State v. Kraft, 11596

Decision Date05 August 1975
Docket NumberNo. 11596,11596
PartiesThe STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jack KRAFT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Jonathan W. Cottrell of Rayborn, Rayborn & Ronayne, Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant.

Wayne Kidwell, Atty. Gen., James W. Blaine, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McQUADE, Chief Justice.

Defendant-appellant Jack Harold Kraft was charged by information with the commission of the felony of rape, 1 which was alleged to have occurred on July 15, 1973 in Twin Falls County, Idaho. A jury found appellant guilty as charged upon which a judgment of conviction was entered. It is from that judgment that this appeal has been brought. We affirm.

In his first assignment of error appellant argues that the state's evidence failed to establish a prima facie case against him, in that there was insufficient corroboration not only as to his purported involvement in the alleged offense, but as to its very occurrence. He therefore contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury to return a verdict of acquittal.

The prosecutrix testified that the alleged act of rape occurred in the early morning hours of July 15, 1973, at approximately 1:20 a. m. while she was alone in her apartment. She stated that she was asleep on her bed when she felt 'something or someone standing over her' at which point she began to scream. She then related that an object which she thought was a knife at the time, (but which was later identified as a kitchen fork) was placed near her throat by her assailant who threatened to kill her if she did not stop screaming. She then recounted how she continued to scream whereupon her assailant put his hand over her mouth and told her to shut up. After that occurred she testified that she stopped screaming.

The prosecutrix further testified that her assailant '. . . got on top of me and he asked me if I wanted him to make love to me; and I said no.' At this time he still had the kitchen fork in his hand, but then placed the fork out of her reach on the other side of the bed. She then asked her assailant if he would put the fork on the night stand because,

'. . . I realized that I couldn't reach the fork where it was. And I was trying to decide about something I could do, some way I could reach it. So I asked him if he would put the fork on the night stand because I knew if I had a chance to reach it I could reach it better if it was on the night stand. And so he did.'

While the alleged illicit act of intercourse was occurring the prosecutrix started to reach for the fork, but her assailant grabbed her hands preventing her from getting to it. Following the alleged rape, the assailant hurriedly got dressed and left. After the assailant's departure the prosecutrix went to her bedroom window where she hoped to and did catch another glimpse of her assailant. Then after spending some time attempting to compose herself, she phoned the police to report what had happened.

There is sufficient evidence of the circumstances surrounding the alleged rape to clearly corroborate the prosecutrix's account of what transpired in her apartment against her will in the early morning hours of July 15, 1973, so as to sustain the judgment of conviction that was entered. A review of the record indicates that the prosecutrix reported the occurrence of this offense within a few hours after her assailant left her apartment. The investigating officer upon arriving at the scene found her visibly shaken, in tears and very upset. The kitchen fork which the prosecutrix testified to last seeing hanging over the stove 'where it belonged,' before going to bed that night, was found by the investigating officer on a counter in a kitchenette room between the living room and kitchen. The investigating officer after finding out from the prosecutrix what had happened, relayed her description of the assailant and the clothing he was wearing at the time to the detective on call at the police station. This description accurately matched that of a suspect (later identified as appellant) who had been arrested shortly after 3 a. m. in the morning of July 15, 1973, on a suspicion of burglary charge. Further confirmation of her assailant's identity occurred at a lineup held later in the morning of the 15th of July, when he prosecutrix identified appellant (among four other possible suspects) as the perpetrator of the rape.

After the testimony of the prosecutrix, the investigating officer, and the detective on call at the police station were heard, the state also called to the witness stand the doctor who had examined the prosecutrix a few hours after the alleged rape. While he could not say for sure whether she had or did not have sexual relations within the past twelve hours he did state that upon his examination he found:

'There was mild reddening of the vulva. That is the outside area. There was no evidence of any injury to the vaginal vault. There was a very minimum amount of mucoid material, not enough for pooling. . . .'

