contradicted. If a fact educed by cross-examination may be "shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction," it is not collateral. To be collateral it must be "a fact not bearing upon the issue." Finn v. Telephone Company, supra, 101 Me. pages 281 and 282, 64 A. page 491.
Was this testimony collateral? Relation to something that transpires after the alleged commission of the offense does not necessarily make it collateral, as, for instance, in State v. Priest, supra, evidence was held not to be collateral which had to do with a conversation between the respondent and a State's witness following the death of the victim, because it "pertained directly to his conduct" (meaning the respondent's) "in connection with the crime for which he was being tried."
The fact of going to Portland to see the attorney, if true, pertained to the respondent's conduct. Nadeau had testified that the respondent had asked him if he...
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...of a corrupt motive to testify falsely as to render the same inadmissible. We recognized as much, when we stated in State v. Kouzounas, 137 Me. 198, 17 A.2d 147 (1941), an arson "While mere consultation with an attorney is not sufficient to show an improper motive or practice, yet it may ta......
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...cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836, 70 S.Ct. 43, 94 L.Ed. 510 (1949); Hampton v. United States, 318 A.2d 598 (D.C.App. 1974); State v. Kouzounas, 137 Me. 198, 17 A.2d 147 (1941); State v. Long, 280 N.C. 633, 187 S.E.2d 47 (1972); Smith v. Wilkins, 403 P.2d 485 (Okl.1965); 3A Wigmore on Evidence, §§......
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...is made by appellant in his brief that the statements related to a matter then in issue. It has long been established (State v. Kouzounas, 137 Me. 198, 17 A.2d 147 (1941); Bessey v. Herring, 121 Me. 539, 118 A. 423 (1922); State v. Priest, 117 Me. 223, 103 A. 359 (1918); Finn v. New England......