State v. Ladiges
Decision Date | 07 November 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 37229,37229 |
Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Osmar LADIGES and Richard Ladiges, Petitioners. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Edward P. Reed, White Salmon, for petitioners.
Alf M. Jacobsen, Pros. Atty., Goldendale, for respondent.
June 25, 1963, Osmar Ladiges and Richard Ladiges were convicted of the crime of assault in the third degree in the Justice Court of Goldendale Precinct, Klickitat County, and sentenced to serve 30 days in the county jail. They immediately gave oral notice of appeal to the superior court, and deposited a cash bail and appeal bond as provided by law.
July 3, 1963, the justice of the peace filed a transcript of the justice court proceedings with the clerk of the Superior Court for Klickitat County, as provided by RCW 10.10.040. The justice of the peace mailed a copy to the attorney for the Ladigeses, but did not advise the attorney that he had filed the transcript in the superior court.
July 19, 1963, the prosecuting attorney moved to dismiss the appeal in the superior court for the reason that it had not been perfected, in accordance with the appeal time schedule provided by J Crim.R. 6.01 and 6.03.
July 22, 1963, the Ladigeses, in writing, requested the justice of the peace to prepare a supplemental transcript of the justice court proceedings. July 23, 1963, the request was denied.
August 2, 1963, the Ladigeses filed in the superior court a notice requesting that the case be set for trial at the next jury term.
August 2, 1963, the superior court granted the state's motion to dismiss the appeal, and remanded the cause to the justice court for execution of the sentences imposed.
Osmar and Richard Ladiges, by this certiorari proceeding, seek a review of the judgment of dismissal which denied them their right of appeal.
On June 25, 1963, the procedure for appeal of a criminal case to the superior court from the justice court was prescribed by statute.
RCW 10.10.010 provides:
(Italics ours.)
RCW 10.10.040 provides:
(Italics ours.)
The statutory procedure for the appeal of a criminal case on June 25, 1963, when petitioners gave their notice of appeal provided for an oral notice, a bond, and the prompt filing in the superior court of the transcript of the justice court proceedings. The setting of the cause for trial in the superior court, after perfection of the appeal, was governed by superior court rules. The record shows that oral notice of appeal was given immediately, the bond was approved and deposited, and the transcript filed in the superior court within eight days after the notice of appeal was given. The statutory appeal procedure was precisely followed, and the appeal effected. There is no contention that the request of August 2, 1963, for setting for a jury trial was not in conformity with superior court rules.
New rules for accomplishing an appeal from the justice court to the superior court became effective July 1, 1963.
J Crim.R. 6.01 provides:
J Crim.R. 6.02 provides:
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