The state's final witness was an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, qualified as an expert in conducting microscopic examinations and comparisons of hairs and fibers. The agent examined the following items which were sent to him by the Twin Falls Police Department: clothing worn by appellant at the time of the alleged offense; pubic and head hair samplings from appellant; a pubic hair sampling from the prosecutrix; and the bedspread taken from the prosecutrix's apartment upon which the alleged criminal act occurred. Based upon his examination, the agent testified as follows:

'A. Okay. The purpose of my examination, as I mentioned previously was to determine whether or not there was an interchange, whether or not I could detect an interchange between items submitted to me as having come from Mr. Kraft and items submitted to me as having come from Miss Ingle. On the items submitted to me as being the undershorts of Mr. Kraft, that is State's Exhibit G, and in the debris, which is State's Exhibit J which was removed from those undershorts, in that I found a brown, Caucasian pubic hair which micro-scopically matched the hairs submitted to me as having come from Miss Ingle. That is State's Exhibit H. Accordingly, I could conclude that this brown, Caucasian pubic hair which I found could have come from the same source as the hairs from Miss Ingle.'

Later, on redirect examination, the agent further testified.

Q. (By Mr. Galley) Is it my understanding that the hair that came from Exhibit B, which the the pubic hairs of Miss Ingle, were found on Exhibit G, the shorts?

A. Hairs that were microscopically like --

Q. Right. What do you mean by 'microscopically like'?

A. Well, the hairs from Exhibit B, which were the hairs from Miss Ingle, were compared microscopically with hairs from Exhibit G, the undershorts; and these hairs matched microscopically. That is what I mean.

The agent also testified that acrylic fibers from the prosecutrix's bedspread microscopically matched the fibers on appellant's trousers, although he admitted under cross-examination that the fibers found on the trousers could have come from another bedspread which had fibers that microscopically matched the fibers of the prosecutrix's bedspread.

We believe that the evidence when taken and considered together in its entirety furnished a sufficient quantum of corroborative proof to sustain appellant's conviction. It cannot be said that the evidence which was adduced at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's finding of guilt.

'Whether or not the testimony of a prosecutrix is clearly corroborated by other facts and circumstances is, in the first instance, a question for the jury, and unless this court can say, as a matter of law, that such evidence is not clearly corroborative, we cannot reverse the cause upon that ground.' 2

Appellant's next assignment of error consists of two parts: first he contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury of their duty to judge the credibility of witnesses; and second he maintains that error was committed in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that they might find him guilty of any lesser included offenses, in particular the included offenses of simple assault and battery or assault with intent to commit rape. Appellant admits that he made no request for these instructions at trial but argues that the trial court should have so instructed the jury on its own motion. We find no merit in either contention. 3

In his next assignment of error, appellant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. He contends that his court appointed counsel's representation was inadequate in the following particulars: (1) failure to make an opening statement; (2) failure to move for a dismissal of charges...

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29 cases
  • State v. Hall
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 11 Abril 2018
    ...what was in all other respects reasonably competent assistance of counsel, inadequate under the Sixth Amendment." State v. Kraft , 96 Idaho 901, 906, 539 P.2d 254, 259 (1975). We affirm the district court's dismissal of this argument.r. The district court did not err in dismissing Hall's cl......
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    ...of inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901, 905, 539 P.2d 254, 258 (1975). See also United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir.1987) ("[T]he decision whether to make an opening statem......
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    ...P.2d 1005 (1979); State v. Ruth, 98 Idaho 879, 574 P.2d 1357 (1978); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975); State v. Kraft, 96 Idaho 901, 539 P.2d 254 (1975), direct Michigan, which is the only state technically without some defined post-conviction-relief process, provides for us......
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    ...The decision to forego an opening statement is not unreasonable where the defendant has no evidence to adduce. See State v. Kraft , 96 Idaho 901, 905, 539 P.2d 254, 258 (1975). Pomrenke has failed to show that there was evidence available to support an involuntary intoxication defense that ......
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