State v. Ladd

• Decision Date: 06 December 1919
• Docket Number: No. 2575.,2575.
• Parties: STATE v. LADD et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

216 S.W. 1004

STATE v. LADD et al.

No. 2575.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 6, 1919.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Christian County; Fred Stewart, Judge.

Dewey Ladd and others were convicted of unlawfully disturbing a congregation met for religious worship, and they appeal. Affirmed, and certified to Supreme Court.

G. Purd Hays, of Ozark, for appellants. William L. Vandeventer, of Ozark, for the State.

FARRINGTON, J.

This case is brought here on the record proper by defendants, who were convicted in the Christian county circuit court.

The only error alleged by the appellants in this proceeding goes to the sufficiency of the information upon which a conviction Was based. The information is in the following language, omitting caption:

"William L. Vandeventer, prosecuting attorney within and for the county of Christian, in the state of Missouri, informs the court upon his official oath hereto attached that Dewey Ladd, Clarence Smith, Edd Nash, and Dutch Forgey, on or about the 16th day of March, 1919, in the said county of Christian, in the state of Missouri, did then and there unlawfully, willfully, maliciously, and contemptuously disturb and disquiet a congregation of people then and there met for religious worship, by then and there making a noise and by rude and indecent behavior within their place of worship and so near the same as to disturb the order and solemnity of the meeting, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state.

"William L. Vandeventer,

"Prosecuting Attorney."

—the specific ground of objection being that this information fails to allege that the congregation of people met for religious worship at a place set apart for religious worship or in a church. It will be observed that the information quoted is in the exact letter of the statute (section 4713, R. S. 1909).

In upholding the contention that this was a fatal defect, appellants cite us to the case of the State of Missouri v. Schieneman, 64 Mo. 386, in which case the court held that the indictment charging that a congregation had been disturbed which "met for religious worship, at the southeast corner of the public square in the city of Hannibal," was not a sufficient allegation in the indictment, as this act was intended to protect camp meetings held on a piece of ground set apart for that purpose, and assemblages gathered within a house or place of worship, and not public squares and streets, and in the course of the opinion stated that, if a portion of the public square were a place of worship, that fact should be made to distinctly appear in the indictment. The force of that opinion, as we interpret it, is that, where the indictment charges that the offense was committed on the public square or street, it indirectly charges that it did not occur at a place set apart for religious worship or in a church or building used for religious worship, and for that reason the indictment was held bad.

Based on the holding in this case, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in the case of State of Missouri v. Kindrick, 21 Mo. App. 507, reversed a judgment for conviction on an indictment which is practically the same as the information presented to us in the case at bar, and condemned such indictment because it did not allege that the disturbance took place at a place set apart for religious worship or a church or building used for such purpose. Following this decision, the same ruling has been made in State v. Ellis, 71 Mo. App. 269; State v. Stegall, 65 Mo. App. 243.

We are unable to agree with the decision of the St. Louis and Kansas City Courts of Appeal in the above cases cited, and do not believe that our decision is in conflict with the last ruling of the Supreme Court on the question in State v. Schieneman, 64 Mo. 386.

In the case at bar the information is drawn in the words of the statute, and, while it does not charge that the disturbance occurred at a place set apart for religious worship or in a church or building used for such purpose, it does not contain the charge that was contained in the Schieneman Case, which on its face would show that it was not at a place protected by the statute. In other words, we do not draw the deduction that the other Courts of Appeals have from the Schieneman Case; that is, that where on the face of the indictment the inference would be that it was not at a place set apart for religious worship, it must follow that, where an information fails to mention any specific place, it is fatally bad after verdict, and we hold that there is a sufficient averment or charge in this information such as would permit evidence on the trial to be introduced and to fix the disturbance as having happened at one of the protected places under the statute, where such evidence was received without objection and no point was raised on the sufficiency of the information until after verdict. The closing lines of the Schieneman Case, found on page 388, are:

"When the statute creates an offense, it is always safe for the pleader to charge it in the language of the statute."

Now, that is exactly what the prosecuting attorney did in this case. He followed the wording of the statute, and there is nowhere to be found in the statute any requirement, other than by inference, that it must have taken place at a place set apart, etc., and if that inference can be drawn from the wording of the statute, then the same inference can be drawn from the same wording in the information.

The rule is well settled in this state that the same strictness of pleading is not required in misdemeanors as in felonies. State v. Robertson, 262 Mo. loc. cit. 621, 172 S. W. 6; State v. Lynes, 194 Mo. App. 184, 185 S. W. 535.

It is held an information that follows the words of the statute is sufficient, in the case of State v. Taylor, 167 Mo. App. loc. cit. 108, 150 S. W. 1126; State v. Merget, 129 Mo. App. loc. cit. 48, 107 S. W. 1015; City of Eldorado v. Highfill, 268 Mo. 501, 188 S. W. 68.

We therefore hold that the information in this case is sufficient to sustain a conviction where no question is raised as to its sufficiency until after verdict. This ruling, being in conflict with the St. Louis Court of Appeals in its opinion as shown in State v. Kindrick, 21 Mo. App. 507, and with the Kansas City Court of Appeals in State v. Ellis, 71 Mo. App. 269, requires us under the Constitution to certify this cause to the Supreme Court for its final determination.

STURGIS, P. J.

I fully concur with the opinion of FARRINGTON, J., in this case. It is apparent that an indictment under section 4713, R. S. 1909, for disturbing a congregation met for religious worship is analogous to an...