State v. Kruse
| Citation | 306 SW 3d 603 |
| Decision Date | 20 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 70481.,WD 70481. |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Conrad KRUSE, Jr., Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
STATE of Missouri, Appellant,
v.
Conrad KRUSE, Jr., Respondent.
No. WD 70481.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
January 19, 2010.
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 2, 2010.
Application for Transfer Denied April 20, 2010.
Shaun J. Mackelprang and Jayne T. Woods, Asst. Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.
Laurie S. Ward, Sedalia, MO, for respondent.
Before LISA WHITE HARDWICK, P.J., JAMES M. SMART, JR., and ALOK AHUJA., JJ.
JAMES M. SMART, JR., Judge.
The State of Missouri appeals the grant of a motion to suppress physical evidence in a criminal case against Conrad Kruse. The State argues on appeal that the evidence should not have been suppressed. The judgment is affirmed.
Facts
Conrad Kruse was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance, section 195.202, one count of first-degree trafficking, section 195.222, one count of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia, section 195.233, and one count of possession of a methamphetamine, section 195.233, and one count of possession of a methamphetamine precursor with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, section 195.246. Kruse filed a motion to suppress physical evidence resulting from the search of his home and storage shed. After a hearing, the motion was granted.
The following evidence, with the facts presented in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, was presented at the suppression hearing. On September 22, 2006, Officer Ron Finnell of the Mid-Missouri Drug Task Force, along with Officer Mark Morgan of the Pettis County Sheriff's Department, met with Deputy Ehlers of the Benton County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Ehlers informed the officers, based upon information he had received from a confidential informant, that an individual referred to as Jeremy Beel was involved in the theft of some anhydrous ammonia in Ionia, Missouri, and that Beel was planning to do a methamphetamine cook in Pettis County at a particular location. Officer Morgan had said that Deputy Ehlers's informants previously had provided accurate information. Ehlers provided a description of the van Beel would be driving, along with the license plate number. The van was registered in the name of Beel's father.
Officers Finnell and Morgan, in running a background check on Beel, discovered that he had an outstanding warrant. The warrant had "caution indicators," which meant that Beel was considered violent. The two officers then went to the location suggested in the tip to try to locate Beel's van. Upon arrival, they observed no evidence that Beel or anyone else was present.
The officers drove around, trying to "brainstorm" other locations where Beel might be. The officers believed that Beel would be unloading the anhydrous ammonia quickly, so they were looking in places known to be involved with methamphetamine. Officer Finnell suggested looking at the residence of Conrad Kruse who had previously violated the "nine-gram Sudafed law." Officers Finnell and Morgan had no information connecting Beel with Kruse.
When the officers arrived at Kruse's residence around 12:21 a.m., they observed the van registered to Beel's father. The van had a flat tire. There were several other cars on the driveway also. Kruse's property contained a mobile home that Kruse was using as his residence, a storage shed, and an abandoned trailer. There were "No Trespassing" signs posted near the front door of the residence and on the front door of the shed. The property was bordered by a wooded area on three sides and by Richardson Road on the fourth side. There were no obstructions to block access to the backyard. The storage shed was located at the end of the driveway,
approximately thirty to forty yards from the road. The officers observed a light on in the shed. They had seen the light on at night before. The shed door was not visible from the road. The residence, a mobile home, had a back door, but it is not clear whether the officers knew at that time that the mobile home had a back door.
After verifying the license plate number of the van, the officers met up with two uniformed deputies a short distance away from Kruse's residence. The officers decided not to apply for a search warrant. They formulated a plan whereby two uniformed deputies would approach the front door of the residence to make contact with the residents in an attempt to locate Beel. Officers Finnell and Morgan would go to the back of the residence to cover any rear door and the shed to prevent Beel from running away.
The officers split up. The two uniformed officers proceeded to the front door, and Officers Finnell and Morgan headed toward the back yard according to plan. At this point, none of the officers had requested or received consent to enter the property. As Officers Finnell and Morgan passed between the shed and the residence, and before the uniformed officers had a chance to knock on the front door, the shed door came "flying open," and Kruse "came bolting out the door." Officer Morgan ordered Kruse to the ground. When Kruse had come out of the shed, he left the door wide open. Officer Morgan observed another man and two women inside the shed. He also observed "various plastic jars and glasses with liquids in them, some of them had bi-phase liquids," and there was a hot plate. Officer Finnell moved toward the shed to cover the open door, and he also observed a man and two women inside the shed. The man identified himself as Beel. Officer Finnell ordered everyone out of the shed, and the three individuals complied.
Officer Finnell briefly glanced in the shed to verify that there were no other individuals present. While doing so, he noticed a "very elaborate system basically for manufacturing methamphetamine." After everyone was secured, the officers took pictures from the threshold of the shed to document what they were able to see. They did not move anything in the shed, but they were able to smell chemical odors associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
At some point, Kruse's wife came out the back door of the residence, wanting to know what was going on. She, along with the others, was arrested on a twenty-four hour hold for the manufacture of methamphetamine. One of the uniformed deputies accompanied Kruse's wife back into the residence to obtain her cell phone, and while doing so, he observed a set of triple beam balance scales sitting "in plain sight" in the kitchen. Officer Finnell left to secure a search warrant for the property. After he returned with a warrant, the officers located and seized a variety of evidence associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine from both the shed and the residence.
Kruse filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained from the search on the ground that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Among other arguments, Kruse alleged that "the seizure of Defendant Kruse and items on or about his person were fruit of a previous illegal and unconstitutional search of his property." Officers Morgan and Finnell testified at the suppression hearing. Following the receipt of trial briefs and a suppression hearing, the trial court granted Kruse's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the officers conducted a warrantless search of Kruse's
backyard without the existence of exigent circumstances.
The State appeals.
Standard of Review
"Where a trial court has granted defendant's motion to suppress, `we review the trial court's decision on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard ... and the decision will be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous.'" State v. McDonald, 170 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Mo.App.2005) (citation omitted). "Our review ... is limited to a determination of sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's finding." State v. Kriley, 976 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Mo. App.1998). "We will defer to the trial court's findings of fact, but make an independent evaluation of the conclusions of law the trial court draws from its factual findings." Id. "Where there is no dispute as to the underlying facts, the determination of the reasonableness of a search and seizure, under the Fourth Amendment, is a question of law." Id. "We will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision of the trial court even though we may have weighed the evidence differently." Id. "When there is conflicting evidence, we will defer to the trial court's determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses, accepting or rejecting all, part, or none of the testimony it hears." Id. "If the trial court's ruling is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently." Id.
Analysis
The State argues that the evidence recovered from Kruse's mobile home and shed should not have been suppressed. It claims that the officers did not conduct a warrantless search. The State says that the arrests were based on probable cause stemming from the officers' plain view of a methamphetamine lab on Kruse's property. It also states that the evidence Kruse sought to suppress was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant.
"The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures inherently acknowledges the sanctity of a person's home and extends protection to the curtilage of the home." State v. Berry, 92 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Mo.App.2003). "The curtilage includes all out-buildings used in connection with the residence, such as garages, sheds, barns, yards, and lots connected with or in the close vicinity of the residence." Id. "A search or seizure that occurs on a person's premises without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable." ...
To continue reading
Request your trial