State v. Kuhlman

• Decision Date: 31 October 1899
• Citation: 152 Mo. 100,53 S.W. 416
• Parties: STATE v. KUHLMAN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

53 S.W. 416

152 Mo. 100

STATE v. KUHLMAN.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

October 31, 1899.

CRIMINAL LAW — CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES — ACCOMPLICE — RECEIVER OF STOLEN GOODS.

The thief of goods is not an accomplice of the one who receives them, within the meaning of the law which requires a special instruction to be given covering the credibility of an accomplice as a witness.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; P. R. Flitcraft, Judge.

Fred, alias Chris., Kuhlman was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and appeals. Affirmed.

The defendant was indicted at the October term, 1897, of the circuit count of St. Louis, for knowingly receiving and buying a horse from one William Van Leuven which had previously been stolen from Randolph See, Jr., in Montgomery county. He was duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and on May 24, 1898, was convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for two years. His motions for a new trial and in arrest of the judgment having been overruled, he has appealed to this court.

G. N. Fickeissen, for appellant. Edward C. Crow, Atty. Gen., for the State.

GANTT, P. J.

There was abundant evidence to sustain the charge. Practically the only question raised in this court is the propriety of the circuit court's action in refusing the following instruction asked by defendant: "The jury are instructed that, in considering the testimony of the witness Van Leuven, they should take into consideration the fact that he is the self-confessed thief of the property mentioned, and you should consider this in passing upon the credibility of said witness." The court, of its own motion, had already instructed the jury as follows: "Fourth. The jury are instructed that they are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony. In determining such credibility and weight, they will take into consideration the character of the witness, his manner on the stand, his interest, if any, in the result of the trial, his relation to or feeling towards the defendant or the prosecuting witness, the probability or improbability of his statements, as well as the facts and circumstances given in evidence. In this connection, you are further instructed that, if you believe from the evidence that any witness has knowingly sworn falsely to any material fact, you are at liberty to reject all or any portion of such witness' testimony. Fifth. The law presumes the defendant to be innocent, and this presumption continues until it has been overcome by evidence which establishes his guilt to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proving his guilt rests with the state. If, however, this presumption has been overcome by the evidence, and the guilt of the defendant established to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, your duty is to convict. If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, you should acquit; but a doubt, to authorize an acquittal on that ground, ought to be a substantial doubt touching the defendant's guilt, and not a mere possibility of his innocence."

While it is the settled law of this court that the jury are at liberty to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, it is equally well settled that the trial court should instruct the jury that such evidence ought to be received with great caution by the jury, and they ought to be fully satisfied of its truth before they convict upon such evidence alone. State v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S. W. 1124; State v. Sprague (Mo. Sup.) 50 S. W. 901. Defendant invokes these decisions, and many others to the same effect, to convict the circuit court of error in refusing the instruction asked by him and...