State v. Laaman, No. 6571

• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
• Writing for the Court: LAMPRON
• Citation: 114 N.H. 794,331 A.2d 354
• Docket Number: No. 6571
• Decision Date: 31 December 1974
• Parties: STATE of New Hampshire v. Jaan Karl LAAMAN a.k.a. Karl J. Laaman.

Page 354

331 A.2d 354 114 N.H. 794 STATE of New Hampshire
v.
Jaan Karl LAAMAN a.k.a. Karl J. Laaman. No. 6571. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Dec. 31, 1974.

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[114 N.H. 796] Warren B. Rudman, Atty. Gen., and Robert V. Johnson II, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

William H. Kelley, Manchester, by brief and orally, for defendant.

LAMPRON, Justice.

Defendant was indicted for unlawfully transporting a high explosive on February 16, 1972, contrary to the provisions of

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RSA ch. 158 (Supp.1973), and for willfully causing damage to the Manchester police station and to the central fire station by discharging explosives in violation of RSA 572:3. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of these charges. The indictment charging unlawful transportation has been nol-prossed since and is not involved on this appeal.

Prior to the trial date of June 5, 1972, the defendant's motions to quash the indictments and to dismiss due to extensive preindictment and pretrial publicity; for a continuance for the same reason and to provide adequate time for trial preparation; and for a change of venue or a change of veniremen due to pretrial publicity, were all denied. His motion to suppress certain statements made by him to the police were also denied. A motion to suppress certain personal articles seized by the police was granted. During the trial, defendant's renewed motions to quash the indictments and to dismiss were denied. Defendant excepted to the court's rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence and to the denial of his motion to set aside the verdicts of guilty. His exceptions to all adverse rulings by the Trial Court (Dunfey, J.) were reserved and transferred.

At approximately 1:20 a.m. on February 16, 1972, an explosion occurred immediately outside the Manchester police station. About twenty minutes later a second explosion took place at the same location. One minute later a third explosion damaged the central fire station. Later that same morning a fourth unexploded bomb was discovered lodged on the outside window sill of the office of the chief of police. The three explosions inflicted substantial damages to both of these buildings.

After the first explosion two individuals, one wearing a tan raincoat, were observed running from the scene. A police [114 N.H. 797] officer on duty on Elm Street received a radio report of these events from the police station. Shortly thereafter he saw a man wearing a tan raincoat with his right hand in its pocket which was covered with blood. The officer asked him what happened and received the following response: 'He said that while getting into his car he tripped and he cut his hand on a beer bottle.' Another officer was summoned and the defendant was placed under arrest and taken to the police station for investigation. Meanwhile a police lieutenant examining the result of the first explosion had discovered an unexploded bomb in a bag on the sidewalk near the station. When defendant arrived at the station in the custody of these officers, the lieutenant testified that he gave the defendant the required 'Miranda' warnings and told him about his discovery. 'I told him that people might get hurt and asked him did he know how long it would be before that bomb went off.' The defendant 'told me in less than fifteen minutes.' The above were the statements involved in defendant's motion to suppress.

A probable cause hearing on the charges against the defendant was held in the Manchester District Court on February 25, 1972, and cause found. Indictments were returned by the grand jury at the April 1972 term of the superior court. Defendant's pretrial motions were heard on June 6, 1972. The selection of the jury with voir dire occurred on June 7 and 8 and was followed by the trial at which the defendant was found guilty. The main issues on this appeal are the propriety of (1) the denial of various motions of the defendant based on prejudicial media publicity, and (2) the denial of his motion to suppress the statements he made to the police officer before his arrest and thereafter to the lieutenant at the police station.

Regarding the first issue, defendant states in his brief that almost immediately after the release by the police regarding his arrest, he 'became the subject of continuous and widespread coverage by all factions of the news media, most notably, at least in terms of characterization, by the 'Manchester Union Leader'. This coverage

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continued increasingly up to and during . . . (his) trial. In terms of the extent of coverage, it is noted by way of example that local radio station WGIR [114 N.H. 798] in Manchester, New Hampshire, between February 16, 1972, the date of . . . arrest, and June 12, 1972, the date of verdicts, . . . aired forty-five (45) different news releases relating to . . . his alleged criminal activities.'

It is well established that due process requires that an accused must receive a trial by a fair and impartial jury. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 15; U.S.Const. Amends. VI, XIV; State v. Jackson, 69 N.H. 511, 512, 43 A. 749, 750 (1898); State v. Booton, 114 N.H. --, 329 A.2d 376 (decided Nov. 29, 1974); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Publicity about a case can result in two types of prejudice with regard to the accused's right to a fair trial. The first is inherent prejudice which exists when the publicity by its nature has so tainted the trial atmosphere that it will necessarily result in lack of due process. In such cases the defendant need not show actual identifiable prejudice. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); Calley v. Calloway, 382 F.Supp. 650 (D.Ga.1974); see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-543, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965). The second is actual prejudice which exists when the publicity has infected the jurors to such an extent that the defendant cannot or has not received a fair and impartial jury trial. In this situation the defendant must show that the nature of the opinions formed by the jurors as a result of the publicity are such that they cannot be set aside by the jurors to enable them to render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v....